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Abstract 
This thesis examines a group of television-makers that aimed to circumvent the regulations 
affecting standards of content and to reshape the boundaries of permissible violent content. It 
also examines the regulators who, in a period of significant regulatory restructuring, were 
required to police those boundaries and protect viewers from ‘harmful’ or ‘offensive’ content, 
and programme-contributors from ‘unfair’ treatment. 
 
In doing so, the aim is to offer a broader, empirically rich understanding of the individual, 
organisational and external factors that can lead to non-compliance and the relaxation of 
regulatory affairs over time; and to understand how rules or regulations can get pushed and 
reshaped. 
 
My findings revealed that both regulators and television-makers were confronted by conflicting 
economic and public interest objectives/responsibilities, and that, due to a variety of individual, 
organisational and external-level factors, they tended to prioritise their economic obligations, 
and this led to a loosening of the standards of consumer protection.  
 
The factors that influenced television-makers’ and regulators’ decision-making, and thereby 
this sequence of events, included, but were not limited to, the government’s shift toward 
deregulation, technological advancements, changing politics, a competitive organisational 
culture and a lack of sufficient accountability for television-makers.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Research summary 
 
This thesis examines a group of ‘tabloid’ entertainment television-makers who aimed to extend 
the boundaries of permissible violent content as a means of gaining ratings, on the one hand, 
and the regulators who were required to police those boundaries, on the other. My aim was to 
understand how the Office of Communications (Ofcom) approached the regulation and 
enforcement of standards affecting television content, and how television-makers responded in 
turn, at a monumental point in time when both the television market and the regulator were 
going through a period of significant and rapid change. Within this framework, I wanted to 
understand what factors influenced the way these actors behaved, and how their approaches, 
in turn, affected the state of television and regulatory affairs.  
 
What I found ultimately enabled me to contribute to our understanding of regulatory 
‘compliance’ and to the process of regulatory decline. It does so by addressing a current 
deficiency in the compliance literature by identifying not only the array of external, but 
organisational and particularly individual level factors that affect behaviour by regulatory actors, 
including, for instance, the cultures and understandings that operate within regulatory regimes. 
As an important, linked sub-theme, I also wished to understand how the boundaries of what is 
and can be shown on television have become consequently reshaped. This pertains to a wider 
discussion of the evolution of social, and in turn regulatory, boundaries.   
 
To understand the process of television-making and regulation enforcement, I traced the 
making of a single television series throughout its life-cycle – that is, being commissioned, 
researched, filmed and edited by a production company; ‘compliance-checked’ and broadcast 
by a broadcasting company; and examined for regulatory breaches by Ofcom – and analysed 
actors’ decision-making at every critical turning-point in the process. 
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Each of the actors involved in the creation and regulation process was confronted by conflicting 
economic and public interest objectives or obligations. For example, the producers and 
broadcasters wanted to increase audience ratings and this, in practice, sometimes interfered 
with their duty to comply with the ‘content standards’ regulations. The regulators were required 
by the Communications Act 2003 to develop and enforce television consumer protection 
policies (for example, to protect viewers from ‘harmful’ and ‘offensive’ content), yet they were 
also required to promote a thriving and competitive television industry; a requirement which, in 
practice, was sometimes at odds with consumers’ protection. 
 
My findings revealed that television-makers’ response to the conflict – which varied between 
out-rightly breaching the rules, practicing ‘creative compliance’1 and reshaping one’s 
interpretation of rules (what I shall refer to as ‘rule reinterpretation’) – was influenced by a 
variety of individual, organisational and external-level factors. The government’s widespread 
free-market ideology (which encouraged deregulation), technological advancements and 
market forces together led to a culture of competition in which the producers and broadcasters 
I examined claimed that they needed to push (or breach) regulatory boundaries in order to 
survive financially in the market.  
 
Further motivating their non-compliant behaviour, employees were burdened by intense 
working pressures, limited staff training, and tight time and budget restrictions. There was also 
a lack of transparency surrounding their production practices, and so producers (correctly) 
believed that much of their rule-breaking behaviour regarding ‘unethical’ production practices 
would go unnoticed and that they would escape penalty. Due to factors such as these, the 
television-makers I examined reshaped the frontiers of permitted violent content and infringed 
programme contributors’ rights to fair treatment in order to achieve ratings and meet tight 
deadlines.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX           TEXT OMITTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY PURPOSES        XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
                                                 
1
 Baldwin and Cave define ‘creative compliance’ as “the process whereby those regulated avoid having 
to break the rules and do so by circumventing the scope of a rule while still breaching the spirit of the 
rule” (1999: p. 102-103).  
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Setting the scene 
 
The television industry had grown significantly in the two decades prior to this research. For 
instance, as a result of new technology and changes in regulation, the United Kingdom had 
gone from broadcasting five television channels in the early 1980s to over 400 in 2007, while 
the independent production sector rose to over 800 production houses. Multichannel television 
was launched, along with an array of digital and ‘converged services’ (e.g. mobile television, 
television over the internet or IPTV). Globalisation turned the television market into an 
international playing field. Competition and the birth of new technologies had forced television-
makers to seek alternative revenue streams beyond that of advertising. And, the United 
Kingdom adopted the new regulatory requirements laid down by the European Union’s 
‘Audiovisual Media Services Directive’, a Directive that was, and still is, meant to oversee and 
‘harmonise’ the regulation of media content across the member states.  
 
These changes brought forth an array of challenges that the producers, broadcasters and 
regulators I examined had to face. For instance, regulators were presented with the task of 
determining how to: 
 
 regulate television content standards in a significantly expanded market; 
 regulate newly-converged services (e.g. television over the internet and mobiles); 
 preserve the future of public service broadcasting amidst the growing competition 
from commercial operators; and 
 deregulate/re-regulate the market in a manner consistent with wider political 
objectives. 
 
And television-makers had to: 
 
 gain/maintain audience share and generate new sources of revenue in the light of an 
increasingly competitive market; 
 produce programming on a limited and sometimes reduced budget; and  
 ensure the compliance of television products, including those made by external 
production companies. 
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In 2003 the UK’s regulatory structure underwent a dramatic change to tackle such changes in 
the market. The five former media and communications regulators – the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission (BSC), the Independent Television Commission (ITC), the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel), the Radio Authority (RAu) and the Radiocommunications Agency 
(RA) – were merged into one, the Office of Communications (Ofcom). I began my examination 
of Ofcom just seven months after its inception to examine how it regulated the market in light of 
these changes. 
 
Research objectives and intended contribution 
 
Regulations tend to be formed out of a demand from society – or from those who are treated 
as its representatives - to protect the population from social ills, such as environmental 
pollution, violence, discrimination and so forth (Erikson, 1966). These objectives are often 
cultivated into laws by government and then interpreted into practically applicable policies by 
regulators, who oversee their enforcement.     
 
In the United Kingdom the television ‘content standards’ regulations, in particular, were 
developed by regulators to protect viewers from ‘harmful’ and ‘offensive’ content, and 
programme contributors from ‘unfair’ treatment. These goals reflected the protectionist, social 
welfare-based ideology of the government and wider culture at play. 
 
I chose to analyse how Ofcom enforced its broadcast regulations at a unique time in history in 
which it took over former regulators’ roles and had to devise its own regulatory approach in 
light of the significant changes occurring in the market. I was therefore fortunate to be able to 
witness first-hand how a new system of regulation was implemented. I also examined how 
television companies responded to the regulations and form of enforcement to examine how 
these provisions unfolded in detail, as to identify if there was a gap or breakdown between 
Ofcom’s regulatory objectives and the results they achieved.  
 
As I did detect such a gap, since I found routine acts of non-compliance while working in the 
television industry which went undetected by the regulator, I went on to explore why this 
breakdown had occurred by looking at what individual, organisational and external level factors 
influenced the decisions of television-makers and regulators, and how their decisions in turn 
 11 
led to a weakness in regulatory enforcement. This thereby enabled me to add to our 
understanding of the features of ‘non-compliance’ and the nature of regulatory softening.  
 
I also examined, as a related sub-theme, how social and regulatory boundaries can become 
pushed and reshaped. In particular, this included a review of how the restrictions for 
permissible content had become relaxed. My research therefore contributes primarily to the 
sociology of regulation literature, and to a lesser extent, the sociology of deviance and control 
literature. By way of its very nature, it also adds original work to the sociology of media 
literature as a study of this kind has not been done before, as it simultaneously examines 
media regulation compliance from the perspective of both the regulator and the regulated, and 
offers a rare ethnographic examination from inside a regulatory body.  
 
In terms of my contribution to the sociology of regulation, at present the bulk of the compliance 
literature has focused on the external factors that shape actors’ compliance behaviour (e.g. 
competition, changing politics, etc.). More work needs to be done to explain the organisational, 
and particularly the individual, level factors that influence compliance decisions. I shall help 
contribute to this area by outlining not only a range of external, but organisational and 
individual level factors that affect regulated entities’ and regulators’ compliance approaches.  
 
Whilst doing so I shall compare and contrast my findings to the theoretical literature. At present 
there are a variety of theories used to explain individuals’ compliance behaviour, including why 
some choose to comply with the rules and others not. As I shall outline in the literature review 
(Chapter Two), these theories tend to fall broadly under three categories – why some 
individuals comply with the rules, why some are unwilling to comply and why some are unable 
to comply. Under these headings lie numerous theories, such as Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) 
‘amoral calculator’, ‘corporation as incompetent’ and ‘corporation as a citizen’ ideal-types, the 
‘opportunity perspective’ (Angenent and Geeraets, 1998), ‘social bonds’ theories (Huberts, 
1991), ‘legitimacy’ theory (Franck, 1988; Tyler, 1990; Sutinen, 1999) and many more. 
 
There are also a variety of theories that have been used to explain how regulation originates 
and develops over time, such as those listed under the theoretical labels of ‘public interest’, 
‘private interest’, ‘interest group’ and ‘institutional’ (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: p. 18-33).  
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My own research was conducted inductively, therefore I saturated myself in the different social 
worlds I examined and then used the literature as a resource or toolbox to help explain my own 
findings. In doing so, I found that no one compliance or regulatory development theory 
perfectly reflected my own findings. Rather, my findings reflected a mix of different theories and 
ideas, as well as containing some original observations not extant in the standard literature. In 
an attempt to stay truthful to my research and to describe my findings as accurately as 
possible, I therefore used the theoretical literature as a sounding board and reference point for 
the discussion of my own work, freely pulling from different relevant concepts.  
 
In other words, this thesis has not been designed specifically to test the effectiveness of pre-
existing theories, but rather to offer a rich empirical description of regulatory activities. In the 
process of discussing my findings, I however found some theories to be useful for the purpose 
of comparison and clarification, and therefore I am not only able to contribute to the field’s body 
of knowledge empirically but also, to a lesser extent, theoretically.  
 
A less emphasized contribution of this thesis will be to the sociology of deviance and control, 
as it includes a body of work that discusses how social (which can in turn be interpreted as 
regulatory) boundaries get pushed and relaxed. Given that my core focus is on non-compliance 
and the weakening of states of regulation, this topic is an obvious and fruitful extension to my 
own work and therefore I will explain the step-by-step process of how the television-makers I 
examined managed to extend the limits of permissible content. 
 
I shall also, as noted, contribute to the sociology of media literature by offering a candid look at 
regulators’ enforcement decisions, and television-makers’ production and compliance 
decisions. By adopting an ethnographic approach, I can reveal the rich complexity surrounding 
the factors that shape those decisions, thereby providing unique depth to our body of 
knowledge. The result enables me to address gaps in the media ‘gatekeeping’ literature.  
 
Shoemaker, the leading scholar of the gatekeeping approach – an approach which echoed my 
own research method – called for additional research to: a) examine the micro- and macro-
level factors that shape media practitioners’ decisions about content (with the greatest need to 
examine environmental factors), and b) make connections between the different levels of 
analysis. My examination of the individual, organisational and external elements that influence 
media practitioners’ decisions – and my method of making connections between factors across 
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these levels – fills this gap (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009; see also Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; 
Ferree et al, 2002; Benson and Neveu, 2005), (see Chapters Two and Three for a full 
discussion of gatekeeping).  
 
In sum, my core objective in this thesis is to offer a broader, empirically-rich explanation of the 
individual, organisational and external factors that can lead to an industry’s non-compliance 
and a weakened state of regulatory affairs. Secondarily, I will offer a reformulation of current 
regulatory theories to explain how limits of permissible behaviour can become extended, and to 
illuminate micro- and macro-level factors that shape media practitioners’ decisions about 
content. 
 
To make this research manageable and narrow my focus, I examined one particular area of 
television regulation – what is referred to in the industry as ‘negative’ content regulation. 
Content regulation comes in two forms – ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. Negative content regulation 
is based on consumer protection goals and encompasses the regulatory rules which define 
what broadcasters cannot do when developing or broadcasting a programme. For instance, 
broadcasters cannot transmit what is held to be “harmful” or “offensive” content, or treat 
programme contributors “unfairly”.2 
  
Positive content regulations, which I shall not be covering in this thesis, state what 
broadcasters must do. For instance, the public service broadcasters (PSBs) have a variety of 
quotas about the amount of news, children’s programming and independently produced 
content they must transmit. These quotas are imposed to ensure that the television market 
provides, for instance, sufficient quality, diversity, plurality and educationally-rich content. 
 
I have selected negative content regulation in particular because the television industry, like 
other industries such as telecommunications and the internet, has undergone numerous large-
scale changes in the last two decades (e.g. stemming from rapid growth, globalisation, 
technological advancement, changing politics, etc.). This placed (and continues to place) the 
regulator in the challenging position of determining how to address the issue of consumer 
protection in a widely expanded and liberalised market. It can be difficult for a regulator to 
adapt quickly and fully enough to address adequately these large-scale and on-going changes, 
and this can put it at greater risk of regulatory weakness. For instance, like the difficulty 
                                                 
2
 I will outline the negative content regulations more fully in Chapter Three. 
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associated with protecting consumers, and particularly children, from harmful and offensive 
content in the online realm, the television industry has expanded to the point where monitoring 
all the content that enters households is rather difficult. It was as a result important to 
investigate how Ofcom attempted to oversee and govern the rapidly changing market and how 
the industry responded in its turn. 
 
To explore this area, I gained employment at an independent television production company 
and at Ofcom to conduct ethnographies. I also interviewed various employees at a 
broadcasting company. This enabled me to carry out a three-part study which followed a single 
television series, and examined the step-by-step process of producing, broadcasting and 
regulation enforcement.  
 
I used a procedural approach that focused on understanding the factors that influenced 
regulators’ and television-makers’ decisions at the major turning points in their enforcement 
and compliance processes (see Shoemaker, 1991). Those who have adopted a similar 
approach have argued that in order to understand an end product, one must understand the 
sequence of critical decisions that went into creating it (see White, 1950 and the ‘gatekeeping’ 
approach). I therefore asked in particular: 
 
 what were producers’, broadcasters’, and regulators’ working objectives in relation to 
the production and regulation of content; 
 how they practically pursued these objectives; 
 what factors influenced the way they pursued these objectives; and 
 how their decisions and actions affected their regulatory compliance/enforcement, 
and the state of television and regulatory affairs. 
 
As noted, my aim was then to compare and contrast my findings to the regulatory literature to 
elaborate on our understanding of the nature of regulatory compliance and decline. This 
accumulative material may, in turn, be of interest to students, media-practitioners and policy-
makers with an interest in regulation, social control and/or the mass media. 
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Chapter outline 
 
This thesis will flow as follows. While this first chapter offered a summary of my study and 
outlined my research aims, Chapter Two will review the literature which touches on these 
themes, on the one hand, and, on the other, suggest how it may be amended by my own work. 
Chapter Three will provide a background understanding of the regulations governing television 
and how the industry has developed over time. Chapter Four will explain the methods I used to 
collect and analyse my data. These chapters represent the necessary preliminaries for 
understanding this study and therefore prepare the way for the more original ethnographic 
analysis that follows. 
 
Chapters Five to Seven represent the core chapters in the thesis – each being dedicated to a 
different sector in the industry and to each of my three linked case studies. The first follows the 
making of a television series at an independent production company. The second explains how 
the commissioning broadcaster dealt with the series’ compliance. Finally, the third explores 
how Ofcom enforced its television standards regulations and reviews how it assessed the 
compliance of the series I followed in the previous two chapters. The last chapter, Eight, 
concludes this thesis with highlights of my findings. 
 16 
Chapter 2 
Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
“Regulation refers to the use of the law to constrain and organize the activities of business and 
industry” (Hutter, 1997, p. 4). Those who devise and enforce regulations generally do so to 
implement greater political directives which are meant to achieve or prevent outcomes that 
might not otherwise be achieved if the market were left to its own accord. Thus, regulatory 
measures are used both to restrict or prevent the occurrence of socially undesirable behaviour 
by agencies, and to encourage and facilitate desirable behaviour.  
 
Regulation can take various forms, from ‘self regulation’ which refers to an industry that is 
policed by its own members, to ‘co-regulation’ whereby a government/regulator oversees 
organisational conduct jointly with the industry and/or interest groups, or to a ‘command and 
control’ style of enforcement whereby legal restrictions are issued and monitored by a 
government or regulator.  
 
These measures can themselves come in a variety of forms, from the allocation of specific 
rules that an industry must follow (e.g. directions to limit the amount of pollution a company 
can emit), to the introduction of means to influence business activity (e.g. the release of 
incentives such as taxes or subsidies, contractual powers or the deployment of resources), so 
as to promote the welfare of a market or the public. 
 
I have examined the television industry in the United Kingdom and its regulator, Ofcom. At the 
time, Ofcom was in the throes of deregulating the industry in order to take more of a co-
regulatory approach, in relation to its adoption and enforcement of the television content 
standards rules.  
 
As my thesis examined the regulators’ method of enforcing these rules and television-makers’ 
approach to complying (or not complying) with them, I shall focus on three distinct areas of the 
sociology of regulation literature in this chapter. I shall begin by outlining the basic structure of 
the two main regulation enforcement models used in Britain today – the ‘compliance’ and the 
‘deterrence’ models – as a precursor for understanding the field.  
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I shall then describe the theoretical background of two common responses found within the 
compliance literature regarding why the regulated can fail to comply with rules. Generally 
speaking, they consist of reasons for why some regulated entities are unable to comply and 
why others are unwillingly to comply, either due to a principled disagreement with the rules or 
the positioning of personal interests above regulatory interests (see for example, Kagan and 
Scholz, 1984; DiMento, 1989; Vaughan, 1996; OECD, 2000, etc).3  
 
I shall then offer a general explanation of the ‘public interest’, ‘private interest’ and ‘institutional’ 
theories, as they attempt to explain: the reasoning behind why regulation is imposed (i.e. who 
are regulators trying to benefit when intervening in an industry and why); and how and why 
states of regulation evolve in particular directions (i.e. why do some regulatory bodies fail to 
meet their objectives, why do some become ‘captured’, etc). 
 
Within these broad theoretical labels there are multitude of theories used to explain compliance 
behaviour, and the origination and evolution of regulation. I conducted my fieldwork inductively 
(as so-called historical institutionalists often do) and so I collected my findings, and then 
compared and contrasted them to the findings/theories of others to see which applied best, and 
thus offered the greatest assistance in helping me to describe my own research. I was 
therefore able to write this literature review in such a way that only those concepts that were 
useful to my own work are reviewed, while unrelated ideas have been excluded for the 
purposes of clarity and brevity.4  
 
It is important to note however when reading this chapter that theories (such as the ones that I 
will discuss) are often generalised and simplified for the purpose of illustration and usability. In 
practice, social behaviour, in its complexity, rarely reflects a single pattern as every individual is 
different and therefore people can behave in diverse ways. Many researchers, like me, 
therefore rely on the literature as a starting point for describing one’s own findings, freely 
pulling from and building on to, the ideas of others in a manner that reflects more realistically 
the complexity and distinctiveness of particular examples of human interaction. Therefore, one 
                                                 
3
 Encompassed within these broad categories are a number of theories that have been generated to 
explain a variety of complex and interconnected compliance behaviours. For the purpose of brevity, I 
shall focus only on those theories that are most dominant in the field or that best contributed to the 
explanation my own findings. 
4
 For those readers who have a wider interest in the subject matter, beyond that which is purposeful for 
this thesis, I have provided some further description in the footnotes. 
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should bear in mind when reading this section that the ideas discussed are not to be 
understood as if they were concrete rules, but rather concepts that I have drawn from loosely 
and pragmatically. 
  
Finally, while the focus of my thesis is on regulation and is thereby centred within this body of 
literature, there are aspects of my work that cross over into the sociology of deviance and 
control, and the sociology of media fields. I therefore felt it important to include a description of 
the related sections of this work. To illustrate, my thesis is on television regulation enforcement 
and compliance, and how the boundaries of permissible behaviour become extended over 
time. The sociology of deviance and social control has offered interesting insight into the 
testing of social boundaries and so I will furnish a few key ideas from this literature that I will 
draw from in later chapters. Similarly, the regulation enforcement literature offers few examples 
about the television industry, and so it was useful to turn to the media literature (and 
specifically to the gatekeeping literature) to better understand how different factors/constraints 
influenced the way media-practitioners operated and shaped media content. 
 
 
The compliance and deterrence regulation enforcement models 
 
Generally speaking there are two different models of rule enforcement which are used to 
ensure that industry players or social bodies comply with the rules – the compliance or 
‘cooperative’ approach and the ‘deterrence’ approach.5 In the following I shall review the 
general features of both models, as Ofcom’s approach constituted a hybrid of them, and then I 
shall move on to a discussion of the compliance-related literature, which describes businesses’ 
frequently used rationales towards compliance. 
 
Features of the compliance or ‘cooperative’ model 
 
The principal objective of the cooperative approach is to secure compliance with the law “by 
taking action to prevent potential law violations without the necessity to detect, process and 
penalize violators” (Reiss, 1984: p. 23). The compliance system is therefore premonitory – 
                                                 
5 Compliance is defined as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour and a 
specified rule” (Raustiala 2000, p. 388). It should be viewed as a process of interaction and negotiation 
between regulators and industry members whereby results are achieved over a long period of time 
through the use of various techniques employed to encourage conformity (e.g. negotiation, education, 
direction, threats, penalties) (Di Mento 1986; Hutter, 1997). 
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when faced with a potential violation, rule-enforcers will attempt to prevent its occurrence 
(Reiss, 1984). 
 
This system is based on assumptions about the usefulness of cooperation and conciliation, 
and practitioners’ use of means such as bargaining and incentives or awards (Reiss, 1984), 
restorative shaming, praise (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; 1994), persuasion, education and 
negotiation to achieve conformity (Hutter 1989). To support the monitoring of the industry, 
regulators in this enforcement tradition build relationships with the regulated which are 
premised on trust and communication (Reiss 1984; DiMento, 1989). 
 
The system is therefore more concerned with managing people in an effort to achieve short- 
and long-term compliance objectives than with enforcement (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 
1996; see also Hutter 1989). Those who work in this fashion rarely impose the formal law (or 
sanctions); rather they use it as a threat or as a last resort to encourage compliance. If a 
penalty is imposed, it is typically after a long period of unsuccessful negotiations, and can be 
viewed by the regulator as a failure on its behalf to secure conformity.  
 
The underlying working belief associated with the cooperative approach is that people want to 
comply with the rules. This might be due to a sense of duty, a respect for authority, a belief in 
the purpose of the rules or a desire to maintain a positive reputation. For example, in a study of 
fishermen, Sutinen (1999) found that individuals complied with the rules because of a feeling of 
moral obligation, and a perception that the authorities and their rules were legitimate and fairly 
enforced. Similarly, in their study of music piracy, Wingrove, Korpas and Weisz (2011) found 
that many individuals’ actions were driven by a general feeling of obligation to obey the law.  
        
When individuals are assumed to have such a rule-abiding character, it is argued that the 
cooperative style can prove more successful than a more penal-based approach (May, 2005). 
Some furthermore contend that the use of threats and legal coercion may actually be 
ineffective or counter-productive if companies are unable to follow the rules due to reasons 
such as capacity issues (because, for example, of a shortage of resources or staff) or political, 
social or economic limitations (that is, if they lack the needed financial capacity or have 
experienced organisational changes which prevent their compliance) (Tallberg 2002; Murphy, 
2004). It is also thought by some that a heavy-handed approach may alienate the regulated 
and therefore not breed cooperation. For reasons like these, various researchers have found 
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the cooperative approach to yield better results than the deterrence approach (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982; Kelman, 1982; Scholz 1991).  
 
Given the belief of adopters of this approach that regulated bodies essentially wish to comply 
with the rules, acts of non-compliance are generally deemed unintentional and thought to stem 
from: an ambiguity of the rules; bodies’ misunderstanding the rules/lack of education; a 
contesting of the basis of the rules; political, economic and resource limitations; or 
administrative breakdowns (see Tallberg 2002; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996; Chayes and 
Chayes, 1993; Hutter, 2001; Worsfold, 2001; Nadler, 2002; Braithwaite, 2004; Ahmed and 
Braithwaite, 2005, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2006; Footer 2008; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; 
Nguyen, 2011; Sarkheyli et al 2011; Vassiliki et al 2011). 
 
To address these issues and encourage compliance, enforcers often help companies to 
understand better the rules. They promote transparency surrounding regulatory and business 
practices (Tallberg 2002) and offer financial and technical assistance (Downs, Rocke and 
Barsoom 1996). 
 
Through such measures, the cooperative approach can: reduce expensive enforcement costs, 
such as high legal and monitoring fees; overcome challenges associated with ambiguous rules; 
and make firms more willing than they might otherwise be under the deterrence approach to 
share information about new problems, thereby saving on the cost of monitoring actors 
(Scholz, 1984). 
 
Alongside these positive features are also the limitations associated with the cooperative 
approach. Scholz (1984) claimed that it is only effective when applied to companies whose 
staff want to comply with the law, not for those that wish to evade the rules or practise ‘creative 
compliance’ (Burby and Paterson, 2007). Veljaovsky (1983) argued that the approach can 
decrease a company’s incentive to comply with the rules due to a diminished fear of penalties 
for non-conformity. Others have argued that regulators can focus so much on cooperating with 
businesses that they lose sight of their key objectives (as was argued about the FSA in regards 
to the 2007 economic recession) (Sabatier 1975; Scholz 1984; Kagan 1994).  
 
Together this supports Hawkins’ (1990) claim that the cooperative approach can give 
companies greater room than the deterrence approach to reduce regulatory standards. To 
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explain further, while there is little leniency extended towards the interpretation of rules in the 
deterrence approach, there is a considerable amount of negotiation and compromise 
associated with the cooperative approach, thereby supposedly allowing companies more room 
to reduce regulatory standards. Due to such issues, a more deterrence-oriented approach is 
deemed appropriate when overseeing individuals who are considered prone to non-compliance 
(Scholz, 1984; Tallberg, 2002).  
 
Features of the deterrence model 
 
The principal objective of the deterrence-based enforcement approach, by contrast, is to 
secure compliance by detecting violations and penalising offenders, so as to discourage further 
offences (Reiss, 1984). Monitoring and sanctions are therefore its two key aspects (Tallberg 
2002). “Monitoring increases transparency and exposes possible defectors. Sanctions raise the 
costs of shirking and make non-compliance a less attractive option” (Tallberg, 2002: p. 612). 
 
Unlike the cooperative approach, a deterrence-based system solely responds to violations after 
they have occurred. When faced with a potential issue, operators of this model, such as the 
police, mobilize their detection forces to await the violation and reprimand the offender (Reiss, 
1984). They tend to be “accusatory and adversarial”, and routinely rely on formal legal 
processes and punishments (Reiss, 1984, p. 13). In Scholz’s words “Officials interpret 
regulations stringently and apply them with bureaucratic literalness” (1984: p. 387).  
 
In contrast to those who espouse the cooperative approach, people who promote the 
deterrence approach believe it useful to conceive actors as rational beings who weigh the 
costs and benefits of compliance before acting (Tallberg 2002), echoing standard rational 
choice and economic models of action (e.g. Becker, 1968). Acts of non-conformity are 
understood to occur when actors believe that the incentives to skirt around the rules exceed 
the perceived likelihood of getting caught and the size of the penalty. There may also be wider 
punitive politics in play regarding the selection of this approach, as some would argue that the 
cooperative approach is too soft.  
 
Rule enforcers who choose this approach therefore view individuals as potentially wilful 
violators who may infringe the rules because of, for instance, a lack of belief in the underlying 
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purpose of the rules or a desire to place alternative interests above compliance requirements 
(Tallberg, 2002). 
 
Regulators seek typically to address such compliance problems by strengthening their 
detection facilities, and by threatening and invoking penalties. Some bodies also publicise the 
sanctions they levy to deter future offences. This method is believed to reap various benefits. 
The regulators’ use of monitoring can allow them to stay abreast of companies’ activities. If 
members of companies do not display evidence of an obligation to comply with the rules, the 
threat of sanctions can provide them with such an incentive. Sanctioning can also be an 
effective tool to deter future violators and save on the cost of additional enforcement (Hutter, 
1989).  
 
There are also limitations associated with a deterrence-base approach (Balch 1980; Burby and 
Paterson 1993). For the approach to be most effective, it requires regulators to watch 
continually over companies to detect violations and enforce sanctions. This can be costly and 
time-consuming, and “the overzealous use of deterrence can foster resentment and retaliation, 
leading regulated groups to apply political pressure to reduce enforcement or repeal the 
offending regulatory program” (Burby and Paterson 1993: p. 756; see also Hawkins, 1990; 
Danaceau, 1982; Shover, Clelland and Lynxwiler, 1986).  
 
The approach can lead the offender to feel alienated and make him or her less willing to co-
operate (Rock, 1973). It can also lead to a reduction in shared information, a legalistic attitude 
toward simply meeting minimal compliance standards, and regulatory tactics that pursue 
breaches that are the easiest, and not necessarily the most important, to prosecute (Hawkins, 
1990).  
 
Scholz (1984) furthermore argued that the deterrence approach does not address the full 
plethora of reasons for actors’ non-compliance. For instance, it excludes the notion that some 
people are rule-abiding in nature and believe in the benign purpose of the rules (Kinsey, 
Grasmick and Smith 1991; Wenzel, 2002; Murphy, 2002, 2003).  
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A mixture of the deterrence and cooperative models 
 
Given the complexity of individuals’ compliance behaviour and the high costs that can be 
associated with enforcement administration, many rule enforcers adopt a mixture of the 
cooperative and deterrence enforcement models (Hawkins and Thomas, 1984). The strategy 
they select may be influenced by a variety of factors including: the nature (and ‘seriousness’) of 
the offences they encounter; the political atmosphere within which they operate; the formal 
powers they are given; their organisation’s internal leadership; the constraints they face; and 
the resources they possess (Kagan, 1984; Hawkins, 2002; Tallberg 2002).6  
 
Bardach and Kagan (1982) claimed that many regulatory officials adopt a “flexible” approach 
whereby compliance failures are handled on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the severity 
of the offence, and the apparent stance of the offender, the agency may either be 
accommodating and helpful or tough and legalistic. For instance, in a study of coal mine safety 
regulation, Braithwaite (1985) found that a mix of a flexible, cooperative enforcement approach, 
backed by the threat of heavy penalties was more effective than either “legally toothless or 
legalistic oriented methods” (p. 390). Tallberg (2002) furthermore found that the European 
Union successfully used a mixed model which emphasized rule clarification, forms of 
monitoring that promoted transparency and sanctions as a last resort. 
 
May and Winter (1999) promoted a flexible “tit-for-tat” enforcement style, whereby regulators 
start by being cooperative and trusting, using incentives to encourage compliance, and turn to 
more punitive measures when compliance is not achieved (p. 628; see also Baldwin and Black, 
2008). They suggest that sanctions be imposed frequently enough to establish that the agency 
will readily apply force should compliance not be achieved; however, they deemed too much 
coercion to be unnecessary and counter-productive. Kagan (1984) refers to this as the “welfare 
maximising”7 style whereby regulators “avoid both excessive leniency and excessive 
stringency, considering both costs and benefits in applying regulations” (p. 389).  
 
The underlying commonality between many of these mixed models is that regulators 
encourage cooperation and negotiation, wishing to provide flexibility to those who try to comply 
                                                 
6 Baldwin and Black (2008) furthermore noted that rules enforcers may be tied to a certain compliance 
approach because of  “their own organisational resources, tools, cultures and practices and the 
constraints of the broader institutional environment” (p. 64). 
7
 “Welfare” in this sense refers to the social good. 
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with the rules. However, when these methods fail, they resort to formal legal measures (Kagan 
1984; Sutinen 1999).8 They tend to reserve these sanctions as a ‘last resort’ for the firms who 
are responsible for routine and/or serious breaches (Scholz 1991; Hawkins, 2002: p. 41, 2003).  
 
To bring further clarity to the variety of mixed models enforcers use, Hutter (1989) outlined two 
general types of enforcement – the ‘insistent’ and the ‘persuasive’ approach. The insistent 
approach possesses elements of both the cooperative and deterrence models, yet leans 
toward the deterrence style, while the persuasive approach places greater emphasis on 
cooperation, viewing the imposition of a sanction as a failure on the part of the regulator to gain 
conformity (p. 154, 161). 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) offered a different perspective on the matter by outlining what 
they referred to as a ‘sanctions pyramid’ (Figure 1). This form of ‘responsive regulation’ is a ‘tit 
for tat’ approach whereby regulators often begin with the use of light measures to gain 
compliance, such as educating, advising and negotiating with regulated entities. If these 
measures do not achieve conformity, regulators turn to more heavy-handed measures, from 
sending warnings, to imposing penalties (e.g. fines) and finally to suspending or revoking 
companies’ licences to operate.  
 
Figure 1: The Sanctions Pyramid 
Licence Revocation
------------------------------------------------------
Licence Suspension
------------------------------------------------------
Penalties
------------------------------------------------------
Warnings
------------------------------------------------------
Persuasion
 
 
                                                 
8
 Kagan (1984) stated: “A compliance system is associated with trust between the regulator and 
regulated where trust is necessary to carry out the principal functions of monitoring and the prevention 
of regulatory offence…When the process fails to build trust, however, there is likely to be greater resort 
to a deterrence system – the use of penalties based upon assumptions of blameworthiness” (p. 15-16).  
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While some individuals are considered “hard targets” who cannot be deterred by the heaviest 
of penalties, others are thought to be “vulnerable targets” who can be deterred by penalties, or 
“soft targets”, who can be deterred by shame alone or the mere recognition of their failure to 
comply (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993; pgs. 73, 220). The pyramid approach is useful because it 
ensures that less intrusive and more cooperative (and often more cost-effective) means can be 
used initially without compromising the possibility of employing harsher tactics for those more 
resistant to compliance. These benefits have led it to be used across a variety of fields 
including pharmaceutical safety, nursing home regulation, coal mine safety, environmental 
regulation, occupational health and safety, and construction industry safety (Braithwaite, 1984; 
1985; Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; 1994; Gunningham, 
1994; Rees, 1994; Haines, 1997). 
  
Over a decade after Ayres and Braithwaite’s original discussion of this form of ‘responsive’ 
regulation, Baldwin and Black (2008) added to their work by presenting the concept of ‘really 
responsive’ regulation, whereby “regulators have to respond not merely to firms’ compliance 
responses but also to their attitudinal settings (or opinions towards) the broader institutional 
environment of the regulatory regime; to the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; 
to the regime’s own performance; and finally to changes in each of these elements” (p. 69). 
This included the need for regulators to take account of and adapt to: the understandings and 
cultures that operate within regulated agencies; the tensions, constraints and opportunities that 
individuals grapple with in these organisational environments; the logic surrounding different 
organisational tools and strategies; the regulators’ own performance; and the “movements in 
regulatory priorities, circumstances and objectives” (p. 73). These elements are meant to feed 
into the regulators’ choice of compliance approach. 
 
Another extension to the sanctions pyramid came with the introduction of second and third 
party entities being used as regulatory tools. Rather than regulators being the sole entities 
used to secure compliance, second-parties (regulated entities themselves) and third-parties 
(commercial and non-commercial entities, including civil society, activist groups, etc.) also 
became used to promote compliance (Ayres, and Braithwaite, 1992). 
 
Baldwin (2004) furthermore argued, in light of his evidence that the United Kingdom had drifted 
into a climate of more punitive regulation enforcement stemming from the approach espoused 
by the Tony Blair administration, that regulators may benefit from adopting a ‘proactive’ 
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enforcement approach. This might include, for instance, ‘meta-regulation’, which seeks “to link 
legal sanctioning to broader corporate incentive regimes and involve demands that companies 
themselves generate explicit assurances on how they will proceed towards compliance,” (p 
382). Baldwin, however, noted that such proactive approaches, again, need to be applied with 
due consideration given to the propensity of individual firms to comply willingly. 
  
The compliance literature 
 
Let me now review in greater depth the compliance-based literature. It explains the behavioural 
patterns associated with companies’ rule compliance. It was a body of work that helped me to 
compare my findings with those of other researchers in my effort to understand what, if 
anything, was distinctive of the regulatory modes I had studied.  
 
Regulatory compliance is defined as “obedience by a target population with regulatory rules or 
with government policy objectives” (OECD, 2000: p. 66). Various strands of social science 
have evaluated individuals’ compliance behaviour in different ways. Law and economics 
scholars have undertaken cost/benefit-oriented analyses regarding compliance decisions (e.g. 
Becker 1968; Stigler, 1970), sociologists have looked at the cultures and social norms 
surrounding compliance decisions (e.g. Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; DiMento, 1989; Vaughan, 
1996; Hutter, 2001; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007) and psychologists have examined how 
individuals’ personal traits have influenced their compliance behaviour (e.g. Brehm & Brehm, 
1981; Jenkins 1994). 
 
In an attempt to clarify and categorise these trains of thought, Kagan and Scholz (1984) 
outlined three commonly used theoretical descriptions to explain what they perceived, and 
other researchers have found, to be companies’ general attitudes towards compliance 
(whether that be for or against conformity) and their reasoning behind non-conformity. They 
also proposed ways in which regulators could respond to businesses based on their behaviour. 
Their typology encompasses numerous researchers’ findings, and although it is a relatively 
simple description, it has remained applicable throughout the years and serves as a good 
starting point for understanding common strands of compliance behaviour. 
  
It should, however, be noted that these behavioural descriptions are generalised for the 
purposes of simplification and illustration, and that it is broadly understood that regulated 
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entities can express a mix of behaviours which are better reflected by a hybrid model that 
intertwines relevant themes from each ideal-type to meet the peculiarities of individual cases. 
 
The following outlines the three ideal-types, and as a means to show how our knowledge of 
compliance has advanced since these ideas were presented in 1984, it reviews more recent 
literature to offer a more sophisticated understanding of the subject-matter.   
 
Non-compliance related to an unwillingness to comply with the rules 
 
The first form of non-compliance that I shall discuss stems from a company’s ‘unwillingness’ to 
comply with the rules. Kagan and Scholz termed companies with such a characteristic as 
‘amoral calculators’. In their (albeit generalised) description, they state: “Motivated entirely by 
profit-seeking, companies carefully and completely assess opportunities and risks. They 
disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of being caught are small in relation 
to the profits to be garnered through disobedience” (Kagan and Scholz, 1984: p. 67).  
 
The idea of the amoral calculator reflects the logic behind the sociology-based rational choice 
theory (Hechter, 1987; Friedman and Hechter, 1988; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Eggert and 
Lokina, 2010; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 2011). The one distinction is “When decision-
makers' calculations of costs and benefits are tainted by self-interest, economics, or politics so 
that intentional wrongdoing and/or harm result, their calculation becomes amoral” (Vaughan, 
1998: p. 1-2). 
 
One of the most seminal works surrounding this rationale choice approach came from Becker 
(1968) who proposed a framework for explaining criminal behaviour. He argued that regulated 
entities do not comply with the regulations when the benefits of infringement are greater than 
the costs (see also Stigler, 1970; Ehrlich, 1972; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Nguyen, 2011).  
 
Such a calculus can be framed in a variety of ways depending upon how one perceives the 
nature of costs and benefits (Vaughan 1998). Where economic theorists have used this model 
to explain how money and the market have influenced the production, distribution and 
consumption of services and goods, rational choice theorists have employed this principle 
more broadly to understand how matters such as reputation (Grasmick and Bursik 1991), 
personal norms and organisational contexts (Li, Zhang and Sarathy, 2010) and individuals’ 
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attitudes and sense of morality (Sutinen 1999, Braithwaite 2002) can influence decision-making 
in different environments. In line with this, social bonds theories have looked at gains and 
losses in the social sphere, such as how non-compliance can stem from individuals feeling 
alienated in society (Humberts, 1991). These theories have helped to extend our knowledge 
beyond the limitations associated with economic-based theories. 
 
Still further, the ‘opportunity perspective’, which emphasizes the features of a compliance-
related situation, argues that people will break rules when opportunities arise for them to get 
away with it and lend them to believe that they will not suffer negative repercussions for their 
actions (Angenent & Geeraets, 1998). In accordance with this concept, Coffee (1981) and the 
Australian Tax Office (1998) found that deterrence rates increase when the gains of non-
compliance are high and the probability of getting caught is low (see also Abusin and Hassan, 
2011; Khanna and Widyawati, 2011; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 2011; Wingrove, Korpas and 
Weisz, 2011). In other words, rules are less effective if organisations’ compliance is not 
adequately monitored (see also Gray and Scholz, 1991; US Department of Labor, 1996; 
Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Khanna and Widyawati, 2011; Nguyen, 2011). Similarly, 
organisations’ rule adherence can also be affected by their awareness of other firms in the 
industry which have faced punitive damages for non-compliance (Baldwin, 2004).  
 
Compliance decisions have furthermore been found to be influenced by cultural norms. The 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1997, 2000) found that 
compliance levels are lower when rules conflict with cultural norms and practices, or when 
there is an underlying social acceptance of deviant behaviour (see also Gilboy, 1998; Hutter 
2001; Job Stout and Smith, 2007; Wikström, 2010).  
 
All of these unique reasons offered to explain companies’ wilful disregard for the rules are 
important because they help to relay my own findings. 
 
Further to these compliance justifications, Kagan and Scholz (1984) argued that when 
regulators view the bodies they oversee as ‘amoral calculators’ they should serve as strict 
‘policemen’. Undeterred by companies’ manipulation or excuses, regulators should 
aggressively inspect the firms and impose considerable penalties for non-compliance. In other 
words, they are encouraged to adopt a largely deterrence-based approach to rule enforcement, 
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which focuses on the “certainty, severity, celerity and uniformity” of sanctions (DiMento, 1989: 
p. 225; Friedrichs, 1996). 
 
In support of this approach, Slapper and Tombs (1999), radical theorists who looked at the 
political economy of corporate crime, took companies to be powerful entities that tried to co-opt 
or ‘capture’ the regulator and thereby manipulate the regulations, and avoid sanctions, 
penalties and negative publicity. Following Kagan and Scholz, they advocated a more punitive, 
deterrence-based approach (see also Pearce and Tombs 1990; Slapper 2000).  
 
Non-compliance related to a lack of support for the rules or regulatory approach 
 
In a second line of rationale, companies are viewed as generally compliant entities. However, 
on occasion they may abscond from conforming when they have a principled disagreement 
with the rules or the regulators’ approach to enforcement.   
 
In this model the regulators view the bodies they regulate as ‘good’ rather than ‘bad apples’ 
(Hawkins and Hutter 1993). Kagan and Scholz (1984) argue that in such cases it can be 
helpful to adopt a more cooperative based approach, as depicted by their ‘corporation as a 
citizen’ ideal-type (see also Bardach and Kagan 1982; Hawkins 1990; Braithwaite and Makkai 
1994). 
 
In this formulation, the company is pictured by the regulator as a “political citizen, ordinarily 
inclined to comply with the law, partly because of a belief in the rules of law, partly as a matter 
of long-term self-interest” (Kagan and Scholz, 1984: p. 76). Such compliance-oriented 
behaviour is, however, contingent. “Business managers have strong views as to proper public 
policy and business conduct. At least some law breaking stems from a principled disagreement 
with the regulations or orders they regard as arbitrary or unreasonable” (Kagan and Scholz, 
1984: p. 76-78). For instance, individuals might lose confidence in regulators if they are 
required to comply with complicated, overly legalistic rules that do not appear to hold any 
substantive purpose (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Anderson, 
1998). Compliance has also been shown to weaken when people feel that the regulator is 
treating them unfairly or when they believe that the regulator has deemed them to be 
untrustworthy (Braithwaite, 1985; Kinsey, 1992; Paternoster, et al 1997; Sherman, 1993; 
Nadler, 2002; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005; 2007). 
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The ‘corporation as a citizen’ ideal-type invokes two types of motivation to comply. The first is 
an interest in complying with the rules because of a personal sense of moral obligation. 
Individuals, it is held, “subscribe to the societal norms of good citizenship and lawful behaviour” 
(Burby and Paterson, 1993: p. 756). They behave according to what they consider to be moral 
and just, and abide by rules that they believe are appropriate and fair (Sutinen, 1999; see also 
Tyler, 1990).  
 
How individuals develop their sense of morality and attitudes towards compliance is reviewed 
within the psychology literature, which uses cognitive and social learning theory to explain the 
socialisation process. Cognitive theory emphasizes how the stages of individuals’ personal 
development shape their morals, and how this in turn affects their attitudes towards compliance 
(Sutinen, 1999: p. 179; see also Kohlberg, 1969, 1984; Levine and Tapp 1997).  
 
Social learning theory (which is more pertinent to my research) focuses on how individuals’ 
compliance is influenced by the features of their environment (Bandura, 1969; Akers, 1985), 
such as their peers’ opinions and social pressures, their organisational culture, consumer 
response and the media’s influence (Hutter, 2001; Hutter and Jones, 2007; Job, Stout and 
Smith, 2007). These external elements are believed to shape individuals’ behaviour through, 
for instance, their interest in protecting their reputation (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; 
Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Parker, 2002; Gunningham et al 2005), in sustaining their social 
bonds with their peers (Hirschi, 2002) or in gaining status and rewards (Sutinen 1999) (see 
also Downes and Rock, 1996). This lends itself to Kagan and Scholz’s idea that conformity not 
only stems from individuals’ belief in the rules, but also from their long-term self interest. 
 
The second motivation for conformity stems from a feeling of obligation to obey a “legitimate” 
authority (Sutinen 1999; Nadler 2002; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005, 2007; Wingrove, Korpas 
and Weisz, 2011). To achieve legitimacy, and therefore compliance, it is argued that regulators 
must: be effective in achieving their policy aims; treat those affected by the regulatory process 
fairly (which is in line with ‘procedural justice’); distribute the rewards or sacrifices associated 
with the regulatory process fairly (‘distributional justice); and operate in a fast and efficient 
manner, quickly addressing problems as they arise (Franck, 1988; Tyler, 1990; Sutinen 1999).  
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These actions are believed to breed the support of regulated bodies, which will presumably 
adhere to the rules because their members believe in the purpose of the regulator and the 
rationale for the rules, and they feel that they are being treated fairly and can see the positive 
outcomes associated with regulatory interventions (Sutinen, 1999).  
 
Lind and Tyler (1988) and Tyler and Blader (2000), for instance, found evidence that 
individuals who believe they are being treated fairly by rule-enforcers are more likely to trust 
them, accept their decisions and follow their directions (see also Folger and Konovsky, 1989; 
Levi, 1998; Tyler, 1997; Nadler 2002; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005, 2007). Similarly, Tyler 
(1990) and Koh (1998) found that individuals comply when they internalize the norms 
associated with the rules and believe in the underlying purposes of the rules (see also 
transnational legal process theory). Similarly, Tyler and Smith (1998) found that individuals are 
more likely to challenge authorities if they believe that their procedures are unfair.   
 
Kagan and Scholz (1984) argued that if companies display these ‘citizenship-like’ qualities, 
then the regulator should play the role of a ‘politician’ and focus on reasoning with and 
persuading companies to agree with the rationality of the rules. Regulators, they say, should be 
responsive to companies’ complaints and ready to adapt the rules when faced with legitimate 
business concerns. Cooperation, negotiation and trust should therefore take precedence over 
a sanction-based approach.9  
 
Non-compliance related to an inability to comply with the rules 
 
The final line of thought that I shall discuss relates to companies’ inability to comply with the 
rules. Referred to as ‘corporation as incompetent’, this ideal-type focuses on businesses’ 
inability to adhere to the requirements due to organisational and managerial inadequacies:  
 
The business firm is seen by the regulator as inclined to obey the law but as a 
potentially fallible or organisationally incompetent entity. Many violations of 
regulations are attributed to organisational failures – corporate managers fail to 
oversee subordinates adequately, to calculate risks intelligently, to establish 
organizational mechanisms that keep all operatives abreast and attentive to the 
growing dictates of the law” (Kagan and Scholz, 1984: p. 68). 
 
                                                 
9
 This approach relates to Gromley’s (1998) finding that regulators are less likely to punish those 
that they believe are behaving admirably (p. 367). 
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This corresponds with the thinking within the ‘management school of compliance’ and the 
organisational process model, as non-compliance is seen to stem from administrative 
breakdowns, rule ambiguity or capacity limitations (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Downs, Rocke, 
Barsoom, 1996; Nguyen, 2011). 
 
Genn (1987), for example, found that there was a widespread lack of knowledge about 
regulations among the businesses she investigated in England and Wales. Similarly, the 
Robens Report (1972, para 261), which reviewed British factory legislation, noted that rule 
infringements typically occurred “through carelessness, oversight, lack of knowledge or means, 
inadequate supervision or sheer inefficiency” (see also Williamson 1975; Hopkins, 1995; 
Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2004; Feld and Frey, 2006; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Nguyen, 2011; 
Sarkheyli, et al 2011; Tabrizian, et al 2011).  
 
Winter and May (2001), who investigated Danish farmers’ compliance with agro-environmental 
regulations, argued that awareness about the regulations and the requirements needed to 
adhere to them is essential if bodies are to conform successfully (see also Genn, 1993; OECD, 
1997 and 1998). They also charged that bodies need sufficient financial capacity to comply 
with the rules, by means such as purchasing equipment or paying for administrative costs.  
 
Kagan and Scholz reported that if businesses appear incompetent and if non-compliance 
stems from organisational failures, the regulator should serve as a ‘consultant’. “His 
responsibility would be to analyse information gaps and organisational weaknesses in the 
regulated firm, and to educate businessmen concerning feasible technologies and 
management systems that would best ensure compliance in the future” (1984: p. 68). It was 
furthermore noted that they should devote resources to help ensure that companies can 
feasibly comply (OECD, 2000: p. 66), and treat companies in an inclusive manner by educating 
them and negotiating ‘reasonable’ compliance standards with them rather than turning initially 
to a penal-based approach (Hawkins, 1990).  
 
While this stance reflects the cooperative-based enforcement approach, Winter and May 
(2001) found that the employees who believed that acts of non-compliance would be detected 
were more likely to be educated about the rules than the ones that did not fear reprisal. This 
suggests that monitoring companies, which is associated with the deterrence approach, could 
also prove effective when dealing with organizationally incompetent entities. The building of 
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relationships which are based on consistent communication might also help to avoid situations 
in which companies intentionally fail to learn the rules (as I have found in my own study) in an 
effort to claim ignorance and mitigate responsibility should they be found in breach of the 
guidelines; this is termed ‘plausible deniability’ (Walton, 1996). 
 
An important addition to this body of literature is the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s report: The 
‘Table of Eleven’, A versatile tool’ (2004), as it has had a significant influence over 
governments’ and regulators’ legislation/policy enforcement approaches. The report, which 
aims to serve as a practical tool kit to help rule enforcers better understand and improve actors’ 
compliance, pin-points 11 different areas to help one evaluate an entity’s level of ‘spontaneous 
compliance’ with the rules and the degree to which they are subjected to external enforcement  
tactics to persuade them to comply. These points include regulated entities’: 
 
1. knowledge of and familiarity with the rules, and the clarity of the rules; 
2. the financial and intangible costs and benefits of their (non)compliance; 
3. their degree of acceptance of the policy objectives and resulting effects; 
4. respect for ‘official’ and ‘competing’ authority; 
5. perceived degree of sanctioning risk from ‘non-official’ or ‘social’ control (e.g. 
colleagues, competitors, the community, etc.); 
6. perceived risk of being reported to the authorities; 
7. perceived risk of inspection; 
8. perceived risk of detection; 
9. perceived risk of ‘selectivity’ (i.e. concerns regarding inspectors singling out and 
monitoring violators more closely than non-violators); 
10. perceived risk of sanctioning; and 
11. the severity of the sanction/s. 
 
Upon evaluating these areas, rule enforcers are able to categorize actors’ compliance 
approaches into the following categories (p. 24): 
 
“a) Unconsciously compliant people: those who do not know the rules very well and 
who unknowingly comply with them...  
b) Unconsciously non-compliant people: those who break the rules because they do 
not know the rules well.  
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c) Spontaneously compliant people: those who know the rules and would comply 
with them off their own accord, even if...there were no enforcement whatsoever. 
d) Spontaneously non-compliant people: those who know the rules and would 
always break them spontaneously, regardless of the risk of inspection, the risk of 
detection, the risk of punishment or the severity of the potential punishment.  
e) People deterred by enforcement or calculatingly compliant people: the people who 
know the rules and who would break them, but rather decide against it with a view to 
enforcement activities.  
f) Consciously or calculatingly non-compliant people: those people who knowingly 
break the rules and consciously accept the risk of being caught.  
g) Next to these, there is a group that will not be influenced, or is very hard to  
influence, this group can be either very respectful to authority (the good ones) or  
very disrespectful to authority (the bad ones).” 
 
My own research will compare and contrast the relevance of these different rationales to my 
findings of Ofcom and the television-makers. It will also add, to a minor extent, to the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice’s report by pointing out alternative compliance rationales that are not 
included above. 
 
The compliance literature’s empirical findings 
 
In addition to the various theoretical models researchers have employed to explain people’s 
compliance behaviour are the empirical-based findings, which focus less on theoretical 
patterns in decision-making and more on the specific factors that influence behaviour. For 
purposes of clarity and illustration, these elements can be segregated into three levels of origin 
– individual, organisational and external. It is this classification system and body of literature 
that I shall use, and in turn contribute my findings to, and therefore it is important to review. 
 
As previously noted, the individual level includes the influence that an individual and his or her 
characteristics have on the decision-making process (e.g. the influence that a person’s unique 
set of ethics, tastes, values, etc. has on his/her decision-making) (see Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982). The organisational level includes the influence of organisational norms, 
practices, routines and culture on decision-making (see Bantz, 1990). The external factors 
level accounts for the influence of external structures and forces on decision-making (e.g. 
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market forces, technological advancements, political and regulatory shifts, ideology, etc.) (see 
Donohue, Olien and Tichenor, 1989). 
 
In relation to external sources, researchers have found that acts of non-compliance are 
connected to: regulatory monitoring and enforcement; the likelihood of detection and severity of 
a sanction; economic and social pressures; consumer response; media influence; and market 
demands (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Cohen, 2000; Baldwin, 2004; Kaider-Market, 2004; 
May, 2004; Stafford, 2006; Hutter and Jones, 2007; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Khanna and 
Widyawati, 2011; Nguyen, 2011; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 2011; Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar 
and Eizinga, 2011; Wingrove, Korpas and Weisz, 2011. 
 
On the organisational level, a firm’s size, reputation, resources, working priorities, culture, 
ideology, values, moral stance, managerial approach, level of regulatory knowledge/training, 
economic interests and constraints, the social norms at play, the social interplay between the 
regulated and regulator, the clarity of rules/expectations, supply chain pressures, and so forth, 
were found to influence actors’ decision-making (Genn, 1993; Ashby and Diacon, 1996; 
Anderson, 1996; Sadorsky 1996; Haines, 1997; OECD, 1997; Gilboy 1998; Schwartz, 1998; 
Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; OECD, 2000; Hutter 2001; Worsfold, 2001; Clayton 2002; Parker 
2002; Balsevich et al., 2003; Kagan and Thorton, 2003; Gunningham, Thorton, Kagan, 2004, 
2005; (Gunningham et al., 2005; Fairman and Yapp, 2005; May, 2005; Mohtadi et al., 2005; 
Feld and Frey, 2006; Fulponi, 2006; Havinga, 2006; Howard-Grenville, 2006; Hutter and Jones, 
2006; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2007; Garcia Martinez, et al., 2007; Job, Stout and Smith 2007; 
Jones et al, 2008; Boonstra and Dang, 2010; Wikström, 2010; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; 
Nguyen, 2011). 
 
On the individual-level, factors such as one’s reputation, personal liability and concerns 
regarding punishment, personal morality, lack of regulatory knowledge/education (either wilful 
or unintentional), subjectivity, and one’s perception of justice/fairness regarding the rules and 
how fairly they were treated by the regulator were found to influence his/her compliance 
decisions (Kinsey, 1992; Genn, 1993; Anderson, 1996; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Frey and 
Feld 2002; Nadler, 2002; Gunningham, Thorton and Kagan, 2005; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 
2004, 2005, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2006; Poulter, et al 2008; Howard-Grenville, Nash and 
Coglianese, 2008; Crundall, et al 2010; Wikström, 2010; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Sarkheyli, 
et al 2011; Tabrizian, et al 2011; Vassiliki et al 2011; Wingrove, Korpas and Weisz, 2011). 
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While these factors are useful to help one understand compliance behaviour, our body of 
knowledge can be further developed, particularly in relation to our understanding of influential 
factors at the organisational and individual levels, and in regard to our knowledge of how 
elements at different levels interplay and affect one another. I have myself employed such a 
multi-dimensional approach that will address these areas by examining the micro- and macro-
level elements that influence regulators’ and businesses’ compliance/enforcement decisions, 
and thereby the state of regulatory affairs.  
 
My examination also addresses a concern expressed by Pearce and Tombs that Hawkins’ use 
of the notion of “good and bad apples” did not offer “much help” to describe businesses’ 
compliance behaviour, as it neglected to show how organisational and environmental factors 
influenced actors’ behaviour.10 Pearce and Tombs examined compliance from the political 
economy perspective, while they argued that Hawkins and his colleagues (members of what 
they refer to as the “compliance school”) tended to use an ethnographic approach which was 
too close to the ground and failed to address fully the influence of greater environmental 
factors (1990; Slapper and Tombs, 1999). In effect, this thesis has attempted to reconcile those 
two, ostensibly warring, positions by using an ethnographic approach to collect rich and 
detailed findings, but also to situate these findings in a context of greater external forces. 
 
Regulatory Development Theories 
 
Having noted the factors known to influence regulated entities’ compliance decisions, I shall 
now outline some of the broad explanations researchers have used to explain regulators’ 
intentions whilst developing rules, and the influence exercised by companies, interest groups, 
and the public over their shape and enforcement. 
 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) reviewed various approaches used to describe how different forms 
of regulation originate and develop, which they classified under a number of theoretical 
labels, such as ‘public interest’, ‘private interest’ and ‘institutional’ theories (pgs. 18-33).  
 
                                                 
10
 Pearce and Tombs claimed, in relation to their study of health and safety and environmental issues, 
that “what is important are the ways that the profit imperative encourages and indeed may virtually 
force executives to marginalize...issues within particular company structures and under particular 
market conditions” (1991: p. 418). 
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While none of these individual theoretical frameworks fully described my own findings, I was 
able to use them as a sounding board to compare and contrast my own findings, and to freely 
draw on complementary aspects of them as I shaped my own theoretical explanation of how 
and why television regulation in the United Kingdom has originated and evolved. Let me 
explain.  
 
Public Interest Theories: 
 
Public interest theories are often used to describe the rationales, or justifications, for 
regulating a sector, and it is in this sense that I shall loosely use it here. Those who promote 
this line of argument believe that regulation is forged and enforced to achieve publicly 
desirable goals when it is likely that the market would fail to achieve such aims if left alone. In 
this sense, regulation is intended to benefit the public’s welfare. 
 
Adopters of such theories have argued that regulation should be imposed to prevent or 
correct undesirable market results. The focus has largely been on economic-related results, 
such as the unwanted dominance of monopolies, “destructive competition”, and the inefficient 
or unfair distribution of public goods (den Hertog, 1999; Ognus, 2004). Other researchers 
have used public interest theory to explain non-economic justifications, such as the desire to: 
reduce social subordination/exclusion; promote social, cultural and political diversity; and 
prevent social harm (Sustein, 1990). 
 
In their examination of media regulation, Feintuck and Varney, two key authors in this field, 
used public interest theory to explain four justifications for regulating the media industry. 
These included: the assurance of fair and “effective communication” (e.g. freedom of 
expression/speech); the promotion of diversity, both cultural and political; the pursuit and 
protection of economic interests (e.g. the exclusion of unfair competition, such as 
monopolies, and the promotion of profitable services) and the proliferation of public service 
goals (e.g. education, effective citizenships, etc.) (2006: p. 58-59). They furthermore noted 
the more paternalistic justification of protecting the public from ‘harmful’ and ‘offence’ media 
content; a topic that will be examined in-depth in this thesis (p. 62). 
 
These elements are important to note in this thesis because many of Ofcom’s regulatory 
objectives were founded on public interest ideals and so it was helpful to refer to these 
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concepts while I explained how the regulators practically juggled their conflicting economic 
and public interest objectives, and what the subsequent outcome of their approach was. 
 
Having laid down the basis for why some forms or regulation are developed (particularly 
Ofcom’s public interest-based form), I shall now discuss two key theoretical frameworks that 
attempt to explain how and why regulation subsequently evolve in particular ways; these 
include private interest and institutional theories. 
 
Private Interest Theories: 
 
Private interest theorists argue that regulatory developments are driven by individuals’ or 
groups’ private interests and not by public interests. Various theories fall under this category, 
such as ‘economic’, ‘special interest’ and ‘capture’. I shall concentrate on the capture theory 
literature because it proved to be the most fruitful in helping me to understand the situations I 
encountered in my own research.  
 
Capture theory emphasizes the power that regulated bodies have over regulators. Levine and 
Forrence (1990, p. 169) put it that capture theory: 
 
...describes actors in the regulatory process as having narrow, self-interested goals –
principally job retention or the pursuit of re-election, self-gratification from the exercise of 
power, or perhaps post office holding personal wealth. These personal goods are acquired 
or cemented by using regulatory power to help others achieve similarly narrow goals. In 
this model, government regulation reflects the influence of special interests and is created 
and operated for their advantage. 
 
The origin of capture theory can be traced back to early twentieth century politics and to Marx 
and the Marxists, who argued that powerful businesses controlled institutions (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1991). The modern interpretation of capture theory was given foundation by Downs 
(1957) in relation to the analysis of political behaviour. It was then later applied to regulatory 
behaviour by Olson (1965), who argued that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (1965: p. 3). He ensued that even if regulation 
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is believed to be founded on public interest ideals, the industry will attack its underlying 
objectives until the regulators fail to meet their public interest goals (Baldwin, 1999).11  
 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) outlined three general strands of capture theory that have evolved 
over time. Berstein’s life cycle model (1955), Truman’s (1951) interest group model and 
Posner’s (1974) capitalist model. Posner’s work relates most closely to my research, therefore 
I shall briefly outline its characteristics in what follows. 
 
The capitalist model argues that regulation is liable to be swayed by the persuasive 
blandishments of the economically powerful. Posner (1974) argued that “Big business – the 
capitalists – control the institutions of our society. Among those institutions is regulation” (p. 
341). Bernstein (1955) offered one of the most influential formulations. “He contended that the 
creation of a regulatory agency is characterized by a struggle between a diffuse majority 
favouring regulation – the public – and a powerful minority resisting regulation – the regulated 
group” (Berry, 1984: p. 524). At the root of this argument is a belief in an inherent contradiction 
between public and business needs, and the dominance that businesses have over influencing 
regulatory outcomes. 
 
Some have argued, alongside other criticisms of capture theory, that this stance can present 
“an overly simplistic, and thus an inaccurate representation of regulatory politics” (Berry, 1984: 
p. 526). I shall use my own analysis to address some of the key concerns expressed about the 
theory. Namely, classical models of capture theory have focussed so much on the interplay 
between the regulators and regulated that they fail to address, as my research has done, other 
individual, organisational and external elements that can lead to a weakened state of 
regulatory affairs.  
 
My work shall also tend to the fact that capture theory fails to address the influence that 
companies’ culture and cultural change can have on the regulatory process. Baldwin and Black 
(2008), who examined theories of regulatory enforcement, argued that corporate behaviour “is 
often driven not by regulatory pressure but by the culture prevailing in the sector or by the far 
                                                 
11
 Stigler (1971) extended this argument by claiming that it was not only big businesses, but small 
businesses, that influenced the content and mode of regulation. Kolko also added a unique perspective 
by noting that regulators can intentionally give businesses additional power as a means to stabilize and 
strengthen an industry. (In his book Railroads and Regulation (1965) he noted that the railway industry 
was stabilized through the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) by allowing for a pro-cartel based 
regime which shielded incumbents.)   
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more pressing forces of competition” (p. 63). Regulators, they say, thus need to “take account 
of the cultures and understandings that operate within regulated organisations” (p.70).  
 
It may also be argued that capture theory does not address how the shape of rules can allow 
for ‘creative compliance’ and therefore regulatory weakness: some rules are “precise” and 
“transparent”, and are therefore likely to be easily and consistently interpreted, while some are 
so widely ‘scoped’ that they allow business members to adjust their interpretation to benefit 
their own particular objectives (see also Davis, 1979; Diver, 1989; Gifford, 1989; Ofcom, 2004). 
This can lead some companies to follow the ‘letter’ of the rule, but not its ‘spirit’, thereby 
showing a weakness in the regulation.  
 
Berry claimed that these deficiencies call “for the development of post ‘capture theory’ theories 
of regulation based on a more realistic view of the regulatory process” (1984: p. 526). I shall, in 
part, address these concerns in my own research as I examine a variety of macroscopic and 
microscopic factors that influenced the regulatory process, including (but not limited to) the 
relationship between the regulator and regulated, the cultures at play, and the structure and 
enforcement of regulatory rules. In doing so, my intention is not to add a new variant to capture 
theory, but rather to offer my own unique explanation of behaviours and processes that take 
account of a variety of concerns expressed about established theoretical renderings. 
 
Institutional Theories: 
 
The final strand of theory that I found useful when describing my own findings was from what 
has been called institutionalism. Simply put, “Institutionalists are those that think theoretically 
about institutions and their impact on behaviour and outcomes” (Clark and Foweraker, 2001: p. 
1). ‘Institutions’ have been described as rules that form part of the blueprint for institutional 
behaviour and as such are the foundation of human behaviour. Some rules are informal, such 
as cultural norms, and some rules are formal, such as regulatory or constitutional requirements 
(Clark and Foweraker, 2001).  
 
Institutional theorists argue that institutional structures, arrangements and social processes 
shape regulation (Meyer and Roward, 1977; March and Olsen, 1984; Scott, 1987; Powell and 
Di Maggio, 1991; Jepperson, 1995; Levy and Spiller, 1996). Individuals are seen to be 
influenced by their social/organisational settings and the rules with which their settings are 
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governed. Institutionalists therefore often examine the norms, rules, principles and procedures 
that reside within a social setting, along with their historical and cultural frameworks, to explain 
actors’ behaviour.  
 
Broadly speaking, institutional theory has been divided into two bodies of thought, ‘old 
institutionalism’ and ‘new institutionalism (Rhodes, Binder and Rockman, 2006). ‘Old 
institutionalism’ originated from researchers in Britain and the United States who aimed to 
explain how political institutions influenced matters of the state after World War II. After the 
‘behavioural revolution’ brought forth new methods for examining politics, such as rational 
choice theory and positivism, the institutional approach was abandoned due to its limited 
nature, and replaced with an examination of individual, not social and political, structures. 
 
In the 1980s, institutionalism was revived by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and renamed ‘new 
institutionalism’, following an initial formulation by Meyer and Rowan (1977). DiMaggio and 
Powell contested the popularly used rational-choice, economic-based models, and instead 
integrated sociology and organisation theory to explain how institutions’ cognitive and cultural 
settings shaped organisational phenomena. Their work sparked a renewed interest in 
institutionalism, and the concept became widely used across a variety of disciplines, including 
sociology, economics, political science and international relations. 
 
The work on ‘new institutionalism’ depicted institutions as unique constructs that were shaped 
by different social, political and economic dynamics. It elaborated on the old institutional 
literature by explaining how the elements within each construct shaped individuals’ actions and 
thereby the shape of regulation.  
 
Three distinct pools of thought have emerged within the new institutional literature – ‘historical’, 
‘rational choice’ and ‘sociological’ institutionalism. Aspects of each will appear in the following 
chapters and so I shall outline them briefly here as I have pulled from them (as I have the other 
theories I have discussed here) to explain my own unique findings. 
 
Historical Institutionalism: 
 
Historical institutionalism emerged in response to the group theories of structural-functionalism 
and politics which were prevalent in political science during the 1960s and 1970s. Drawing from 
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these theories, historical institutionalists have attempted to explain how and why organisational 
and political practices evolve by exploring (amongst other factors such as cultural surroundings 
and norms), the histories of particular institutions and how they affect actors’ preferences and 
behaviour. Adopters of this approach tend to express a commitment to chronological 
description, the examination of specific events over time and the importance of historical 
causation. Historical institutionalists uniquely define institutions as:  
 
...the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range from the rules of a 
constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the governing 
trade union behaviour or bank firms relations (Hall and Taylor, 1996: p. 6-7). 
 
Historical institutionalists believe that these institutional settings shape actors’ behaviour at 
various points in history and need to be understood to appreciate fully how individuals come to 
decisions in the present day. In terms of my research that would mean how events in history 
have influenced the way the television market has been regulated, and how the industry has 
responded to the regulations. 
 
Rather than viewing history simply as a progression of moving from point A to point B, 
historical institutionalists choose to pinpoint certain instances in the timeline in which they feel 
that there has been a fundamental shift in behaviour – otherwise referred to by Almond (1956) 
as a ‘historical cue’ – and they wish to explain why a particular trajectory was followed and not 
others. Therefore, it is just as important to historical institutionalists to note the directions not 
taken as it is to describe those that were. For instance, the UK government has chosen to 
digitalise its national television system and I will show in this thesis how this decision has 
subsequently significantly affected the shape of content regulation. 
 
‘Path dependence’ is one of the most widely used concepts in this tradition of thought. Pierson 
and Skocpal (2002) describe path dependence as how “outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger 
feedback mechanisms [negative or positive] that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern 
into the future”. In their opinion, this is significant because “once actors have ventured far down 
a particular path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course…The ‘path not taken’ 
or the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” 
(Pierson and Skopol, 2002). In other words, in relation to this thesis, one might argue that 
 43 
regulators can venture so far down a particular path of governance that it can be difficult for 
them to operate flexibly and change course, even if there are justifications for doing so. For 
example, I shall illustrate in what follows how the government’s deregulation of the industry and 
its proliferation of digital technology have led to the expansion of the television market and the 
relaxation of content controls, which has led to an increase in contentious violent content. I will 
show how the industry has evolved so far down this path that the government is propelled to 
continue forward despite the negative drawbacks.  
   
Rational Choice Institutionalism: 
 
The rational choice approach (at least in its ideal form) focuses on the strategic calculations 
said to be associated with human behaviour and decision-making. Like Kagan and Scholz’s 
(1984) ‘amoral calculator’, it assumes that individuals have a set of preferences regarding their 
desires or goals, and in the process of seeking to attain these goals, they calculate the costs, 
benefits and risks of different courses of action before taking the most seemingly 
advantageous approach. The theoretical focus in this respect is on how individuals calculate 
their options in the process of maximising their benefits. 
 
Unlike conventional rational choice theorists, rational choice institutionalists emphasize the role 
that institutions play in the shaping of actors’ understanding of their roles, objectives and, in 
particular, the likely consequences of different courses of action. Institutions, in this sense, are 
considered “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally...humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: p. 3). Shepsle (2005) wrote: 
 
An institution is a script that names the actors, their respective behavioural repertoires (or 
strategies), the sequence in which the actors choose from them, the information they 
possess when they make their selections, and the outcome resulting from the combination of 
actor choices. Once we add actor evaluations of outcomes to this mix – actor preferences – 
we transform the game form into a game (p. 2). 
 
In relation to the topic of compliance, institutions in this tradition become the parameters of 
knowledge which affect how regulated entities regard potential regulatory consequences. More 
specifically, institutions provide businesses with information about the likely responses that 
regulators will have to their actions, such as the regulators’ likelihood of detection or 
penalisation of certain forms of misconduct (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This, in turn, shapes 
actors’ decision-making about which strategic path to take. 
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Sociological Institutionalism: 
 
The final theoretical path that has emerged from new institutionalism has been referred to as 
‘sociological institutionalism’, as it emanated from sociology and organization theory (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: p. 13). This model came from a movement that dates back to the late 1970s 
which challenged traditional rational choice models in light of a more culturally-centred 
approach.  
 
Unlike the rational choice perspective, where models are formed prior to analysing individuals 
or organisations in the market, this model is derived inductively from an analysis of society. It 
examines how actors are influenced to hold certain preferences and to conform to certain 
social norms through the interactions they have with others, which echo the social constructs 
and constraints embedded in their environment. Institutions in this tradition are defined as 
social constructs in “that they embody shared cultural understandings (‘shared cognitions’, 
‘interpretive frames’) of the way the world works” (Meyer and Rowen, 1991; Zucker, 1983; 
Scott, 1995).12 
 
 Similarities and differences between these three models: 
 
To help explain the three strands of institutionalism further, I shall note their similarities and 
differences. It is however important to note that these examples are exaggerated 
generalisations given for the purpose of illustration. Not everyone in the field uses such a 
stringent application of these models, especially as the lines between them are increasingly 
blurring in practice. 
 
In all three forms of thought, institutions are important because they shape human behaviour. 
Each approach also takes into account that people often behave rationally and calculate costs 
based on personal interests. 
 
                                                 
12
 In accordance with this, a sociological institutionalist would likely argue that organisations may rise 
and fall, but the culture and institutional norms present will remain relatively unchanged across time. This 
is because actors learn how to behave and to evaluate their situations from the world around them, 
replicating previously propagated rituals (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: p. 11; Dobbin, 1994; see also 
Thelen, 1999).  
 45 
The key difference between the analytic traditions is in their approach to the evaluation of 
behaviour. Historical Institutionalists (and sociological institutionalists) tend to develop theory 
inductively as I have done in my own research. They enter the field to understand the 
situations they encounter and then they compare and contrast their findings to different 
theories to help explain the situations they have encountered. Because theirs is not a theory in 
search of evidence, historical institutionalists (and myself), do not argue that institutions are the 
only important variable for understanding political outcomes. Quite the contrary, these scholars 
generally see institutions as intervening variables (or structuring variables) through which 
“battles over interest, ideas and power are fought” (Clark and Foweraker, 2001: p. 2). They see 
institutions as important because “they are the focal points of much political activity and 
because they provide incentives and constraints for political actors and thus structure that 
activity” (Clark and Foweraker, 2001: p. 2). 
 
Conversely, rational choice institutionalists tend to work deductively. They often believe that 
models can be devised to help us understand and predict political behaviour. In doing so, they 
first devise a model and then look to the real world to test its validity rather than the other way 
around. For these scholars, their first priority is to create and refine theories of politics, not to 
generate detailed empirical work as historical institutionalists do.13  
 
As I have worked inductively and have placed greater emphasis on my empirical rather than 
my theoretical findings, my research approach has more in common with that of historical 
institutionalists. However, I have also briefly reviewed the rational choice institutionalism 
literature because I found aspects of it useful when trying to explain my own findings (such that 
I have found the amoral calculator ideal-type useful). 
 
In a similar vein, rational choice institutionalists tend to concentrate on fewer more micro-
specific and generalizable themes/ideas, as they are “not as interested in a comprehensive 
understanding of some real institution or historical phenomenon, so much as in a deeper 
understanding of some theoretical principle or logic” (Clark and Foweraker, 2001: p. 2).  
 
Conversely, historical institutionalists tend to focus on how individuals’ behaviour is shaped by 
a sometimes larger number of complex and often macro-level factors, which extend over time 
                                                 
13
 In this sense they are “almost always willing to sacrifice nuance for generalizability [and] detail for 
logic” (Levi, 1997: p. 1). 
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(Thelen, 1999). Due to this approach, historical institutionalists’ research tends to be conducted 
over long periods of time, while rational choice institutionalists’ research tends to be conducted 
for shorter periods. In other words, and generally put, “Rational choice institutionalists try to 
understand ‘what is the game and how it is played?’ Historical institutionalists, in contrast, want 
to answer more traditional questions such as ‘who wins, who loses and why? (Clark and 
Foweraker, 2001: p. 3). 
 
Another difference between the two traditions of thought is that historical institutionalists are 
less focussed than rational choice institutionalists on individuals’ thought processes and more 
focussed on their models of wider social/cultural norms, as they believe that these aspects are 
most likely to shape individuals’ mind frames and actions. The work done in this area therefore 
tends to focus on behaviour influencing factors that stem from the macro-level. Rational choice 
institutionalists conversely place more focus on the person and how institutional factors 
supposedly influence his/her perception of the costs and benefits of various courses of action. 
This literature, while still placing the bulk of its emphasis on macro-level factors, therefore has 
a greater regard for individuals’ ability to affect their own outcomes.  
 
Sociological institutionalism is distinct from other forms of institutionalism in several ways. It 
tends to define institutions more broadly than historical and rational choice institutionalists do to 
include “not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systemic, cognitive scripts, 
and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: p. 14; Campbell, 1995). This approach removes the conceptual divide between 
‘institutions’ and ‘culture’, making them one in the same idea (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This 
distinction relates to my work as I (like sociological institutionalists have often done) engrossed 
myself in the environments I studied to understand how their cultures affected individuals’ 
moral compasses in regards to contentious compliance decisions. 
 
Sociological institutionalists have also progressed the way we understand actors’ 
internalisation of social norms. In the early work of institutionalism, individuals were believed to 
internalise cultural norms and behave in accordance with them. In later years, sociological 
institutionalists recognised that “institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what 
one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context” 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: p. 15). Therefore, institutions can not only affect individuals’ strategic 
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calculations, but they can also influence their preferences, sense of self identity and the very 
notion of what actions they can even conceive as possible (Berger and Luckmann, 1987).   
 
Finally, sociological institutionalism is unique in its explanation of how institutions originate and 
evolve. While rationale choice institutionalists claim that institutional development stems from 
an organisation’s ability to maximize the benefits of its stakeholders (traditionally in economic 
terms), sociological institutionalists claim that institutions adopt new organisational practices 
because of an interest in enhancing the legitimacy/reputation of the organisation and its 
members. This is a culturally centred interest, which can take precedence over economic 
interests that are emphasized by the rational choice model (Campbell, 1989).14  
 
The desire to enhance one’s reputation/legitimacy is also an important factor to consider when 
analysing regulators as I have done. This is because regulators often cannot effectively 
govern, or lead, an industry unless they can adequately express to its members that they have 
legitimate reasons for intervening in their external business affairs, and that they have sufficient 
authority and ability to produce positive results. In other words, the regulator needs to ensure 
its legitimacy in order for the regulated at large to follow its policies. 
 
More recent developments in New Institutionalism 
 
In the 1990s researchers began to mix elements of these three threads of thought, blurring the 
lines between them. (As noted, this mimics my own approach as I shall draw on ideas from 
various theories throughout this thesis to help explain the unique situations that I encountered.) 
For instance, rational choice Institutionalists have become far more empirical, situational and 
conditional in analysing preferences (Thelan, 1999). The authors of Analytic Narratives, for 
example, were not driven by theory but by an interest empirically in accounting for the events 
and outcomes they witnessed. Therefore they were more devoted to the detailed exploration of 
cases than to the cultivation of theory (Bates et all 1998: p. 11).   
 
Rational choice institutionalists have also become less likely to view preferences as enduring 
and constant, but more so as factors that evolve as individuals interact with others. Norms and 
                                                 
14
 Scott (1995) suggested that organisations must conform to the prevailing rules and norms that 
surround them in order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), because such ‘isomorphism’ will earn 
the organisation legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Dacin, 1997).  
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culture, which have previously been at the epicentre of historical and sociological 
institutionalism, have been adopted within the rational choice calculus, broadening its sphere of 
analysis (Thelen, 1999). To illustrate, Ferejohn, a rational choice institutionalist, argued that 
“culturally shared understandings and meanings” are key factors that shape one’s 
understanding of the different strategic options they assess (1991: p 285). Institutionalists are 
therefore fading the lines and drawing from a wider pool of thoughts, as I myself have done.  
 
I shall end this chapter by briefly touching on two other areas of literature that also helped to 
inform my research; they stem from the sociology of deviance and control, and sociology of 
media ‘gatekeeping’ literature. 
 
Pushing social and regulatory boundaries, the sociology of deviance and control literature 
 
My examination of producers’ and broadcasters’ compliance with the television standards 
regulations links with a broader discussion of social control, and the pushing and reshaping of 
social/regulatory boundaries (a topic that is covered in the sociology of deviance and control 
literature). This is because the television-makers I examined breached and actively tried to 
extend the regulatory limits, and their success in doing so is an important theme in my thesis   
which is fundamentally linked with the regulation literature. 
 
Television standards were written to permit the monitoring of broadcasters’ behaviour and to 
ensure that they did not ‘harm’ or ‘offend’ viewers, or treat programme contributors unfairly. 
Rules to prevent such harms have existed in society for centuries and have appeared in a 
variety of forms, such as rules to keep peace in a family, laws to ensure order in a society, or 
regulations to protect citizens from harmful business practice (Erikson 1966).  
 
According to Kai Erikson in Wayward Puritans (1966), the rules or boundaries associated with 
a social group or community reflect the culture and values of its members. An identity is 
established through the exchange of a common language, and shared experiences and 
understandings. These understandings are then spread across the population through the 
mass media which have “long operated as agents of moral indignation”, publicising the 
boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Cohen, 2002: p. 7).  
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The nature of particular rules or social boundaries frequently differs between and within 
communities; what may be acceptable in one setting might not be in another. People must 
therefore learn and adapt to the limits associated with the various milieu they encounter in 
order to adhere to the rules and avoid the potential social exclusion they might face from non-
conformity. As with regulation and law, these limits are not always clearly defined and leave 
room for interpretation, and individuals must therefore rely on overt social cues to understand 
their meaning.  
 
These boundaries are also often rarely fixed – “they are always shifting as the people of the 
group find new ways to define the outer limits of their universe” (Erikson, 1966: p. 12). Many 
broadcast regulations are intended to be flexible enough to reflect these shifts, as regulators 
attempt to interpret and enforce socially conceived boundaries over time, such as those 
concerning viewers’ notions of what constitutes ‘offence’. To do so, rule-enforcers must gain 
and maintain an understanding of the public’s opinions in order to accommodate changes in 
social perceptions. 
  
Television, as a commodity which supposedly reflects and moulds British culture, evolves as 
broadcasters respond to viewer ratings over time. Commercial broadcasters, like other 
financially-run enterprises, are influenced by their need to generate revenue in order to sustain 
their businesses. Such revenue primarily comes from advertisers’ funding and the demand for 
broadcasters to generate sufficient ratings is therefore high.  
 
The difficulty with this situation is that competition for ratings has become so intense that many 
broadcasters were (at the time of my fieldwork and still are), as they say, ‘pushing the 
envelope’ regarding social/regulatory boundaries. For example, scenes of violence were on the 
rise (BBC, BSC, ITC, 2002) and there are concerns that television content and production 
standards were in decline (BSC, 2000: p. 16; see also Langer, 1998; Glynn 2000). How these 
broadcasters were able to establish effective mechanisms to re-shape these socially conceived 
boundaries is therefore important if one were to address viewers’ concerns about the changing 
nature of content. 
 
Gatekeeping, the sociology of media literature 
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This takes me now to a discussion of the ‘gatekeeping’ literature which touches on various 
factors that other researchers have found to influence the shape of media content. This 
literature is important not only because it influenced my method of information gathering and 
analysis, but also because numerous studies within this genre have explored the media 
production process as I have done. The regulation literature encompasses studies about 
various industries, however, next to nothing has been written about the television market and 
content standards in particular. It was therefore helpful to enhance my understanding of my 
research by comparing my findings with others who have investigated the media market. 
 
To begin, the concept of a ‘gatekeeper’ was introduced in 1947 by Kurt Lewin whose theory, 
then referred to as a concentration on “channels and gatekeepers”, was used to explain how 
widespread social change was created in communities. Since then the gatekeeping approach 
has been applied to a variety of fields, including journalism, sociology, political science, 
information science, management and law (Barzilai-Nahon, 2007). Within the media field, it has 
offered scholars a framework from understanding how and why media content has been 
selected and shaped (Barzilai-Nahon, 2005).  
 
Pamela Shoemaker, one of the most influential authors in the gatekeeping tradition, described 
it as “the process by which the billions of messages that are available in the world get cut down 
and transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day” 
(Shoemaker, 1991: p.1; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). 
 
The gatekeeping method focuses on the various stages, or “gates”, that content must pass 
through in order to become released to the public. This descriptive process begins when ideas 
about potential content are first conceived, and it continues through to their shaping, production 
and dissemination (Shoemaker, 1991: p.1; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). At each stage (for 
instance, when a story is selected, researched and edited), the decision-makers responsible 
for the content must decide whether to accept, reject or reshape it. The gatekeeping process is 
used to identify the range of factors that influence these decisions and, by extension, the shape 
of media material. This stems from the belief that one must understand the circumstances 
surrounding individuals’ decisions to gain a clear picture of events (White, 1950). 
 
I have similarly aimed to understand how individuals at each stage of the production, broadcast 
and regulation enforcement process have made decisions about the selection, shape and 
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compliance of programme content, and the factors that influenced their decisions. I shall 
therefore discuss various key findings within the gatekeeping literature, and compare and 
contrast them with my own findings in the forthcoming chapters. Specifically, I shall note the 
factors that other researchers have found to influence media-practitioners’ production 
decisions, such as expressed in the following. 
 
In the examination of news work, researchers have found production decisions to be dictated 
by the requirements associated with a profit-seeking business (Bantz, McCordle and Baade, 
1980; Gans, 1979; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shoemaker and Mayfield 1987; Soley, 2002; 
Price, 2003; Vettehen, Nuijten and Beentjes, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). That is, 
news production has been driven by an intense competition between organisations eager to 
acquire high ratings and gain advertising revenue (see also Fensch, 1990; Alexander, 2004; 
Hoskins, McFayden and Finn, 2004; Lee 2005). This has led news-makers frequently to select 
more sensationalist, entertainment-based stories, such as those about accidents, disasters, 
crime and politics, as those topics were believed to hold the most audience appeal (Berkowitz, 
1990; see also McManus, 1994; Beam, 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). 
 
In such situations, producers’ resources and time-frames have typically been tight (Epstein, 
1973), however, their management expected them to turn out media products within the 
allocated deadlines and with the resources available (Altheide, 1976). News production was 
therefore found to be influenced by an organisation’s power structure (Bantz, 1985; Breed, 
1955; Donohew, 1967; Soloski, 1989; Chomsky, 2006; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009), and by the 
insistence of management that news products should be packaged in a streamlined, 
standardised format (Berkowitz, 1991).   
 
Employees aimed to avoid conflict and not challenge this power structure (Bantz, 1985; 
MacDougall, 1988; Soloski, 1989) and they therefore adopted the routines associated with 
rapidly expediting packaged content (Gans, 1979; Bantz, McCorkle and Baade, 1980; 
Fishman, 1982). In doing so, they had to juggle various demands. In addition to ensuring that 
media products were delivered on time and to budget, they had to conform to standards that 
demanded that they would be sufficiently informative, news-worthy and entertaining (Bantz, 
McCordle and Baade, 1980; Bantz, 1985).  
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Due to the frequent emergence of extraneous challenges, workers often had to depart from the 
routines of the standard production process in order to complete these projects (Bantz, 1985; 
Berkowitz, 1990). For instance, Berkowitz (2002) found employees to be subject to tight time 
restrictions which sometimes prohibited them from cross-checking fully the accuracy of 
conflicting information before they released it to the public.  
 
In addition to the influence that project demands and resource limitations had on the shaping of 
news production (Bantz, McCordle and Baade, 1980; Fishman, 1982), other factors were found 
to influence media-practitioners’ decisions, such as: ideology (Tuchman, 1978; Gitlin, 1980; 
Shoemaker, 1987; Soloski, 1989; Entman and Rojecki, 2000; Turner, 2002; Warren and 
Vavrus, 2002); what have been called ‘professional instincts’ or ‘personal criteria (Breed, 1955; 
Gans, 1979; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986; 1996; Berkowitz, 1990; Henningham, 1997; 
Shoemaker and Vos, 2009); organisational socialisation and ‘group thinking’ (Jablin, 1982; 
Janis, 1983; McDougall, 1988; Kim, 2002; Entman, 2007; Mills, 2007; Shoemaker and Vos, 
2009); space constraints (Gieber, 1956); professional roles (Berkowitz, 1993; Livingstone and 
Bennet, 2003); personal ‘feelings’; advertisers (Soley, 2002; Price, 2003); sources (Sigal, 1973; 
Chibnall, 1975; 1981); audience dynamics (Napoli, 2003; Allen, 2005); public relations (Sallot 
and Johnson, 2006); governments (Kuhn, 2002; Thussu, 2002); insufficient space in the 
programme agenda; if a story had previously appeared (White, 1950); interest groups (Russell, 
1995; Huckins, 1999); other media (Gans, 1979; Paterson, 2001; Skewes, 2007); and news 
consultants (Bantz, McCorkle and Baade, 1981; Berkowitz, Allen and Beeson, 1996; Allen, 
2005).  
 
It was also found that media production decisions tended to be made by groups rather than 
individuals (Donohew, 1967; Epstein, 1973; Tuchman, 1978; Berkowitz, 1990; Chomsky, 2006) 
and that the role of gatekeepers (or key decision-makers) has changed with the introduction of 
new production technologies (Pavlik, 2000; Gunter, 2003; Livingstone and Bennet, 2003; 
Salwen, 2005; Singer, 2006; Wigley and Meirick, 2008). 
 
In an examination of entertainment-based content – the genre of programming I have 
examined – Lewis (1969) asked local programme-makers to rate the importance of 45 
statements concerning their decision-making. Eight factors were ranked in importance: direct 
feedback (correspondence from individuals and groups); regulation (industry or government 
regulation); inferential feedback (ratings); ‘conditional’ (comments from critics, friends, 
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magazine writers); production staff (opinions of colleagues); personal (common sense, ‘gut 
instincts’, community knowledge); financial (cost, financial potential, sponsors’ and sales 
personnel’s opinions); and tactical (arrangement of schedule and programme planning) (see 
also Huber, 1974). Pekurny and Bart (1975) later asked local affiliates to rank the importance 
of five of these factors and the following order emerged: personal, direct feedback, tactical, 
regulatory and financial. 
 
In a separate study of the makers of comedy, sports, news and game shows, Virts (1978), 
found that their decisions were influenced by local viewing behaviour (ratings, audiences’ 
tastes, fan clubs); performance in other markets (demographics and ratings); the availability of 
alternative programmes; a knowledge of the local audience; programme strategy; financial 
profitability; colleagues’ opinions; and a programme’s compatibility with sister programmes. 
Interestingly, Virts (1984) also found that programme-makers believed that audience feedback, 
such as complaints, was not of paramount importance because it was seldom received (p. 77).  
 
In Chapters Four and Five I will compare and contrast these findings with my own. In doing so I 
will address a current gap in the gatekeeping literature by offering an examination of the 
individual, organisational and external factors that affect media practitioners’ decisions about 
the shape of content and their compliance with the content regulations (see Chapter Four for 
further detail).   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the relevant literature, concentrating specifically on detailing the 
different approaches to regulation enforcement, and regulated bodies’ response to rule 
compliance and how this feeds into regulators’ determination of which enforcement approach 
to use. I have also noted the different public, private and institutional theories used to explain 
how states of regulation originate and evolve. 
 
I then linked this discussion to the broader topic of boundaries to help explain how social (and 
in turn regulatory) limits become understood, and get pushed and reshaped. I have also 
reviewed the relevant gatekeeping literature because it is helpful in its description of the factors 
that influence media practitioners’ content production decisions.  
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Now I shall offer some background information on the UK television market and its regulation 
as a means to provide further context to my case studies. 
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Chapter 3 
Background: Regulation and the Television Industry 
 
Let me now explain the origin and evolution of the regulations affecting television content 
standards, and elaborate on how the industry developed over the three decades prior to this 
research. This chapter is important because I will outline the particular content standards 
regulations that pertain to this study. I will also draw on the information presented in this 
chapter throughout the remainder of my argument, as I shall explain how greater 
environmental factors, such as advancements in technology and changes in politics, have 
influenced the actions of television-makers and regulators at the ground level. The information 
presented here is not designed to be a current review of the UK broadcast sector and its 
regulatory framework, but rather a snapshot of the industry and its regulation at the time the 
ethnographic case studies were undertaken.  
 
Changes in television regulation 
 
The television industry has changed significantly since the early 1980s when programming was 
limited to a mere four channels – BBC 1, BBC2, ITV1 and Channel Four – and the regulator, 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), dictated what programming channels could 
broadcast. 
 
During the years of the Thatcher government, 1979-1992, many Western European 
democracies shifted away from a model of a ‘social market economy’.15 These economies were 
capitalist, yet governments maintained a significant level of control in shaping their economic 
development (Underwood, 2003). Mrs Thatcher spurred this shift in the UK and led the drive 
toward a ‘free market economy’16, otherwise referred to as ‘neo-liberalism’17 – a drive that 
                                                 
15
 In a social market economy the “government creates the regulatory framework in which economic 
and labor activities take place and withdraws more and more from the market process” (Wirtz, 2004). 
This includes two central aspects: “1) Decontrol to a certain degree of market processes, and 2) an 
institutional framework of government Ordnungspolitik, an orderly structure of rules for the economy, 
designed to steer market powers and compensate for undesirable effects of liberalization”.  
16
 A free market economy is “A market economy based on supply and demand with little or no 
government control. A completely free market is an idealized form of a market economy where buyers 
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called for the reduction of State intervention, the sale of government-run industries to the 
private sector, and a reliance on the ‘free market’ to manage the economy with few 
government restrictions (Underwood, 2003). A result was the ‘deregulation’18 of numerous 
sectors, including the Independent Television Commission’s (ITC) loosening of regulatory 
restrictions in broadcasting. Mrs Thatcher was “ideologically opposed to the whole notion of 
public service broadcasting” and helped to introduce the 1990 Broadcasting Act which 
contributed to its decline (Cultsock, 1999).  
 
The former regulator, the IBA, “was designed to foster a culture of excellence” whereas its 
successor, the ITC, “was a body that set minimum, rather than aspirational, standards in an 
industry where yardsticks for measurement are notoriously hard” (Barnett, 1998: p. 83). As a 
product of the Broadcasting Act 1990, the ITC heralded the deregulation of commercial 
broadcasting “to prevent abuses rather than promote excellence”, thus monitoring “fair 
competition” rather than promoting television of high quality (Barnett, 1998: p. 83; see also 
Gibbons, 1998). It was a change that encouraged the consumerist media culture to thrive as 
audiences began actively to wield their power over ratings to shape the substance and 
packaging of television products (Barnett, 1998).  
 
Movement down the deregulatory path was furthered by the Communications Act 2003, which 
instated Ofcom, the United Kingdom’s first ‘mega-regulator’. The Act united the five media and 
communications regulators to allow Ofcom to regulate the television, radio and 
telecommunications industries under one umbrella. As I shall illustrate in this thesis, Ofcom, 
like the ITC, took steps to deregulate the industry. This was done, in part, to make it easier for 
broadcasters to enter the market, thereby increasing competition, economic gain, and the 
‘diversity’ and ‘plurality’ of content. 
 
There were also changes at the European level which has affected the television market. The 
‘Television Without Frontiers Directive’, later renamed the ‘Audiovisual Media Services 
                                                                                                                                                    
and sells are allowed to transact freely (i.e. buy/sell/trade) based on a mutual agreement on price 
without state intervention in the form of taxes, subsidies or regulation” (TheFreeDictionary.com). 
17
 “Laissez-faire is short for ‘laissez faire, laissez passer,’ a French phrase meaning "let do, let pass" 
(Wikipedia.org). 
18
 “Deregulation is the process by which governments remove selected regulations on business in order 
to (in theory) encourage the efficient operation of markets. The theory is that fewer regulations will lead 
to a raised level of competitiveness, therefore higher productivity, more efficiency and lower prices 
overall” (InvestorDictionary.com). 
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Directive’, published rules with which member states needed to comply. These rules introduced 
several important features which affected the shape of regulation in the United Kingdom. For 
instance, the Directive emphasized the need to protect children, to commission programmes 
through independent production companies, and to allow television content to flow freely 
between member states, as long as it adhered to the regulatory requirements in the Directive in 
its home country. Foreign content was therefore allowed to be broadcast in the United 
Kingdom without necessarily meeting Ofcom’s standards. This measure was intended to 
promote European programming within the Union, and has led to more consistent television 
standards between member states and a change in content regulation in the United Kingdom.  
 
Alongside political changes came technological advances which brought ‘next generation’ 
cable, satellite and digital transmission services, opening the door to a plethora of new 
broadcasting entrants. Until 1988 television had been broadcast solely through analogue 
technology, which used the UK’s finite resource of electromagnetic spectrum (a limited 
resource of electromagnetic waves that are used to enable broadcasting) to transmit content. 
The technology allowed for only a small number of channels to broadcast simultaneously – 
BBC One, BBC Two, ITV1, Channel 4 and Five. 
 
Given that the spectrum these channels used was considered a scarce public resource, they 
were heavily regulated with content controls and broadcasting quotas (e.g. requirements to air 
an agreed amount of news, children’s programming and so on) (Feintuck, 1999). 
Having few channels also meant that each broadcaster catered to a significant proportion of 
the total UK audience. The regulators were very restrictive over the nature of the content in an 
effort to ensure that their programmes were appropriate for their diverse, multi-age audience 
and therefore it put checks in place to ensure that child viewers were protected. This, in turn, 
led to television programming that centred on ‘family viewing’,19 meaning programming that is 
deemed suitable for children’s consumption.  
 
By the mid- to late 1980s, technology had advanced and ‘next generation’ cable and satellite 
services had been introduced, allowing operators to transmit additional channels. As the 
number of channels grew, so did the concept of ‘niche’ channels, which are services that cater 
                                                 
19 ‘Family-viewing’ is associated with a form of regulatory policy. ‘Family-viewing policy’ aims to ensure 
the protection of children through such measures as the 9:00pm watershed, a restriction on the use of 
profanity, and a limitation on the amount and nature of sexual and violent content allowed for 
broadcast (see also Towler, 2001). 
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for a specific ‘target demographic’ (or audience profile), such as children or young men. 
Understanding that some niche channels, especially in the late evenings, were unlikely to have 
child viewers, the ITC allowed broadcasters greater freedom to decide what content to 
broadcast. 
 
As the technology behind digital transmissions evolved, it became possible to use spectrum 
more efficiently, alleviating many concerns about its scarcity and allowing for the influx of 
hundreds of new channels (Forgan and Tambini, 2000). That step led to the introduction of 
digital satellite, cable and terrestrial television (DTT) services operated by BSkyB, Virgin Media 
and Freeview20, respectively.  
 
By 2007, these ‘multichannel’ services together dominated the market with over 82% of all 
viewing share (Figure 2). (This proportion has increased as the government plans to turn off 
the analogue signal and move entirely to digital television services in 2012. All viewers in the 
United Kingdom will then have access to a wider array of channels than is offered by analogue 
terrestrial television (ATT).) 
                                                 
20
 Freeview is a free television proposition started by a consortium of public service broadcasters and 
Crown Castle; it broadcasts roughly 40 channels and was used to drive the take-up of DTV. 
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Figure 2: Take-up of multichannel television 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q1 1999 Q1 2000 Q1 2001 Q1 2002 Q1 2003 Q1 2004 Q1 2005 Q1 2006 Q1 2007
Analogue cable
Digital cable
Digital terrestrial
Free-to-view digital
satellite
Analogue satellite
Pay digital satellite
Households (millions)
81.7%71.8%64.9%56.7%48.0%44.7%41.7%34.0%27.2%
% of homes
 
Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
 
To address the rapid changes in the broadcasting environment, and particularly the large 
increase in the number of television channels, Ofcom updated the ITC’s regulations governing 
television content standards in an attempt to maintain their relevancy. The following briefly 
outlines the revised regulatory structure and the key policies which will be discussed in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
 
The television regulations explained 
 
Feintuck and Varney (2006) outlined four key justifications for regulating the broadcast industry 
– “effective communication”; “diversity, both political and cultural”; “economic justifications”; 
and “public service”:  
 
 The need to ensure effective, or unobstructed, communication is deemed necessary 
to promote diversity and democracy;  
 The promotion of cultural diversity is intended to prevent social exclusion, while 
political diversity is deemed necessary to allow for the productive exchange of 
political ideas; 
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 Economic justifications pertain to the promotion of a financially thriving industry, and 
the prevention of market failures relating to aspects such as monopolies and unfair 
competition; and 
 Regulation imposed for the sake of public service pertains to the protection of 
educational and cultural values in broadcasting which can come under threat as a 
product of the industry’s on-going commercialisation. 
 
These rationales for regulation underpin the three different types of broadcast regulation that 
were at play in the United Kingdom – “structural”, “behavioural” and “content regulation”: 
 
In shorthand, ‘content regulation’ refers to limitations being imposed on what 
cannot, or must, be broadcast or published, while ‘structural regulation’ refers to 
limits on the extent of that which can be owned within any market by any one 
corporate entity and, in effect, ‘behavioural regulation’ generally serves to limit how 
property held can be used in relation to its impact on actual or potential competitors 
(Feintuck and Varney, 2006: p. 68). 
 
I noted in Chapter One that this thesis looks specifically at content regulation, or ‘negative’ 
content regulation.  Ofcom was required under the Broadcasting Act 1996 and the 
Communications Act 2003 to set, and periodically to review and revise, standards for television 
programmes (meaning to establish ‘negative’ content regulations). This task included the 
drafting of guidelines that broadcasters must adhere to with regard to programmes, 
sponsorship, fairness and privacy. The guidelines set various requirements relating to the 
protection of minors; the restriction of material that could incite crime or lead to social disorder; 
the protection of viewers from harmful and offensive content; and an assurance that news is 
reported accurately and with due impartiality. 
 
In adherence with the Act, Ofcom published the Ofcom Broadcasting Code on 25 July 2005 to 
serve as a set of guidelines, or standards, for television-makers to follow. The two key areas of 
the Code that I shall focus on here (as they relate most to my own research) are ‘harm and 
offence’ and ‘fairness and privacy’. 
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Negative content regulations – ‘Harm’ and ‘Offence’ 
 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directives influenced the formation of the Ofcom Broadcasting 
Code, the terms ‘taste’ and ‘decency’ being replaced by ‘harm’ and ‘offence’ to assimilate the 
language of the Directive. The Code stated that broadcasters were required “to provide 
adequate protection for members of the public from the inclusion in such services of harmful 
and/or offensive material” (2005, Ofcom). 
 
‘Harm’: 
 
Although Ofcom stated that a broadcaster could not transmit ‘harmful’ material, it was difficult 
to interpret which material can cause harm to viewers, as studies of the effects of television 
violence offered conflicting findings, giving no clear guidance about if or when television 
violence leads to audience emulation.  
 
Behavioural effects theorists argued that viewers of television violence learn to believe that 
violent behaviour is acceptable (Paik and Comstock 1994; Wilson et al 1998). When 
confronted with an aggressive situation, individuals who watch extensive levels of violent 
programming are more likely to respond with violence and aggression (Geen, 1994) and/or 
‘indirect’ violence (bullying) (Kuntsche, 2003).  
 
Children were believed to be most affected by television violence and so the majority of this 
area of research had focused on them. Research had also found that television violence has 
both short- and long-term effects on the violent behaviour of boys and girls (see Anderson, et 
al., 2003; Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Huesmann, et al. 2003). 
 
Other strands of research on media effects has claimed that television violence leads to a 
greater fear of violence, desensitization toward real-life violence and a decrease in viewers’ 
willingness to act on behalf of victims of violence (American Association of Paediatrics, 2000).  
 
These arguments have, however, faced extensive criticism from social scientists who have 
argued that their methodologies for data collection and interpretation were often weak and/or 
misdirected, and that media displays of violence do not motivate viewers to emulate such 
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forms of behaviour (Cumberbatch and Howitt, 1989; Paik and Comstock, 1994; Newburn and 
Hagell, 1994; Gauntlett, 1995, 1998). 
  
Despite this conflicting research, behavioural effects theory has been highly influential in the 
design of television regulation policies, and over Ofcom’s and the ITC’s interpretation of 
harmful content (Carter and Weaver, 2003: p. 8). For instance, Ofcom worked to the belief that 
the ‘context’21 of violent scenes influences viewers’ interpretation of them. This perception 
reflects the work of Morrison (1999) who found that viewers’ understanding of violent content 
was based on what imagery was used and how it was portrayed. Most context-related 
concerns stemmed from scenes that showed violent acts without negative consequences, that 
were celebrated or were “perpetrated by heroes rather than victims” (Millwood Hargrave and 
Livingstone, 2006: p. 65; see also Ofcom, 2005). 
 
The methods that television-makers and regulators used to decipher ‘harmful’ content will be 
reviewed in this thesis, along with the problems that arose from rules that were not clearly 
defined and were thereby loosely interpretable.  
 
‘Offence’: 
 
Ofcom also stated that a broadcaster cannot transmit ‘offensive’ material; however, there was 
no agreed definitive definition of ‘offense’. Gibbons (1998) moved most closely towards some 
such characterization by stating: “Offence has been described as that which upsets, distresses, 
disgusts, outrages or puts out members of the public in relation to what is and is not 
appropriate for public as opposed to private consumption” (p. 74).  
 
To help decipher what content viewers found offensive, Ofcom published Programme 
Information Research: An investigation of current attitudes and behaviours towards programme 
information in 2006. It examined the forms of content viewers found offensive and how often 
                                                 
21
 The Ofcom Broadcasting Code defines the term ‘context’ as: ( 2006: p. 16): “Context includes (but is not limited to): 
the editorial content of the programme, programmes or series; the service on which the material is broadcast; the time of 
broadcast; what other programmes are scheduled before and after the programme or programmes concerned; the 
degree of harm or offence likely to be caused by the inclusion of any particular sort of material in programmes generally 
or programmes of a particular description; the likely size and composition of the potential audience and likely expectation 
of the audience; the extent to which the nature of the content can be brought to the attention of the potential audience for 
example by giving information; and the effect of the material on viewers or listeners who may come across it unawares. 
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they were offended. The study examined over 700 television viewers from across the UK, who 
were 16 years and older.  
 
Ofcom reported that roughly half of all adult viewers were concerned “about what is shown on 
television these days.” Thirty-two percent of viewers claimed to have been offended by 
something they saw on a television programme, up from 29% in 2000. When respondents were 
asked ‘What is it about programmes on television that offends or concerns you nowadays, if 
anything?’, over half (53%) spontaneously stated that television violence was their greatest 
concern. This was followed by ‘bad/offensive language’ (50%), sexual content (41%) and 
graphic violence (36%) (Figure 3).  
 
Roughly half of all parents also spontaneously stated that they had concerns about their 
children’s viewing habits; this rose to three-quarters when prompted. 
 
Figure 3: Cause of offence 
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Source: Ofcom, 2006: ‘Programme Information Research: An investigation of current attitudes and 
behaviours towards programme information’ 
Base: All UK television viewers (16+) who have ever been offended by things on television. 
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In terms of the frequency of offence, one-third of respondents stated that they were offended at 
least once a month, around 20% were offended less than once every six months and a further 
20% claimed never to be offended (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Frequency of offence 
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Source: Ofcom, 2006: ‘Programme Information Research: An investigation of current attitudes and 
behaviours towards programme information’ 
Question: How often, if at all, do you see things on television that offend you or you feel are unsuitable 
for you personally to view? Base: All UK viewers aged 16+ (709) 
 
 
These statistics are important to note because television content and the associated 
regulations were constructed with audiences’ tastes in mind, so if viewers were generally 
offended or harmed by certain types of content, regulators and television-makers either should 
have or would have adapted their practices to take this into account.  It is also important to 
note that these statistics were – or should have been – consequential because they were 
commissioned and digested by Ofcom itself. 
 
Fairness and privacy regulations 
 
Ofcom also required broadcasters to avoid the ‘unfair’ treatment of programme contributors 
and to respect their ‘privacy’, as will be outlined the following.  
 
‘Fairness’: 
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Section 7.1 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code (2005a) stated “Broadcasters must avoid unjust 
or unfair treatment of individuals or organisations in programmes”. Sections 7.2 to 7.14 noted 
the various practices that broadcasters must follow to ensure the fair treatment of programme 
contributors. The following notes the specific rules which relate to this research (for a fuller 
description of the fairness and privacy regulations, see Appendix Four). 
 
 
 
 
‘Informed consent’ is the issue most germane to this study because it is the rule that the 
producers I examined most often breached. The BSC defined ‘informed consent’ as: 
“Permission based on a participant’s knowledge and understanding of (a) a programme’s 
format, aims and objectives, (b) how their contribution will be used and (c) the potential 
consequences for them or for third parties of their taking part” (BSC, 2000). 
Extracts from Section 7 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code: Fairness 
7.3 Where a person is invited to make a contribution to a programme (except when 
the subject matter is trivial or their participation minor) they should normally, at an 
appropriate stage:  
 be told the nature and purpose of the programme, what the programme is 
about and be given a clear explanation of why they were asked to contribute 
and when (if known) and where it is likely to be first broadcast;  
 be told what kind of contribution they are expected to make, for example live, 
pre-recorded, interview, discussion, edited, unedited, etc;  
 be informed about the areas of questioning and, wherever possible, the 
nature of other likely contributions;  
 be made aware of any significant changes to the programme as it develops 
which might reasonably affect their original consent to participate, and which 
might cause material unfairness;  
 be told the nature of their contractual rights and obligations and those of the 
programme maker and broadcaster in relation to their contribution; and  
 be given clear information, if offered an opportunity to preview the 
programme, about whether they will be able to effect any changes to it.  
Taking these measures is likely to result in the consent that is given being ‘informed 
consent’ (referred to in this section and the rest of the Code as “consent”). It may be 
fair to withhold all or some of this information where it is justified in the public 
interest or under other provisions of this section of the Code. 
7.5 In the case of persons over sixteen who are not in a position to give consent, a 
person of eighteen or over with primary responsibility for their care should normally 
give it on their behalf. In particular, persons not in a position to give consent should 
not be asked for views on matters likely to be beyond their capacity to answer 
properly without such consent.  
7.6 When a programme is edited, contributions should be represented fairly.  
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In 2000 the BSC examined if and how programme-makers obtained contributors’ consent. It 
found that, while most programme-makers “normally supply sufficient information to allow 
people to give informed consent to their participation,” a minority “of participants and some of 
their close relatives were concerned about the treatment they had received from programme-
makers” (BSC, 2000: p. 7). It found that participants were not always supplied with sufficient 
information about a programme’s nature and objectives, or about the way in which their 
contributions would be used (BSC, 2000: p. 8).22 
 
The authors of the report linked the programme-makers’ unfair treatment of contributors to the 
pressures of competition, pointing out that the stress that industry workers were under to 
create an entertaining, and sometimes controversial, show was sometimes at odds with an 
‘ethical’ approach (BSC, 2000: p. 16; see also British Film Institute, 1999):  
 
More than half (53%) of those working in factual programming felt that they had 
‘experienced pressures at odds with how they believed contributors should be 
treated’. A similar number (52%) claimed that, during the production of factual 
programming, they had ‘experienced pressures to achieve an exciting, 
controversial or entertaining programme that they felt were at odds with 
maintaining accuracy’. 
 
My own study offers a more probing examination of such pressures. Unlike the BSC, which 
examined a range of broadcasters on a general level, I examined two television companies in 
depth and was able to get a more intensive understanding of the behind-the-scenes practices 
of each.  
 
‘Privacy’: 
 
Section 8.1 of Ofcom’s Code stated “Any infringement of privacy in programmes, or in 
connection with obtaining material included in programmes, must be warranted”. The following 
notes the areas of this section which correlate to my research. 
 
 
                                                 
22 “Seventy-one percent of our survey respondents argued that the programme-makers should both 
inform participants about what is involved in making the programme and advise them about the 
possible consequences of transmission” (BSC, 2000: p. 7). 
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In 2002 a consortium of broadcasters and regulators commissioned Morrison and Svennevig to 
produce the research report, The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy, which found that 
viewers were sceptical about the motives of the media in invading one’s privacy. Their 
scepticism was substantiated by an industry member who, after being asked if media 
companies would infringe individuals’ privacy if the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) did 
not enforce protective rules, stated (p. 44):   
 
Yes. I mean the whole idea of the PCC was to establish a code of practice that we 
abide by because of the competitive nature of the business. I think people would 
be transgressing all the time unless we had clear boundaries. 
 
Extracts from Section 8 of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code: Privacy 
Consent 
 
8.5 Any infringement of privacy in the making of a programme should be with the 
person’s and/or organisation’s consent or be otherwise warranted. 
 
8.6 If the broadcast of a programme would infringe the privacy of a person or 
organisation, consent should be obtained before the relevant material is broadcast, 
unless the infringement of privacy is warranted.  
 
8.7 If an individual or organisation's privacy is being infringed, and they ask that the 
filming, recording or live broadcast be stopped, the broadcaster should do so, 
unless it is warranted to continue.  
 
Gathering information, sound or images and the re-use of material  
 
8.9 The means of obtaining material must be proportionate in all the circumstances 
and in particular to the subject matter of the programme.  
 
8.10 Broadcasters should ensure that the re-use of material, i.e. use of material 
originally filmed or recorded for one purpose and then used in a programme for 
another purpose or used in a later or different programme, does not create an 
unwarranted infringement of privacy. This applies both to material obtained from 
others and the broadcaster's own material.  
 
Suffering and distress  
 
8.16 Broadcasters should not take or broadcast footage or audio of people caught 
up in emergencies, victims of accidents or those suffering a personal tragedy, even 
in a public place, where that results in an infringement of privacy, unless it is 
warranted or the people concerned have given consent.  
 
8.17 People in a state of distress should not be put under pressure to take part in a 
programme or provide interviews, unless it is warranted.  
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Respondents were asked how much, if at all, they believed people’s privacy was intruded on 
by different media sources and they replied that people working for newspapers were more 
likely than television-makers to intrude into people’s lives, followed by radio broadcasters and 
internet practitioners. Focusing on the newspaper and television industries, between 77% and 
90% of respondents believed that workers in these sectors were fairly, or very, likely to intrude 
into people’s lives (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Media intrusion 
 
How likely, if at all, do you think these various media intrude into people’s privacy? 
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Source: The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy, 2000 
 
 
My study examined if, when and how television-makers infringed individuals’ privacy, and how 
the regulator responded to such acts of non-compliance. 
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The growth of the television industry 
 
Having reviewed the regulations which are focused on in this thesis – ‘harm’, ‘offence’, 
‘fairness’ and ‘privacy’ – I shall now outline the general changes that have occurred in the 
television industry, as a precursor to understanding the broadcaster and independent 
production company which I shall examine in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
As a result of the growth of multiple channels (cable, satellite and digital services), the 
television industry grew substantially over the period I conducted this research. In the six years 
from 2000 to 2006 it grew a significant 39% from £7.7bn to £10.8bn (Figure 6). The largest 
beneficiaries were the satellite and cable platform operators, BSkyB and Virgin Media, which 
together gained £4.0bn in subscription revenue in 2006 alone.  
 
As audiences began to migrate to non-terrestrial channels, commercial multichannel operators’ 
revenue rose. In 2000 they made £795m and, in 2006, £1.4bn (up 82%). This meant that they 
accounted for 13% of the market’s total revenue by 2006, up 3% from 2000.23  
 
Figure 6: Total television industry revenue by sector 
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Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
 
                                                 
23 That trend may be compared with the commercial analogue channels, ITV1, Channels 4 and Five, 
which experienced a 9% decline in revenue over the period to £2.7bn. In 2000 they accounted for 39% 
of the total revenue and by 2006 this had fallen to 25% (Figure 2).  
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The growth in the multichannel operators’ revenue and viewing share brought about a 
fragmentation of viewers across the schedule. Figure 7 shows that each of the terrestrial 
channels’ viewing shares had declined while the non-terrestrial channels’ combined share rose 
to 33% since 1990 (when multichannel television was introduced), showing that they had 
become a competitive and instrumental component in the industry. These broadcasters, 
labelled ‘others’, included hundreds of services, such as Sky One, UKTV, Living TV and the 
Discovery Channel.  
 
This growing and increasingly influential segment of the market included the television-makers 
I shall examine in this thesis. 
 
Figure 7: Channel shares in all homes, 1982 – 2006 
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Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
Note: ‘Others’ refers to the multi-channel operators 
 
 
Growth in the independent production sector 
 
In addition to examining a broadcasting company, this thesis examines the inner workings of 
an independent production company, which was founded during a period of rapid expansion in 
the sector that came alongside the growth in television channels. 
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Prior to the establishment of Channel 4 in 1982, programmes were almost entirely produced 
‘in-house’ by broadcasters. To stimulate the expansion of the independent production sector, 
Channel 4 was mandated by an Act of Parliament to rely solely on external production facilities. 
That development planted the seeds for the enlargement of the sector, which was later 
bolstered by the Broadcasting Act 1990 which required public service broadcasters to 
‘outsource’ at least 25% of their programming to independents.  
 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive was also introduced; it required that Member States 
“ensure that, where practicable and by appropriate means, at least 10% of the transmission 
time of broadcasters established in the Member State is reserved for European works by 
producers who are independent of broadcasters; alternatively, that 10% of the broadcaster’s 
programming budget is spent on independent productions” (Article 5(1); Ofcom, 2004d: p. 3). 
Given that this included all broadcasters, not just PSBs, the consequence was a promise of 
many additional commissions to independent producers. 
 
With such measures in effect, by 2006 (during my examination of Ofcom) the sector had 
expanded to over 800 production companies which generated £1.69bn in revenue over the 
year. As the sector began to mature, one could see a concentration of businesses, as the 
largest companies expanded and consumed their competition through mergers and 
acquisitions. After a period of concentration, the largest companies dominated the market as 
their revenues soared above those of their smaller competitors.  
 
Reflecting this trend, Figure 8 shows production companies’ turnover by revenue band: the 
highest earners, those making £20m or more per year, experienced the greatest increase in 
revenue between 2005 and 2006, up 43% to £1.2bn. These few companies grew rapidly 
through merger and acquisition activity, and held the greatest economic share, while most 
small and mid-sized independents suffered financial losses which put them under greater 
pressure to generate revenue in order to survive the increasingly competitive market. 
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Figure 8: Independent production company turnover by revenue band  
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Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
 
(It is important to flag this matter because the production company I examined was a mid-sized 
producer which, despite the losses suffered by its peers, grew to become one of the 100 
highest-earning independent producers in the industry. How it approached the competition and 
carried out its business will be discussed in Chapter Five.)  
 
This increase in competition had a ‘knock-on’ effect on various aspects of the industry, and the 
shape of the industry’s employment structure and of television content in particular. An 
understanding of its effect is useful because it helps to explain why the production company I 
examined functioned the way it did. 
  
Changes in television’s employment structure 
 
The rise in competition caused a shift in the television employment sector, which was readily 
visible in the television companies I studied. It became ever more difficult to gain employment 
in the sector, as an increasing number of individuals wanted to work in the field, and there was 
less job security, as many permanent positions had been replaced with short-term, freelance 
posts. It was (and still is) common to work extensive hours, without overtime pay, and salaries 
were often minimal for low-level employees and non-existent for interns. In other words, the 
sector faced an excess supply of would-be employees who were willing to accept few rewards 
simply to be a part of the industry. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) reported in February 
2008: 
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The TUC has found that people working in the media, including journalists, public 
relations officers, photographers and broadcasters, are fifty percent more likely to 
work unpaid overtime as the rest of the working population, making the industry 
one of the worst offenders when it comes to unpaid overtime. Four in ten (40.3%) 
media professionals work an average of six hours 42 minutes unpaid overtime 
every week, worth £5,884 a year per person. Across the sector, 49,000 employees 
are working unpaid overtime, worth a total of £288 million a year. 
 
Part of the intensification of work resulted from the expectation that employees would perform 
‘multi-skilled’ jobs in which they served in multiple roles within their given position, such as a 
producer, editor and camera operator. Employees were able to serve in these different 
capacities as improvements in production technology have enabled employers to harness 
better the potential of workers (Ursell, 2001; see also Sparks, 1991; Bromley, 1997).  
 
Collectively this shift led to an environment which required long working hours, while offered 
minimal pay, little job security, and few benefits, if any (Saundry, 2002; see also Ursell, 2001). 
This served to intensify the competition and working pressure within the industry. 
 
Changes in television content 
 
The shifts in the television market also led to changes in the shape of the production of media 
material and consumption of content. Figure 9 is a summary of the total hours of content that 
PSB terrestrial channels transmitted by genre between 2002 and 2006. Using Ofcom’s 
classification system (see Appendix 2), on average, the number of hours of entertainment-
based genres rose, while those of the more informative genres gradually declined.  
 
Specifically, there was a 33% increase in the number of hours of general factual and 
entertainment programming. As a consequence, the hours of children’s programming declined 
by 11%, education by 9% and sport 7%. News experienced a fluctuation in hours, as the 
amount broadcast in 2006 was 2% lower than that in 2002, and 12% lower than in 2005.  
 
During peak-time (6pm – 11pm), when viewing is often at its highest, hours of general factual, 
entertainment and drama accounted for 70% of all output, while more education-based content 
accounted for a relatively small proportion of the schedule. These shifts represent what some 
might refer to as the ‘dumbing-down’ of programme content. 
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Figure 9: 24-hour output for terrestrial PSB channels 
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Source: Ofcom, 2007 
 
 
Figure 10 shows that multichannel operators came to dominate the broadcast schedule by 
airing over 700,000 hours of output in 2006, up a significant 28% from 2005. This accounted 
for 80% of the industry’s total hours of transmission.  
 
The entertainment genre represented the largest proportion of this total. It accounted for 
241,000 hours in 2006 – a significant 19% increase from 2005 – and represented 35 times 
more hours of programming than the five terrestrial channels combined produced. Ofcom also 
noted that the number of entertainment channels doubled in number between 2002 and 2007 
to 31.  
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Figure 10: Hours of output by multichannel operators 
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Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
 
Figure 11 displays the viewing share of the different genres across those homes with 
multichannel television (e.g. digital terrestrial television (DTT), cable or satellite). Consistent 
with the previous chart, it shows that there was a significant increase in the share of the 
entertainment genre and its popularity over the other genres. The growth of this style of 
programming reflects the commercialisation of content, as broadcasters have (and continue to) 
respond to audience demand by providing more entertainment-based rather than information-
based content.  
 
Figure 11: Aggregate share of channel genres in multichannel homes 
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Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2007 
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This chapter has statistically verified (using Ofcom’s own data) the age old claim that content 
has become more commercially geared, as entertainment-based programming has 
increasingly dominated the schedule and viewing share in multichannel homes. Meanwhile, 
multichannel operators have accounted for an increasing proportion of total television revenue, 
viewing share and hours of output.  
 
The television companies I examined optimised these changes in the market, as the series I 
followed was a low-budget, entertainment-based programme, commissioned by a non-PSB 
multichannel broadcaster and produced by an independent production company, which 
struggled to survive in the competitive market.  
 
I chose to examine a non-PSB multichannel operator because these broadcasters had (and 
continue to have) an increasing level of influence over the direction of the market, the evolving 
shape of content, and the media messages that viewers receive. Additionally, it was important 
to examine television content within the entertainment genre as the majority of the analyses 
like mine of content production have examined the news (e.g. Elliot 1989; Borden and 
Pritchard 1997; Voakes 1997, 1998; Daniel 2000; Linden, 2010; Luljak, 2000; Phillips, 2010; 
Smith, 2011), not entertainment-based programming (such as Grindstaff 2002 did), despite its 
clear, and growing, dominance over all other genres in terms of audience share.  
 
The features I have noted here have therefore laid out the organisational history and regulatory 
framework that underpin the central theme of this thesis. With this said, I shall now explain my 
methodological approach. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
  
While the previous chapter provided a general background, this chapter will explain my 
research approach, which includes a three-part qualitative study that traced a television series 
throughout its life-cycle. The first part involved an ethnography of the making of the television 
series, Agony II, by the television production company, Envision. Part two consisted of 
interviews with staff at Entertainu, the funding broadcaster, during the transmission of the 
series. Part three encompassed an ethnography of the regulator, Ofcom, during the time it 
received and investigated audiences’ complaints about the series. (The names used for the 
series and channels are pseudonyms to protect the identities of those involved.) 
 
Before discussing these three segments, I shall discuss my core research method, the 
ethnography, along with my use of reflexive analysis and some ethical considerations that 
needed to be made during the study.  
 
An ethnographic approach 
 
Ethnography is defined as “the scientific description of peoples and cultures” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2003). The method was first used by Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western 
Pacific, a study of Trobriand Islanders in 1914. He stated that the goal of an ethnographer is “to 
grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world” (1922: p. 
25). The ethnographic method has since been widely adopted throughout the field of sociology 
and has evolved to represent a qualitative approach in its various forms. 
 
I used the ethnographic method to gain an incisive understanding of producers’ and regulators’ 
social worlds, their processes, their members’ behaviours and beliefs, their relationships with 
their peers and with each other, and of how these elements were comprehended and 
experienced by those involved (Rosenberg, 1999).  
 
Following the routines of ‘participant observation’, I immersed myself in production and 
regulation environments for extended periods to learn about the companies’ cultures through 
participating in their activities and observing their settings, staff and procedures. Informal 
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conversations and interviews were also used to gather information, alongside the collection of 
related documents that helped to explain the groups (Graue, 1997).  
 
I aimed to enter the field unconstrained by a predetermined “mind-set” or “goal-set”, so as not 
to be limited by pre-existing beliefs about my data and findings (Ball and Ormerod 1999: p. 
406). Rather, I sought to work with an open mind and to allow my own experience and my 
viewing and discussing of others’ experiences inductively to shape my understanding of the 
social worlds (see Glaser and Strauss, 1968). 
 
I therefore attempted, as far as I was able, to remain flexible and responsive, observing events 
as they unfolded and charting interesting processes over time. This shaped my research 
direction and the themes I selected for exploration. It also allowed for my research questions to 
emerge as the ethnography progressed, and the data I collected to shape my understanding of 
the environments. (For instance, I did not enter Envision expecting to find acts of regulatory 
non-compliance or even anticipating to discuss the topic of regulation. In my investigation of 
the production company, the topic of non-compliance, however, crept up almost daily and 
therefore appeared to be the most important matter to address academically.)24  
 
The benefits of the ethnographic method 
 
The benefit of the ethnographic method is that it allowed me to see the complexity and inner 
workings of the organisations I examined; something that was not readily visible to outsiders 
(Jorgensen, 1989). I was able to partake in working practices which allowed me to understand 
how actors operated, what factors influenced the decisions they made and how these 
decisions affected the shape of media content and regulation. In the process of doing this I was 
able to examine regulators and television-makers in their natural, unedited setting and this 
offered insight into their organisational culture – a factor that has been found to shape 
individuals’ attitudes and actions, both generally and in relation to their compliance behaviour 
                                                 
24
 To illustrate this point, coincidentally I bumped into one of the series producers at the production 
company I studied. I had not seen him since I conducted the ethnography at Envision roughly five 
years before. One of his peers who was with him asked me how I knew him and what I did for work. 
After I explained that I was doing a PhD and met the producer while conducting my fieldwork at 
Envision, she replied, ‘I take it that you are examining illegal broadcast content then’. Surprised by 
what she said, I asked why she assumed that and she replied ‘Well, if you were working at Envision 
that would be the most obvious topic to examine’,  indicating that she perceived the organisation as 
overtly rule evading in nature. 
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(Bandura, 1969; Vogel, 1974; Geerken and Gove, 1975; Braithwaite and Geis, 1982; Akers, 
1985; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Victor and Cullen, 1988; Hutter, 1989; Makkaira and 
Braithwaite, 1993; and Nie, 2008). The approach also offered insight into otherwise hidden 
influences, power dynamics and tensions which were likely to go undiscovered by other 
methodologies, such as the behind the scene influence that management had over employees’ 
decisions (Van Maanen, 1979; Jorgensen, 1989; Snow, 1999).  
 
As noted, I conducted ethnographies at the production company and Ofcom. In terms of the 
production company, I worked alongside producers, tackling the same challenges and 
undergoing the same struggles that they did, and so I became viewed as one of their peers 
rather than just as an academic researcher. This transformation enabled me to develop lines of 
trust with them, and open the door of communication to allow them to express sentiments 
about sensitive topics, such as compliance, ethics and violent imagery. It led to findings which 
would probably not have been revealed through more formal interviews or questionnaires 
alone, as participants would have been unlikely to disclose such sensitive, and rule infringing, 
information – and certainly not to a stranger.  
 
I was thereby equipped to see the complex web of factors that influenced producers’ 
compliance behaviour. Beyond simply examining whether they breached the regulations, I was 
able to explain why they behaved the way they did. Did they wilfully breach the rules, did they 
do so by accident, did they do so because they faced a number of constraints which led them 
to believe that non-compliance was their only option, or did they do so because of a mixture of 
these elements?     
 
Like the television environment, the regulatory environment was also best examined through 
longstanding immersion in the field. Working at Ofcom helped me to understand the 
background to the enforcement of television standards. It permitted me to learn about the 
organisation’s statutory obligations, the regulators’ approach to researching the needs and 
dynamics of markets and consumers, and how these (and other) factors influenced their 
formation and implementation of policy. It enabled me to grasp the complexities and tensions 
associated with their decisions and procedures, and it brought to light questions and answers I 
could have not known existed had I not been embedded in the setting.  
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An ethnographic approach would have also been the most fruitful approach for exploring the 
world of the broadcaster. However, in-depth interviews were used as a substitute due to the 
study's time constraints and the difficulty in obtaining long-term access to the broadcaster. I 
was able to conduct the ethnography at Envision because I obtained employment there. 
Shortly after, I gained a job at Ofcom to conduct a second ethnography. It was not feasible to 
obtain a third position with the broadcaster, as there were no appropriate positions available at 
the time and I felt that the data available at Ofcom were so useful that they outweighed the 
benefits of ending the research and relocating employment.  
 
Addressing the weaknesses of the ethnographic approach 
 
There are strengths and weaknesses in every social research method. When conducting a 
study, the aim is to select the method best suited to collect the desired data. The researcher 
should then tailor his/her approach to address and accommodate the method’s weaknesses.  
 
I selected the ethnographic method because it allowed me to probe intricate environments and 
social networks. But such work always trades generalisability for intensity. I was necessarily 
limited to examining a single production company so my findings at Envision cannot be 
generalized to the industry as a whole. In an attempt partially to remedy this deficiency, I also 
examined numerous infractions that were brought to Ofcom’s attention to compare my findings 
at Envision with other compliance cases as to detect whether certain forms of behaviour were 
unique or common. 
   
There were also inevitable difficulties in accurately understanding and reflecting different 
participants’ perceptions. To tackle this issue I used techniques to enable participants freely to 
define themselves, their roles and their social settings (Stanley and Wise, 1983), by employing 
open-ended questions which allowed peoples’ opinions to be liberally expressed without being 
influenced by my own opinions or statements. Interviewees’ comments were often included 
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verbatim in the thesis to avoid my having to reconstruct them, with the accompanying risk of 
altering their meaning. Systematic checks with participants were also conducted to clarify and 
ensure the accuracy of statements. I furthermore took pains to pay meticulous attention to 
note-taking and to validating the data/findings with participants. 
 
A final drawback of the ethnographic approach is that, because the researcher becomes a part 
of the environment, he or she naturally affects and influences the thoughts and actions of those 
under examination. Researchers’ subjectivity can influence their selection of the subject matter 
and interpretation of data. Their presence can also have an impact on their surroundings, other 
individuals’ behaviours and ultimately the research findings. It is therefore important that a 
researcher considers the impression that he/she has made on their environment – and I 
attempted to do so through the use of reflexive analysis. 
 
Reflexive analysis 
 
Reflexivity is defined by Linda Finlay (2002) as: 
 
[A] thoughtful, conscious self-awareness. Reflexive analysis in research 
encompasses continual evaluation of subjective response, in intersubjective 
dynamics, and the research process itself. It involves a shift in our understanding of 
data collection from something objective that is accomplished through detached 
scrutiny of ‘what I know and how I know it’ to recognizing how we actively construct 
our knowledge. ‘The reflexive ethnographer does not simply report ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ 
but actively constructs interpretations of his or her experiences in the field and then 
questions how those interpretations came about’ (Hertz, 1997, p. viii) (p. 532). 
 
Although subjectivity is an indispensable feature in social life, it was also important that I 
attempted to enter the field with something of an approximation to an objective mind-frame and 
recognize the effect that my preconceived ideas may have had on my research (see also 
Schutz 1967; Harrington, 2000.)  
 
I therefore tried to make subjectivity problematic and use it to my advantage. I also attempted 
to address my loss of analytic distance by treating data as problematic, and by periodically 
retiring from the field and discussing situations with others, so as to attain some distance and 
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perspective on the experiences I had had. I then returned to the field and discussed shared 
sensibilities, and common understandings and patterns of actions with members of the group. 
 
In an effort to think reflexively, I considered my interest in and assumptions about the data, and 
how they may have influenced the research in particular directions (Finlay, 2002). Take my 
nationality as an instance. I am American and therefore upon commencing this study I was 
more familiar with the parameters of acceptable television content in the United States than in 
the United Kingdom. At the time I did not adequately understand the British population's 
sensitivity to television violence and did not want to make false assumptions, so I relied on 
social research and the judgement of experts during my examination to avoid allowing an 
American understanding of ‘acceptable’ or ‘standard’ broadcast content to affect the way I 
collected and processed data.25 By understanding and addressing how my interpretation could 
affect the data, I improved my ability to generate accurate findings (see also Lather 2001).   
 
My foreign ‘outsider’ perspective also brought advantages to the research. It meant that I had a 
fresh, uncontaminated view of the material. I had few preconceptions about the United 
Kingdom’s television industry and its regulation, and this may have helped to illuminate 
practices, patterns, embedded presumptions and social structures that would not have been as 
readily visible to native eyes (see also Simmel, 2002).  
 
Playing the naive outsider encouraged interviewees to explain their procedures and culture, 
and the industry to me in greater depth. Had I been native to the industry, individuals would 
have likely assumed that I was already aware of these things and glossed over them. Being an 
‘outsider’ however meant that respondents could make fewer assumptions about my 
background, my knowledge, thoughts or research motivations (see also Robb, 1954). 
 
Some individuals, particularly in the production environment, also used our time speaking as 
an open confessional, revealing far more about their experiences than I had expected (see 
also Simmel, 2002). Part of this openness stemmed from their desire to relieve pent-up work-
related stress before a friendly and readily listening audience, and part related to their desire 
                                                 
25 For example, the television-makers I examined routinely had to make judgements about whether or 
not particular scenes of violence were permissible. Rather than relying on my own opinions, which 
were coloured by the television programming I watched in my home country, I asked those in the 
industry to explain why certain programmes were deemed contentious. I also examined the numerous 
studies broadcast regulators had conducted about public attitudes towards television violence. This 
enabled me to separate better my opinions from the more relevant opinions of those concerned. 
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that I, a stranger, should understand the tough realities of an industry that was often viewed by 
outsiders as glamorous.   
 
As my employment at Ofcom spanned over four years, I was susceptible to losing this 
objective view of the setting over time, of ‘going native’. To prevent this, I continually attempted 
to think critically about events and to return periodically to an academic mind-set. I reviewed 
the detailed notes I had taken of my experiences as I wrote my thesis, which enabled me to 
recapture my thoughts and feelings at different stages in the research process. I also made 
individuals aware that I was conducting an academic study and, since many people wanted to 
help me in this process, they were willing to discuss my research with me in an on-going 
manner. This enabled me to return frequently to my academic mind-frame. 
 
Although being self-aware is an important feature in reflexive analysis, I also knew that 
researchers cannot be entirely aware of themselves at all times, especially when playing a 
participatory role. As I had obtained access to the environments by accepting posts within 
them, I had to divide my attention between analysing the environments and performing my 
professional roles. Although this situation gave me a relatively naturalistic view of events, it 
sometimes impaired my ability to think self-consciously about my interpretation of events and 
how my presence might have influenced others. I therefore took to analysing situations 
prospectively and retrospectively, and to checking my findings with others in the field to ensure 
that they received some endorsement.26  
 
Ethical considerations 
 
This project dealt with sensitive information surrounding companies’ non-compliance, and so I 
was obliged to build ethical considerations into the research plan to protect the interests of 
participants as to ensure better their involvement. I therefore altered the description of the 
programmes to conceal their identities and anonymised all participants, both in the writing of 
this thesis and in my communication between the organisations.27  
 
                                                 
26 One’s self examination can also lead to the problem of not knowing when to stop the cycle of 
analysing one’s self analysing situations. My decision to validate my findings with a range of people 
helped to address this issue, and kept me from focusing unduly on reflexive analysis.  
27
 For a fuller discussion of such ethical elements see Burgess, 1985; Murphy and Dingwall, 2001. 
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This rendered Ofcom unable to investigate the non-compliant acts of the producers or 
broadcasters I examined, because they did not know their identities. I also did not discuss the 
inner workings of the regulator with the television-makers, nor the way that they dealt with their 
compliance infractions, both out of a desire to retain confidentiality and to keep the data free of 
contamination. I was furthermore not in a position where I could have explained these matters 
to the television-makers, because I examined Ofcom after my discussions with them and 
therefore, at the time, I could not have revealed any information to them that was not already in 
the public domain. 
 
In line with this, given the sensitivity surrounding regulatory matters, I kept various aspects of 
the regulatory process confidential, even in the writing of this thesis.28 I made these 
amendments to my thesis without jeopardising the integrity of the data. 
 
I also informed those who I worked with that I was a PhD student studying television regulation. 
The objectives of the research were also revealed to the producers, broadcasters and 
regulators upon my initial meeting with them, and they were discussed at various points 
thereafter as my research focus evolved. Prior to the interviews, I also explained what types of 
questions I was going to ask and what I hoped to gain from their contribution. I informed them 
that I was going to tape record the interviews so that I could turn to them at later dates for 
information. I also relayed that every individual was going to remain anonymous, and that all 
names and programme titles were going to be changed to avoid external identification. I took 
these measures to allow participants to feel comfortable to talk about sensitive topics that they 
might otherwise not discuss. In return, many of the participants were willing to disclose 
sensitive compliance information with me, on the basis of an understanding that I was not 
going to relay such information to the regulator. 
 
Lastly, while conducting the fieldwork at Envision, I was confronted with and invited to partake 
in unethical practices on numerous occasions. For instance, producers were instructed by 
management to deceive individuals about the nature of the series in production to get them to 
agree to interviews. In these instances I opted to behave as I was instructed, in the belief that 
to have done otherwise would have compromised my employment at the organisation and 
imperilled the research.  
                                                 
28
 For instance, I did not reveal sensitive information about specific companies which was not 
already in the public domain. 
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Individuals who investigate crime, deviance and regulation almost always confront instances of 
rule-breaking which, were they to report it, would likely sour relations between the researchers 
and researched, and bring all research in the area to an abrupt halt. It is the business of the 
researcher to work dispassionately, observing, reporting and analysing without judging or 
interfering (unless, of course, one witnesses something as deviant as child abuse for instance) 
(Douglas, 1970). Researchers can then, as I have aimed to do, use their findings to shed light 
on the deviant practices they witnessed, so that they might be addressed more widely. In this 
instance, I therefore believed that the contribution this research could make to the field would 
outweigh the cost of my actions. 
 
Part 1: Examining an independent production company 
 
The first segment of my study included a five-month long ethnography of the television 
production company, Envision. There I was employed as a researcher, assisting in the 
production of Agony II for the broadcaster Entertainu and Violent Rage for VSTV (both pseudo 
names). The access to Envision was secured by obtaining an internship, which I found via the 
internet.  
 
The internship was for one month only, so it became my objective to gain a freelance position 
in order to continue the research. I tried to gain employment with Agony II as it appeared most 
in need of assistance and therefore its producers seemed most likely to hire me. My strategy 
was to understand the employees’ duties and decision-making processes to establish who had 
the greatest overall knowledge and the power to hire staff.  
 
After identifying the series producer as the key figure on Agony II, I began spending a 
substantial amount of time assisting her and her staff. She noticed the long (12 to 14 hour) 
days I had been working and hired me within a month to work as a researcher for four to six 
days a week, with hours ranging between 50 and 90 per week. This allowed me to witness the 
programme’s entire production process, as I began when it started and left when it was 
complete. She also served as a gatekeeper to different branches of production usually 
inaccessible to researchers, such as the editing, shooting and interviewing processes, and this 
allowed me to develop relationships with the producer, editors and camera operators. After I 
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had established a rapport with colleagues, I was able to question them about their work and 
request formal interviews.  
 
My initial goal when I entered the field had been to examine television portrayals of violence 
towards women, as the two programmes I had worked on showed extensive amounts of 
violence. However, my research direction shifted as the topic of regulatory compliance and 
ethical practice emerged as a more fruitful and important subject matter. Given this 
unanticipated shift, I carried out the ethnography before undertaking a regulation-based 
literature review. This enabled me to be open-minded, allowing the environment to shape my 
understanding of pertinent subjects and leading me in turn to the formulation of findings based 
on an accumulation of data-led empirical evidence, rather than to findings influenced by pre-
existing notions or theories. After examining my findings, I identified the literature that pertained 
to my research and reviewed it whilst I conducted my review of the broadcaster and regulator. 
This gave me a framework for better understanding and scoping my topic.  
 
My questions about regulatory compliance evolved over time and became woven into a 
comprehensive description both of the television environment, and of the production and 
broadcasting processes. My knowledge of the field increased alongside my ability to become 
integrated into the various working communities, earning employees’ trust and building social 
ties through the camaraderie of spending long hours in an office and on filming assignments 
with them.  
 
I initially chose to appear friendly, conversational and unbiased, and tried not to give a strong 
indication of my own opinions (see also Selltiz, 1965; Sjoberg and Nett, 1968). Toward the end 
of the ethnography, after I had gained colleagues’ trust, I did share some of those opinions and 
feelings to deepen my level of conversation with colleagues. This led them to express their own 
thoughts about sensitive issues, such as how they were treated as employees and how they 
felt about working with very violent content. 
 
The combination of situational opportunities and the use of different approaches to gather data 
enabled me to learn about the various areas I needed to understand to engage with the topic of 
regulatory compliance. Broadly speaking, this included an examination of: 
 
 the producers’ programming-making and regulatory objectives/responsibilities; 
 87 
 how they pursued these objectives and responsibilities; 
 what factors influenced the manner in which they pursued these objectives and 
responsibilities; and 
 what their decisions/actions revealed about the nature of regulatory compliance and 
weakness. 
 
To explore these areas I: kept a detailed daily journal of my observations of the company’s 
activities; participated in the creation of its television series through researching programme 
topics; observed the editing and filming of the series; and collected and analysed various 
documents and correspondence. As my time at the organisation progressed, I also conducted 
numerous informal and formal, in-depth interviews with staff at all levels, including researchers, 
editors, assistant and series producers, camera operators, a production manager, the 
production director, the head of development and the president of the company. This 
constituted nearly every member of staff, almost 15 people. For a description of the individuals 
I interviewed and an example of the types of questions I asked, see Appendix One. 
 
Part 2: Examining a broadcaster 
 
I next explored the process of commissioning programmes and enforcing regulatory 
compliance by the broadcaster, Entertainu. I gained access to employees of Entertainu through 
my relationship with Envision. The series producer recommended that I contact Envision’s 
commissioning editor to request an interview. She agreed to meet and then arranged for me to 
interview the manager and programme viewer in their compliance department. Members of the 
compliance department reviewed all content prior to its broadcast and were responsible for 
ensuring that it met relevant regulations. The manager oversaw the department and handled 
the correspondence surrounding contentious content with the regulator, while the programme 
viewer examined content for compliance errors and instructed production-makers of how to 
remedy them. In the interviews I explored:  
 
 the broadcasters’ programme-making and regulatory objectives/responsibilities; 
 how they pursued these objectives and responsibilities; 
 what factors influenced their chosen approach; and 
 what their decisions/actions revealed about the nature of regulatory compliance and 
weakness. 
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Furthermore, I observed the programme being edited, and formally and informally questioned 
the editors and producer about their discussions with the broadcasters. I monitored the 
correspondence between the broadcaster and the production company, which discussed the 
content in Agony II that the broadcaster asked the production company to augment or remove 
in order to comply with regulation.  
 
I was also permitted to examine the previous correspondence between the broadcaster and 
the regulator. This included documents which discussed how the prequel to the series I had 
worked on, Agony, had breached the regulatory rules, Ofcom’s consideration of whether Agony 
II may have also breached the rules, and how the broadcaster and the regulator negotiated 
these matters. Reading those papers gave me insight into the compliance process and the 
dynamics of the relationship between the broadcaster and the regulator. The information I 
found in the correspondence, along with the supporting interviews, was particularly helpful in 
allowing me to determine what impact the reprimand relating to the first series had had on the 
compliance measures taken in the second.  
 
Part 3: Examining the regulator, Ofcom 
 
This section has been omitted for confidentiality purposes. 
 
Data analysis 
 
This takes me now to a discussion of how I analysed my data. As noted, my research 
attempted to understand how individuals at each stage of the production, broadcast and 
regulation enforcement process made decisions about the selection, shape and compliance of 
programme content; what factors influenced their decisions; and what the subsequent effects 
of their decisions were.  
  
In order to analyse the data that I collected, I reviewed my journal notes (which outlined my 
daily observations), my interview transcripts and other key documents that I found to be useful 
tools to explain the situations I examined (e.g. company documents, compliance case 
literature, etc). I also reviewed the relevant media/regulation literature to understand the 
external factors that helped to shape the dynamics of the environment (e.g. changes in politics, 
advancements in technology, etc.).  
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I categorised my findings under themes which helped me to understand the television-makers’ 
and regulators’ common forms of behaviour. Once I was able to establish patterns in their 
behaviour, I examined the data to identify what factors appeared to shape their conduct. (For 
instance, I noted the different ways in which the producers commonly breached the regulations 
and the variety of reasons that they used to explain why they behaved the way they did.)  
 
To confirm the accuracy of my findings, I arranged formal and informal interviews with 
participants at each organisation to review the data and cross-check colleagues’ statements. 
 
In a manner resembling the approach of Shoemaker and Reese (1996), users of the 
gatekeeping method, I then arrayed my findings into a hierarchal model which outlined the 
elements that influenced actors’ decisions (see also Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). While 
Shoemaker and Reese’s model included five levels, I used a simplified version, based on three 
levels. The first was the individual level - which included the influence of an individual and his 
or her characteristics on a decision-making process (e.g. the influence that a person’s unique 
set of ethics, tastes, values, etc. had on their decision-making) (see also Kahneman, Slovic 
and Tversky, 1982). The second was the organisational level, which included the influence of 
organisational norms, practices, routines and culture on decision-making (see also Bantz, 
1990). The third, the external factors level, accounted for the influence of external structures 
and forces on decision-making (e.g. market forces, technological advancements, political and 
regulatory shifts, ideology, etc.) (see also Donohue, Olien and Tichenor, 1989; Kuhn, 2002; 
Skewes, 2007) (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: Hierarchical model of the levels that influence decision-making 
External level
Organisational level
Individual level
 
 
 
While various researchers have adopted a similar model and analysed situations on single 
levels of this spectrum, my own work identified influential factors across the spectrum and 
made links between them.29 This has allowed me to reveal how factors at one level have 
influenced decision-making at other levels, thereby explaining better the source and working of 
influences. (For instance, it shows how environmental factors (e.g. changes in regulation, 
politics and technology) have filtered down and influenced television-makers’ day-to-day 
decisions about content and regulatory compliance.)  
 
My identification of aspects across the hierarchical model and my method of making 
connections between them, answers the call from Shoemaker and Vos (2009) for such work to 
be done to fill a gap in the media gatekeeping literature (see also Ferree, 2002; Benson and 
Neveu, 2005; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). It also fulfils their request for further research to 
examine how environmental factors shape media-practitioners’ decisions about content. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 This highlights the benefit of the ethnography method, which enabled me to be saturated into the 
environments I studied for nearly five years to learn their ‘ins and outs’ in detail. 
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Conclusion 
 
In summary, my research method was an amalgam of observational, documentary and 
interview techniques targeted at three organisations. The first part included a five-month 
ethnography of a production company. The second involved interviews with members of the 
compliance and commissioning teams at the sponsoring television channel. The third involved 
a long-term ethnographic study of the regulator. 
  
I shall now move on to the next chapter, which introduces the first segment of the research, the 
ethnography of the production company. Through my exploration of a television series 
throughout its production life-cycle, I shall explain how programme-makers pushed the 
boundaries of permissible graphic content and skirted around regulatory rules when faced with 
intense work-related pressure stemming from, amongst other things, an increasingly 
competitive market. 
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Chapter 5 
The Independent Production Company 
 
This chapter discusses the findings from a case study of one independent production company 
which had aimed to circumvent the ‘content standards regulations’ and ‘push the boundaries’ of 
permissible violent content.30 While Ofcom was established to develop and enforce guidelines 
(or limits) to protect citizens from ‘harmful’ and ‘offensive’ content and ‘unfair’ treatment, the 
producers working in the company aimed both to bypass and extend those limits.
31
 
 
The chapter has been laid out as a step-by-step analysis of the process of television 
production, from commissioning, to story-gathering, filming, editing and compliance checking. 
Analysing this process revealed the employees’ practical understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities, and allowed for a greater awareness of how individual, organisational and 
external factors, such as the company’s organisational culture and technological advances in 
production technology, influenced the way content was created and regulatory compliance was 
managed. My intention is to describe the micro and macro level factors that influenced the 
producers’ compliance decisions, how they interlinked and what the subsequent regulatory 
effect was. 
 
Theoretically speaking, I shall also show how the producers were faced with conflicting 
economic/programme-making objectives and regulatory responsibilities, and how, given these 
variety of factors, they felt compelled to prioritise their economic/programme-making 
objectives, and collectively practice non-compliance, ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule 
reinterpretation’. These acts were widespread and routine, as the producers frequently treated 
programme contributors in a manner that would likely be deemed ‘unfair’ by the regulatory 
rules. They also developed techniques to circumvent the content standards rules and 
effectively extend the limits of permissible graphic content.   
 
                                                 
30 The organisation’s claim to ‘push the boundaries’ or permissible content was stated by its production 
director, who oversee the creation of all television series produced within the company. 
31
  To protect the confidentiality of those involved, the names, titles and identifying details of all 
individuals, organisations and programmes have been changed with the exception of the 
organisational identification of Ofcom. This has been done without compromising the integrity of the 
analysis. 
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Producers made these choices much as the rational choice-based theories, rational choice 
institutionalism and the ‘amoral calculator’ typology, would suggest they might, by loosely 
weighing the presumed costs and benefits of different courses of action, and pursuing the most 
advantageous option (Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Hechter, 1987; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009).  
 
The ‘costs’ in this equation equalled their anticipated likelihood of getting caught and penalised 
by the regulator, a likelihood which they presumed to be either low or impossible. The ‘benefits’ 
included completing the series on time and to budget, which enhanced the individuals’ and the 
organisation’s reputations for successful project delivery and thereby their economic positions. 
These decisions were also made within the context of an institutionalised organisational culture 
which not only condoned, but promoted, regulatory non-compliance (which relates to 
sociological institutionalism).  
 
Individuals’ rule infringements also stemmed from, amongst other things, an insufficient, 
sometimes calculatedly insufficient,  knowledge of the rules and an inability to calculate 
regulatory risks effectively, which reflected an interesting mix of Kagan and Scholz’s 
‘corporation as incompetent’ and ‘amoral calculator’ ideal types. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX           TEXT OMITTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY PURPOSES        XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 An introduction to the production company 
 
Chapter Three described various macro level changes which had occurred over the last 
several decades and dramatically altered the shape of the television industry, such as 
advances in technology and shifts in politics. This led to the rapid growth, diversification and 
deregulation of the television market. With this came a rise in multichannel operators, such as 
Entertainu, and independent producers, such as Envision, along with a significant increase in 
competition pressures. These pressures encouraged television-makers to pursue ratings by 
commercialising content and making it more entertainment-based, exemplified by the rise in 
‘tabloid’ and ‘reality’ television; the type of programming discussed in this chapter (Grabe, et al 
2000). 
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Envision was a small to mid-sized independent producer with roughly seven permanent and 15 
freelance staff. It was founded in 1999, alongside numerous other similarly sized producers, 
and filled a niche in the television industry by creating low-cost so-called ‘tabloid’ programming 
which often revolved around sexual, violent or ‘humorous’ content delivered through what was 
conceived to be an ‘alternative’, boundary-pushing style.  
 
The programmes Envision created frequently resembled Jackass, Dirty Sanchez and World’s 
Wildest Police Videos, all of which targeted a young adult male audience. (Jackass and Dirty 
Sanchez were programmes that were intended to amuse and shock audiences through their 
display of individuals performing ‘humorous’ or harmful stunts, such as nailing one’s genitalia to 
a piece of wood or piercing one’s buttocks together. World’s Wildest Police Videos was about 
police chases: the programme used real-life footage of police officers in pursuit of suspected 
criminals.) 
 
Envision grew appreciably in the early 2000s as the commercial demand for reality television’s 
‘caught on camera’ programming such as COPS and American’s Funniest Home Videos 
increased in popularity. It was a trend that had begun in the 1980s as technological 
developments, coupled with deregulation, began to diminish the exclusive power of strong 
terrestrial networks and brought “new patterns of production and distribution that further 
encouraged the tabloid trend in news and also prompted the rise of reality-based 
programming” (Grindstaff, 2002: p. 50; see also Raphael, 1997). This growth led Envision to 
become one of the top 100 ranked independent production companies in the United Kingdom 
(Broadcast, 2006).   
 
I reported that my ethnographic work at Envision, which spanned a five-month period between 
December 2003 and March 2004, captured the behind-the-scenes practices of production-
makers in the midst of this ‘tabloid’ trend. Access to the company was gained through my 
acceptance of a work experience position, which allowed me to participate in and observe the 
production of two tabloid series which I have entitled Agony II and Violent Rage. After the first 
month of serving as a trainee, I was hired as a researcher for Agony II and that led to a 
concentration of my ethnographic focus.  
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In this chapter, I shall primarily describe Agony II, although information from my participant 
observation of the making of Violent Rage and interviews conducted with employees from a 
third series that was in production entitled The 10 Worst will also be included where applicable.  
 
Agony II: 
 
Agony II was an entertainment-based ‘tabloid’ series (as its producers referred to it) which 
examined pain in its various forms and contexts. On its website the broadcaster described 
Agony, its prequel:32 
 
Agony, a suffering stuffed half hour of other people's pain for your entertainment. 
From torture to gun-shot wounds, flesh hanging to whipping. You want pain, we've 
got it in spades.  
 
The science of pain. The history of torture. Real footage of Yakuza severing their 
fingers. The man who survives an eight inch serrated commando knife stuck in his 
brain. Pain for pleasure. Pain for religion. Pain for beauty. Agony pushes the 
boundaries of human experience. You may want to look away from the screen, but 
you'll keep getting drawn back to it.  
 
Merrily pissing on electric fences or getting bullwhipped, we put pain to the test. 
Which nation is the hardest? Who can survive ice torture best, chefs or bouncers? 
What's worse, thumbscrews or water torture? Who will stop the pain first, your 
girlfriend, your sister or a stranger? Does everyone get off on being spanked by 
foxy chicks? You've never seen anything as extreme as this. Agony, so good it 
hurts.  
 
Because the series was said by Envision’s staff to be one of the most graphic programmes 
ever to be aired on British television – one that aimed to ‘push the boundaries’ of permissible 
content – Agony II’s production environment offered a rich setting for the exploration of the 
social and regulatory limits of acceptable violent content and how those limits can become 
extended.  
 
Producers’ use of the phrase ‘pushing the boundaries’ referred to the programme-makers’ 
intention to redefine the perimeters of acceptable graphic footage by making programmes with 
violent imagery that had not previously been broadcast. Such scenes would have been 
deemed too contentious to transmit in previous years, as the IBA placed greater restrictions 
over the nature of content broadcasters could transmit, and its regulators (unlike Ofcom’s 
regulators) reviewed and approved all content prior to broadcast to ensure that it complied with 
the regulations.  
                                                 
32
 The website link is not provided as to maintain confidentiality. 
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Ofcom presided over public complaints cases which accused both Agony and Agony II of 
infringing the regulatory code. Its verdict on the first series, which I shall discuss later in this 
chapter, found it to be in breach of the regulation controlling the display of ‘imitable violence’, 
while the second series was deemed permissible. Numerous other, arguably non-compliant, 
acts which will also be discussed in this chapter were not brought to the attention of Ofcom and 
therefore its staff did not assess whether they had breached the regulations. I shall therefore 
describe these acts and suggest what regulatory rules they would likely have been judged 
against should a viewer have complained. 
 
Violent Rage: 
 
The second production I studied, Violent Rage, was produced for a prominent, widely-watched 
British broadcast network. It was a six-part tabloid-style documentary which examined “Violent 
and threatening behaviour in all its forms, from tribal aggression and road rage, through to 
armed robbery and the brutality of international terrorism.”33 The programme displayed ‘caught 
on camera’ footage of highly graphic scenes (for example, individuals being attacked and 
beaten), alongside interviews with the individuals involved who explained where and why the 
violent outbursts occurred.  
 
Violent Rage was a significant addition to the case study, as its producers also actively 
pressed regulatory limits.  
 
Phase 1: The commissioning process 
 
Having described the programmes being examined, I shall examine the step-by-step 
production process. Envision’s first step in the production of Agony II was to secure a 
commission from the broadcaster, Entertainu.34 In this case, securing a commission was 
simple, as Envision had produced its prequel, Agony, which had become the highest rated 
series in the broadcaster’s history. 
                                                 
33
 This description of the programme was provided in an online television guide. The reference is not 
supplied to ensure the programme’s confidentiality. 
34 Commissioning typically involved a broadcaster hiring a production company to produce a 
programme to an existing specification. Alternatively, a production company can develop a programme 
layout to present for sale, otherwise referred to as a ‘pitch’, to a broadcaster. 
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To mimic the structure of the first series, the television-makers agreed that Agony II should 
consistent of 15 episodes, 30 minutes each in length. Every programme would explore acts of 
injury from a different angle, such as ‘Pain for Pleasure’, ‘Suffer to be Beautiful’ and ‘Pain for 
Fame’. The specified layout and subject matter of the series were created to appeal to a male 
audience between the ages of 18 and 34 years old.35  
 
As noted in Chapter Three, the early years of television concentrated the medium in a small 
number of networks which provided commercial ‘airtime’ to the advertisers who wanted to 
reach a wide ‘demographic’ (that is, an audience of men, women and children of various ages). 
Britain’s significant expansion in channels has, however, caused audiences to fragment. While 
the largest channels such as BBC One and ITV1 still reach rather diverse audiences, there has 
been a shift amongst smaller channels, such as Entertainu, towards targeting more specific 
groups. These operators were referred to as ‘niche’ channels.36   
 
Series Objectives 
 
Broadly speaking, the producers of Agony II had two key objectives – to ensure that the series 
was successfully produced (meaning that it achieved high ratings and was completed on time 
and within budget) and to ensure that it was not found by Ofcom to be in breach of regulations. 
 
It was the role of the seasoned series producer to develop a feeling, format and narrative style 
for Agony II which would feed the broadcaster’s need for audience appeal. When questioned 
about her approach, she stated that her experience had showed her that “A successful 
programme had three elements: Something to make people laugh, think and cringe.” In 
essence, this translated into the pursuit of three programme-making objectives:  
 
                                                 
35
 The selection of an audience ‘demographic’ is dictated by the interests of advertisers whose 
commercial funding supports the costs of the network. This has often translated into the creation of 
programmes that are intended to appeal to particular groups based on their age, gender or socio-
economic status. Since advertisers want to market their products or services alongside television 
shows directed at their particular customers, this better enables them to reach those specified groups 
without the unnecessary expense of advertising to uninterested populations. 
36 The population segment they aim to reach is dictated by the interests of advertisers whose 
commercial funding supports the costs of the network. Since advertisers want to market their products 
or services to specific groups, niche channels allow them effectively to do so. 
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1. to provide viewers with shocking stories that had increasingly graphic images of 
violence which viewers had never seen before, such as individuals cutting off their 
fingers in political protest or a man removing his testicles with a scalpel for the 
purpose of personal fulfilment. This was intended to make people ‘cringe’, which 
meant to make them recoil from the surprise of looking at such uniquely gruesome 
imagery; 
 
2. to amuse audiences over the surprising nature of many of the stories; and  
 
3. to provoke thought by educating viewers with related medical or statistical 
knowledge about the form of injury, such as how much pressure must be placed on a 
knife to sever one’s finger. (This ostensibly educational element was used to 
contextualise the content and to offset regulatory intervention by claiming a higher 
purpose.)  
 
The television-makers also wanted to ensure that Agony II was not found to infringe regulatory 
requirements, as the ITC had informed Entertainu that its prequel, Agony, was in breach of 
Section 1.7(c) of the code (imitable violence37) and came “extremely close” to breaching 
sections 1.7(a) and 1.8 of the Code (offensive violence and respect for humans’ dignity and 
treatment of minorities). When the ITC reprimanded Entertainu, it stated (2003): 
 
There is recent evidence of broadcasters’ ‘upping the ante’ as to the pain and 
injury elements in these programmes. The ITC has obvious concern about the 
portrayal of violence – in which we include the infliction of pain – particularly in a 
primarily entertainment context…The portrayal of such extreme scenes requires 
very careful consideration as well as strong editorial justification.  
 
…as the commentary puts it, ‘other peoples’ agony for your entertainment’ hardly 
squares with the [ITC] Code requirement not to make the audience mere voyeurs 
of others’ distress, (Section 1.8)…In its presentation of one ‘painful’ image after 
another, this seemed to us gratuitously extended. Accompanied by a commentary 
frequently flippant in tone, both sequences seem to us to be seriously 
questionable... 
 
To address the consequences of the regulatory infringement and attendant warning, the 
television-makers decided to bring an educational element to Agony II, so as to re-
contextualise the graphic imagery and make it more editorially justifiable. That meant to make 
                                                 
37 “Imitable” violence meant forms of violence content that had the potential to influence viewers to act 
violently. 
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the violence appear less “gratuitous” and therefore compliant with the regulatory code (ITC, 
2003).38 They therefore stated that conceptually their mission was to create a series to appeal 
to a “lad with a PhD”.39  
 
Envision’s intention to target “lads” stemmed from the channel’s perceived niche in the industry 
as a ‘boy’s channel’. A series producer at Envision stated, “If [Entertainu] were a newspaper it 
would be the Daily Star…It is like a slightly cheaper version of The Sun. Basically, there are a 
lot of explosions and breasts.”40 The television-makers’ interest in including an educational 
theme, otherwise referred to as “PhD”, was intended to allow the series to bypass regulatory 
intervention. One employee stated:  
 
Agony II, ‘seeing other people’s suffering’, needs to be editorially justified. It needs 
to be almost as if you are learning something from it. It shouldn’t be for pure 
titillation…Agony had crossed the line between informative, educational television 
into pure violent titillation. 
  
I shall show that the programme-makers’ professed desire to be genuinely informative was, 
however, superficial, as their aim was to repackage images as graphic as those of the first 
series. They thereby intended to create techniques to follow the “letter” of the regulatory Code, 
but not its “spirit”, enabling them to practise ‘creative compliance’.  
 
Phase 2: The hiring process and organisational culture 
 
With the thematic foundation of Agony II’s layout having been developed in the commissioning 
stage, the next step of programme-making involved hiring a production team. I shall describe 
Envision’s employment criteria, as a precursor to understanding the industry’s competitive 
culture. Most importantly, I shall explain how the dynamics of its culture made employees more 
susceptible to adopting non-compliant practices. 
 
Agony II required a staff of three permanent and 12 freelance employees, including producers, 
directors, researchers, editors, a production manager, a graphics specialist and a narrator. (Its 
high number of freelancers reflected the shift in the market away from permanent staff which I 
discussed in Chapter Three.)  
                                                 
38
 ‘Gratuitous violence’ referred to violent scenes that were overly graphic and unjustified by their 
context within a programme. 
39
 Series Producer, Agony II, 2003 
40
 Interview with a Series Producer at Envision, 2004 
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The environment was one in which employees worked as a tight-knit team, in close proximity to 
one another, for extensive hours. It was critical for workers to function in a collegial manner as 
the production environment was highly pressurised and employees needed to work together 
effectively to reach targets within tight deadlines. 
 
The structure of the environment led to the development of close working relationships and 
friendships. There was a norm of reciprocity in which it was common for workers to help one 
another find and secure new jobs to ensure that they had a continuous flow of work. This often 
resulted in employees shifting onto new projects together. The assistance workers provided to 
each other stemmed from a common understanding that it was difficult to sustain steady 
employment in the competitive freelance environment. When one series producer was asked 
about the amount of pressure television-makers were under to find their next project, he stated, 
“Massive pressure. There are times when I’m just so stressed out… It’s massive stress; it really 
is. But it’s all the way up – it is the industry.”  
 
This pressure led employees to maximize the use of their connections and to covet new job 
openings, which led to a sense of insularity and exclusivity in the production environment. It 
was widely noted amongst staff that such exclusivity was common throughout the industry, 
making the possession of inside contacts a critical factor in one’s ability to maintain a 
successful career in programme production. Granovetter noted in ‘Getting a Job: A Study of 
Contracts and Careers’ that such a use of recruitment networks was very common (1974; 
1995).  
 
In addition to having contacts, a strong reputation for successfully completing projects 
appeared to be an essential ingredient to maintain employment. Together, these factors proved 
more valuable than formal experience alone. The series producer of The 10 Worst stated: “If 
someone I trust41 recommends me to someone I will take that person every time over someone 
with a really good CV… it’s all on reputation; the whole thing.” He explained that the reasoning 
for this was that individuals’ curricula vitae could not illustrate their level of commitment to 
projects, their talent for successfully completing programmes in spite of the numerous 
                                                 
41
 His use of the word “trust” in regard to those that he could elicit recommendations from for potential 
candidates included those he had previously worked with and knew to perform to a high standard. 
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obstacles and pressures brought by the hectic environment, nor their ability to fit in socially with 
the team.  
 
Given these barriers, it was common for new entrants to the field to find it difficult to secure 
paid employment. It was a difficulty reflected in a study of 79 UK production companies which 
found that over one-quarter (29 per cent) of organisations surveyed “used or were made up of 
unpaid workers” (Pollard et al., 2005: pg. 28).  
 
An illustration of the type of atmosphere many newcomers experienced was offered by Violent 
Rage’s assistant producer who claimed that he had worked for free for six months, then for a 
year on a salary of £100 per week before he was promoted to the role of researcher. Similarly, 
the series producer of The 10 Worst claimed to have originally competed against 
approximately 400 people to get an unpaid internship in television. He was then promoted to a 
low level position after nine months, working 90 hours per week on a salary of £8,000 a year 
before gaining a more financially secure post. 
 
The producers I examined, all of whom had passed the gruelling and financially draining 
internship phase, expressed a great appreciation of the opportunity to work within an admired 
industry, and a great determination to work hard to remain in the field. The series producer 
from The 10 Worst stated:  
 
One thing you need to keep reminding yourself after the first two years onwards is 
that I’m still very lucky to be working in this industry and I still have to work my ass 
off to keep going in this industry…Last year I was on the road for three months and 
we had maybe one day off work in three months. By the time we got back we were 
knackered, absolutely shot to pieces. You are working and when you are not 
working you are stressing about items that dropped out.42 
 
These individuals’ desire to enter the industry and the challenge that many of them faced when 
trying to stay a part of it, led those at Envision readily to accept and adapt to the company’s 
distinctively heavy working pressures, competitive organisational culture and approaches to 
regulating compliance. 
 
After all, Envision was relatively small in size and did not hold enough market power to 
command costly, high-end commissions, such as those the BBC or ITV funded. Its 
                                                 
42 The ‘dropping out’ of an item means that one of the segments in a series was found to be unusable 
and therefore the producers had to create a segment to replace it. 
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management therefore frequently sold their content to multichannel broadcasters for low 
prices. This brought it about that projects were typically understaffed, as management did not 
have enough funds to hire an adequate number of workers. 
 
In turn, numerous unpaid and inexperienced interns were hired and the remaining team 
members often had to assume multiple roles (for example, researcher, interviewer and camera 
operator) and to work long hours on minimal pay. Researchers worked roughly 11 hours a day 
and often overtime on weekends, and made between £250 and £500 a week. This would 
amount to between £4.55 and £9.10 an hour for a 55 hour working week (see also Grindstaff, 
2002).43  
 
The result was a strenuous working environment, and, to add to the pressure, the series 
producer, who had overall control of the production, often shouted derogatory comments at 
employees when they made mistakes or failed to achieve their project goals. For instance, she 
angrily referred on one occasion to an employee as “stupid” in front of his peers and on 
another she declared that ‘his work was alright so long as he did not have a job where he 
needed to think’.44 Although these remarks may have reflected her generally short-tempered 
personality, the stress of the working environment served to exacerbate the situation and her 
behaviour. She claimed, along with the series producer of Violent Rage, that the years of 
continued pressure they experienced led them to develop physical ailments, and so the 
environment not only led to psychological, but also to physical strain.   
 
Compounding the problem, Envision lacked many of the refined organisational practices often 
associated with larger, more mature organisations. For instance, it offered no production or 
regulatory training sessions to staff, it lacked workers who were dedicated to compliance 
checking, and it did not have a human resources team which could deal with official forms of 
hiring and firing, and with employee grievances (therefore workers did not have a mechanism 
to complain formally about the way in which they were treated).  
 
                                                 
43
 Their salaries, however, increased as they gained experience, shifted into roles of greater authority 
or transferred into companies with more financial resources. Like many industries, it was a small 
number of members at the top that made disproportionately higher incomes than the remaining staff. 
44
 The latter statement is paraphrased from the series producer’s comments to staff, 2004. 
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It will become apparent throughout this chapter that this heavily pressurised set-up helped to 
create an environment and organisational culture in which employees felt compelled to 
prioritise their economic and business objectives before their regulatory commitments.  
 
Phase 3: The story formulation process – the importance of the ‘money shot’ 
 
This section will discuss the importance that the producers placed on graphic imagery as a 
means to attains ratings. It will also explain how they re-contextualised scenes of violence to 
make them appear more ‘comical’ or ‘entertaining’, as to keep viewers from experiencing 
empathy with those who were wounded and reduce their likelihood of disapproval or offence, 
which could render the programme impermissible under the regulatory code.  
 
It will furthermore examine how viewers’ and journalists’ expressed disappointment of the 
content resulted in public dialog which served to produce further ratings and motivate the 
television-makers to test the limits of acceptable content even further. Lastly, the section will 
describe how the television-makers were offered greater freedom than their competitors to test 
these limits, as the channel, Agony II, was being broadcast on the cable and satellite platforms, 
and targeted young men – both of which were aspects that were considered less likely to 
generate public offence. 
 
To begin, the first thing the producers did when identifying potential stories was to look for 
graphic imagery. The storylines were then built around it. This is in line with the argument of 
Laura Grindstaff, who said in The Money Shot: Trash, Class and the Making of TV Talk Shows, 
“What matters is the money shot and virtually all production efforts – choosing topics; finding, 
interviewing, and rehearsing guests; coaching audience members – are geared toward 
maximizing the probability of its display” (2002: p. 21).  
 
The producers I examined reported that Agony’s success with ratings stemmed from its ability 
to keep audiences’ attention by “shocking” them with highly graphic images that they had never 
seen before – the “money shots”, as they were referred to, drove the ratings. 
 
I remarked that the series producer had claimed that a successful storyline made audiences 
“laugh, think and cringe”. The ‘money shot’ could be translated into the “cringing” point of the 
programme. It was the climatic thrust of each story which created the intended effect of what 
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were called “water cooler moments”, which staff described as the “shocking or amazing” 
scenes that were supposed to leave viewers talking about them the next day.45  
 
I asked the production director about the aim of Agony II:  
 
(Production Director): To get people to watch it – to shock.
46
  
 
(Interviewer): What makes people watch it then, shock? 
 
(Production Director): Yes.  
 
(Interviewer): From the graphic images? 
 
(Production Director): Yes. Footage they’ve never seen before. What makes 
viewers flock to this kind of screen is ‘agony’; is the footage. Because you are 
seeing things that you’ve really never seen.  
 
 
The producers believed that the key to making a scene ‘shocking’ and ‘memorable’ was to 
ensure that the storyline and the imagery were different or more extreme than others shown on 
television. This argument was not only made about content within the entertainment genre, as I 
and Grindstaff (2002) have illustrated, but also within the news genre. For instance, Galtung 
and Ruge (1973) found that stories that were unusual, unexpected or particularly violent were 
more likely to be included in news reports than ‘common occurrences’, as they contributed to 
the on-going ‘drama’ of the ‘segment’ (a story within a series of stories). 
 
To illustrate Envision’s approach, in one instance the producers wanted to create a piece about 
body piercing, but piercing in itself was not deemed unusual enough to attract a high level of 
viewers because it was considered publicly acceptable. The company therefore added an 
unusual spin on the topic and produced a segment about a man attempting to beat the 
Guinness World Record for the greatest number of piercings. This tactic allowed viewers to see 
footage which had never been seen before of a man piercing himself with a record number of 
needles.  
 
The belief that one needed to broadcast new forms of graphic imagery to gain ratings led the 
producers to push the limits of television content. When I asked Agony II’s producers if the 
                                                 
45
 Series Producer of The 10 Worst, 2004 
46 The need to shock audiences to attain ratings is consistent with Grindstaff, 2002. 
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series was designed to extend the boundaries and if producers would do whatever they could 
get away with to gain ratings, she commented, “Yes, you are only successful if you do that. It is 
the only way of making people watch because the sort of audience we attract has seen it all 
and so you have to go a step further… I think every channel tries to do this because this is 
what sells so well”. 47 Envision’s production director further stated, “TV has changed because it 
is more ratings-driven. Now that you have got more channels, you have to chase the ratings or 
people won’t watch it; it is a bit sad.”48  
 
The producers’ heavy reliance on such imagery was further confirmed when I counted the 
number of graphic scenes in one random 24-minute episode of Agony (commercials were 
discounted): there were 84, a display of approximately one graphic image every 17 seconds. 49  
 
As these images were taken to be the most important aspect of the series, the storylines were 
written around them. A series producer said, “Always write to your pictures. You do not write a 
story and then put your pictures into it; your story is what you’ve got to show.”   
 
Yet, without the contextualisation provided by the storylines, the images would have appeared 
as no more than a rolling screen of violent shots, and this would not have been editorially 
justifiable or deemed permissible by Ofcom. In turn, and given the regulator’s warning about 
‘offensive violence’ from the first series, the producers sometimes went beyond simply 
reporting the facts surrounding pictures, and reconstructed the storylines to avoid audience 
‘offence’. (In doing so, they often reported the facts surrounding individuals’ stories incorrectly 
and this could have been deemed impermissible under Ofcom’s ‘fairness’ guidelines.) 
 
The following examples illustrate this point. In one instance, producers found material of a 45-
year old South American who was voluntarily crucified as part of a protest to force his 
government to recognize the region’s prevailing issue of poverty and homelessness. The 
demonstration was enacted before the annual celebration of Good Friday where a mock 
                                                 
47
 Interview, March 2004. 
48 Interview dated March 2004. This concept relates to Grindstaff’s finding that as competition 
increased in television talk shows, there was a drive for guests to “make something happen,” leading to 
a shift in content and style, making programmes even “…faster, louder, more visual, and, in the words 
of one producer, ‘full of attitude’” (Grindstaff, 2002: p. 51).   
49 In a second series I observed, Violent Rage, similarly relied on ‘money shots’ as I was informed that 
the series needed at least three graphic images per episode. The scenes were more violent in nature 
than those in Agony II as they held ‘caught on camera’ footage of individuals being attacked, beaten, 
mauled by dogs, and more. 
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crucifixion of Christ took place. Envision wanted to use the images, but were concerned that 
they might offend audiences given their context and so they reported the story without any 
mention of the protest against poverty. They framed it instead around one man’s anger about 
being evicted from his home, because they believed that that appeared more entertaining and 
unusual given his extreme act.  
 
This slant not only removed the original message of the story but also the emotional sentiment 
that may have been felt by the audience had they better understood the man, his community’s 
plight, and the great lengths to which he had gone to plead for governmental assistance.  
 
In another instance, a man who was medically diagnosed with ‘body identity integrity disorder’ 
(BIID) agreed to an interview. BIID is a psychological condition in which a person experiences 
“the persistent desire to have their body physically match the idealized image they have of 
themselves” (BIID.org, 2004). To achieve this image, such individuals may try to have one or 
more of their limbs or body parts amputated. In this particular instance, the man amputated his 
fingers and toes, and viewed what he had done as a form of body art. The producers, in their 
turn, placed his story alongside other segments which discussed body art, such as piercing 
and tattooing. The producers did not, however, report that the man’s actions and mentality 
were shaped by his illness. They also failed to explain how his amputations affected his daily 
life.  
 
This approach was intended to lead audiences to view the amputations as potentially ‘freakish’ 
or ‘artistically eccentric’, not as the act of a mentally-ill individual. It denied audiences the 
opportunity to understand the man and sympathize with him, reducing the likelihood that they 
would complain to Ofcom on the man’s behalf. The producer justified doing this by arguing that 
Agony II was not the type of series suited to discuss a topic as serious as BIID, nor did the 
programme’s format allow enough time adequately to explore the subject matter.  
 
Two additional approaches designed to prevent viewers from acquiring a sense of empathy 
when watching scenes of violence were to introduce ‘comedy’ to the segments and to 
dehumanise the people captured on film.  
 
Various techniques were used to impose a supposedly comical, light-natured slant on events. 
As a programme’s narrator coloured the lens through which stories are told and thereby 
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interpreted by audiences, the producers inserted humorous narrative remarks and sound 
effects into storylines. They also broke up sequences of more serious and dramatic stories by 
introducing segments which were intended to be comical in nature, such as scenes of 
“dwarves wrestling” and people playing in a sado-masochistic game show. 
 
Producers also at times showed victims in a manner that dehumanised them by focusing solely 
on their injuries and not their stories, feelings or even faces. For instance, one segment entitled 
Top Ten Tortures listed various forms of torture used around the world, such as electric shock 
treatment, scalping and the boiling alive of detainees. I was given the role of researching the 
segment and was instructed to locate images of torture devices and victims’ wounds.  
 
When I questioned the production director about the treatment of victims’ footage, he explained 
that Envision would show ‘close-ups’ of the injuries but not the victims’ faces, preventing them 
from being identified and allowing them to be objectified. He further stated: 
 
(Production Director) - In a sense you’re desensitizing it because you are not 
showing the person; you are showing this thing as an inanimate object. You are 
dehumanizing it… The programme is called Agony II and torture is painful. And one 
of the segments in the series is that we are going to show you the torture of what 
people do to other people. But, we are not going to show you who did it and who it 
was done to. We are just going to let you know what was done.  
 
(Interviewer) - But isn’t it [the pictures of the victims’ injuries] for the point of viewing 
pleasure? For entertainment? 
 
(Production Director) – Yes, but this isn’t a serious show. 
 
All in all, these forms of repackaging content were intended to reduce audiences’ sensitivity to, 
and sense of offence about, content.   
 
I retrieved conversations in online chat rooms that viewers of Agony II had had about the 
series, and they suggested that the producers’ attempts to desensitize its young adult male 
audience to the imagery they saw had proved to be effective. One conversation went as 
follows:50 
 
Person 1 - There's folk doing nasty things to themselves on [Entertainu] – worth a 
look. 
 
Person 2 - Yuck! Not nice - those people are just a bit strange! 
                                                 
50
 Web links are not provided to preserve confidentiality. 
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Person 3 - Damn [I] missed it, but ultimate fighting…is on so [I] can get to see 
people in pain still. 
 
Person 4 - Lol [laughs], the guy sticks a couple of daggers into the top of his mate’s 
head, and you notice that he's not wearing gloves.  
 
Person 1 - It's on quite a lot! I'll post [the time] when I find out when it's on next. 
 
Person 3 - Now that would have been good to see. 
 
Person 1 - [There] was a funny scene where this posh-boy prick got crucified and 
slid off his nails, lol (laughs). 
 
Person 6 – [Entertainu] is one of my favourite channels. 
 
 
Not all individuals, however, appeared to be amused by Agony II’s content. It seemed from my 
review of online conversations that young men (who were the series’ target demographic) 
found the programme entertaining, while women and older individuals sometimes appeared 
upset and offended by the content. For instance, one female viewer stated, “One particularly 
horrific segment showed a fire-blackened victim next to a burning car…The images still haunt 
me.”51 
 
Despite the emergence of differing opinions about, and reactions to, the programme, the fact 
that it had generated conversation meant that the producers had achieved their goal of 
generating publicity. This sentiment underwrote the production director’s clichéd statement, “no 
publicity is bad publicity”. The significance of his statement was illustrated after an article by a 
television critic who reviewed Agony (Agony II’s prequel) had stated (2003):52  
 
…Why were we repeatedly shown footage of a Bavarian’s arm snapping with an 
audible crack (nothing humorous about that), and of a Japanese man’s little finger 
being ritually severed from his hand with a knife? Equally prurient were scenes of 
Thai adepts piercing their cheeks with daggers, swords and television aerials (to 
them it has religious significance, to [Entertainu] it’s a freak show)…This 
programme breaks the ITC Code so flagrantly that the channel’s licence remit 
should be examined without delay…  
 
Soon after the article was released, the ITC published a finding that the series had been in 
breach of the regulatory Code. Envision was concerned about the breach. However its staff 
generally claimed that the publicity resulting from the article served only to increase the series’ 
ratings, thus making it the most successful programme ever broadcast on the channel. The 
                                                 
51
 Web links are not provided to preserve confidentiality. 
52
 Reference is not provided to preserve confidentiality. 
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success of the series gave production-makers additional incentive to extend the limits of 
permissible content. This concept is in line with the findings of other researchers who claimed 
that ratings were a key factor in most media practitioners’ decisions about content (Lewis, 
1969; Virts, 1978); and that producers use unique, graphic and/or dramatised imagery as a 
means to gain ratings (Galtung and Ruge, 1973; Grindstaff, 2002; Moss, 2009).  
 
What further encouraged the producers was the fact that the programme was destined for 
broadcast on cable and satellite television, and they held that the regulators were less strict 
about the nature of content shown on these platforms than on terrestrial television. A producer 
stated “I think it is pretty much accepted in the industry that it is a lot easier to get stuff [diverse 
content] through on cable [and satellite] than it is on terrestrial.”  
 
The producers also claimed that that they could broadcast more ‘edgy’ content because their 
programme was transmitted after the watershed on a niche channel that catered to young men, 
and research had shown that this demographic was less frequently offended by such content 
than were women and older individuals.53 Basing their style of programming on what was 
deemed suitable or acceptable to their specific audience profile, broadcasters claimed to have 
more leeway to broadcast new, ‘challenging’ forms of content with less concern about 
complaints than channels with different audience profiles might have had. And in fact, the 
broadcasters did not receive a single public complaint about the series.  
 
This suggests that the broadcast platform and the dynamics of consumers on that platform 
(and their likelihood of complaining) were influential factors in the producers’ decision-making 
process. Given that the commonality between these elements was the influence that the 
designated audience had over actors’ decisions about content, I shall label this factor 
‘audience profile’ and place it under the organisational level within my hierarchical model of 
influential factors. 
  
In summary, I have shown that graphic images were considered the most important feature of 
the series, and that storylines were used not only to engage and entertain audiences, but to 
                                                 
53 Prior to this in 2002 the ITC conducted a study which found that young individuals were far less likely 
to be offended by content than older individuals (75+ years) (17% versus 75%), and that men were 
less likely to be offended than women (33% versus 51%) (Towler, 2002: p. 47). This meant that young 
men were the least likely demographic to find content offensive, and therefore one could assume that 
they were also the least likely group to complain about such content.   
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contextualise content in a manner that would reduce the chance of a programme being found 
in breach of the rules.  
 
I have also suggested that the images may have not appealed to all audience ‘demographics’, 
but they did serve to stimulate viewers’ curiosity and thereby the possibility of additional 
ratings. In this sense, the series attended to one of the producer’s statements – “I don’t care 
whether they like it or whether they hate it, as long as they have an opinion”. This publicity 
(which aided one’s drive for economic gain), along with the dynamics and positioning of the 
audience, shaped producers’ willingness to test regulatory limits. 
 
Phase 4: The process of obtaining violent content 
 
I shall now turn to an explanation of the producers’ procedures for securing graphic footage, 
the character of the relevant regulation and the way in which employees’ responded to that 
regulation. In order to illustrate how employees responded to the regulation, I shall provide an 
example of an instance in which the regulation concerning a programme contributor’s ‘privacy’ 
was seemingly breached. 
 
This example will reveal that individuals evaded the rules when they were constrained by tight 
time and resource restrictions, and when their perceived likelihood of detection was low (due to 
the ease in concealing their unruly acts), and when their chances of penalisation were nil (due 
to the structure of the regulation’s enforcement that was in play). These constraints and 
perceptions were, in part, a product of widespread external changes in the industry, such as 
advances in technology and the deregulation of the sector, and therefore I shall also describe 
how these macro-level factors had a knock-on effect on the production process at the 
organisational level.  
 
I shall begin by explaining how images were found and secured. Agony II presented four 
general types of graphic imagery – images of accidents, and of individuals harming 
themselves, others and animals. Several research techniques were employed to locate these 
images: researchers referred to search engines to find publicly-owned images; they scrolled 
through purchasable footage archives such as Reuters and APTN; and they contacted 
individuals, groups and organisations who had an association with injuries, such as surgeons 
or members of a sado-masochism group. 
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The production team worked on a minimal budget and so they either purchased the content 
they found from inexpensive footage houses, received it as donations from programme 
contributors or filmed the imagery themselves. They were knowledgeable about the regulator’s 
requirement to gain consent for all content gathered through secondary sources54, such as 
footage archivists or individuals who owned the rights to photographs or videos, and they 
typically abided by this requirement. However, there were exceptions when employees did not 
comply. 
 
Take one case. For an episode entitled Head Cases, which featured stories about individuals’ 
who had suffered head traumas, such as facial burns or puncture wounds, staff agreed to 
interview a construction worker in the United States, John Grey, who had survived a fall from a 
ladder onto a drill which punctured his skull (See Figure 13).55 They also agreed to interview 
Grey’s surgeon. 
 
Figure 13: Grey's skull x-ray 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conduct the interview, Envision agreed to fly to California to meet with Grey. Interviews 
such as this were grouped together to save time and money. For international trips a single 
employee would manage the filming for all interviews, serving as a camera operator, an 
interviewer and a travel organiser (I have already noted that the assuming of multiple roles was 
                                                 
54 See Chapter Three for a description of this requirement. 
55
 The reference is not included to ensure the confidentiality of the victim. Also, John Grey, as are the 
other names used in this thesis, is a pseudo name used to protect the identity of those involved. 
           
This image has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another party. 
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a common feature in the industry, particularly among companies with small budgets; see 
Sparks, 1991; Cottle, 1999.) 
  
At Envision, this approach led to highly pressurized interviewing arrangements which 
sometimes resulted in disorganisation and errors. In this instance, a producer had travelled 
across the United States to conduct a series of interviews, visiting between one and two cities 
per day. Although the majority of the interviews had been arranged prior to his departure, he 
was expected later to confirm the arrangements himself. This responsibility was in addition to 
his duty to serve as a camera operator, filming the interviews and various scenes to 
accompany the segments; an interviewer, ensuring that he was briefed on the circumstances 
of the story; and a travel planner, organising his travel details.  
 
In this case the producer claimed that his hectic schedule prevented him from being able to 
confirm all of his interview times. He subsequently flew to California to discover that the 
contributor, Grey, was unaware of the impending interview because his manager had failed to 
inform him of the arrangement. Once the situation had been resolved and the interview had 
taken place, the programme-maker, unaware of all of the circumstances surrounding Grey’s 
story, did not confirm Grey’s willingness to allow Envision to broadcast the images of his 
injuries. The producer received these images from the surgeon, who had incorrectly assumed 
that Grey had consented for them to be broadcast.  
 
After the producer returned to the United Kingdom, I contacted Grey to request permission to 
broadcast the images. He refused and stated that the images were too graphic for television 
and for children to view, and that he would feel exploited if they were broadcast.  
 
When I relayed his refusal to the series producer, she said in a concerned tone that we needed 
to get his permission to use the photographs or the segment would have to be cancelled. She 
repeated the claim that the ‘money shots’ drove the ratings and that segments were unusable 
without them.56 Given the dwindling budget and limited timeline (the series needed to be 
completed in two weeks), she expressed frustration that Envision had paid for a trip to 
California to interview individuals for a segment that was potentially unusable. At this stage in 
the production, employees were under great strain, working nearly 11 hour days in addition to 
some weekends. Several of the most capable staff had also left before the completion of the 
                                                 
56
 Comments paraphrased from a conversation, 2004. 
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series to begin work on their next productions, leaving the project short-handed. This meant 
that there was no one readily available to produce a new segment to replace this one.  
 
Given these constraints, the series producer instructed me to telephone Grey again to offer 
financial compensation for broadcasting the images. Grey did not answer the telephone nor did 
he respond to my voice message. I was then expected to contact Grey repeatedly until he was 
reached. After over a week of contacting him every day without a response I asked the series 
producer to handle the situation. She too attempted to contact him repeatedly and received no 
response.  
 
After two weeks of effort, I commented to the series producer that it was obvious that Grey 
never intended to grant Envision permission to use his photographs. She replied in a frustrated 
tone, “Let’s just say, I didn’t hear that.” After I repeated the comment, she reiterated her 
statement, signifying that she decided to use the photographs without Grey’s permission, as if 
she was unaware of his refusal.57 Grey’s photographs were broadcast shortly thereafter. The 
series producer took it that Agony II was only to be broadcast in the United Kingdom. Grey, 
who resided overseas, was unlikely to see the programme, and was thus unlikely to complain, 
and Envision itself would not face negative repercussions.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX           TEXT OMITTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY PURPOSES        XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Grey’s experience with Envision illustrated two issues surrounding the fair treatment of 
programme contributors. The first involved media practitioners repeatedly contacting a 
potential contributor after he/she had rejected their proposition. The second involved the 
broadcast of a person’s photographs without permission. This case with Agony II was never 
brought to Ofcom’s attention, but it can be conjectured that, if it had been, it would have been 
considered under section 15 of the BSC Code on Fairness and Privacy (1997: p. 7): 
 
Section 15, Privacy: 
                                                 
57
 Paraphrased from a working conversation, 2004. 
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Privacy can be infringed during the obtaining of material for a programme, even if 
none of it is broadcast, as well as in the way in which material is used within the 
programme. 
 
This example is broadly in line with the BSC’s finding that over half of those who worked in 
factual programming “felt that they had experienced pressures at odds with how they believed 
programme contributors should be treated” (2000: p. 16). 
 
It also reveals three influential factors that had contributed to what seemed to be an 
infringement of the regulatory rules and of Grey’s privacy – time constraints, capacity issues 
and a belief that non-compliant behaviour would go undetected and unpenalised.  
 
These factors, which affected the producer’s compliance decision, reflected those of other 
researchers. While Chayes and Chayes (1993), Tallberg (2002), Hutter and Jones (2006), 
Footer (2008) and Nie (2008) found that ‘capacity issues’, such as budget constraints, can lead 
to non-compliant behaviour in various industries, Bantz, McCordle and Baade (1980), Fishman 
(1982), O’Sullivan and Heinonen (2008) and Russial (2009) found that project demands and 
resource limitations can influence, more specifically, the media production process and the 
shape of content (see also Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Winter, 2001). 
 
I have explained that Envision was more susceptible to experiencing budget constraints than 
larger producers because it was a relatively small to mid-size company and subsequently less 
equipped to deal with challenging production schedules. Echoing the argument of Hawkins 
(2002), its staff were, in turn, shown to be susceptible to adopting non-compliant practices as a 
means to achieve their production targets.58  
 
The challenge producers faced to meet their production target was further exacerbated by tight 
time constraints, which Berkowitz (2002) also found to impair media practitioners’ ability to 
work effectively. In his case, however, he found that journalists, who were burdened by tight 
deadlines, sometimes released information to the public before they had cross-checked its 
accuracy; and the reporting of inaccurate information can, in certain situations, be considered 
                                                 
58
 Hawkins (2002) noted that small firms are more sensitive to financial constraints and the costs of 
compliance, and this leads some of them, through a lack of resources and capacity, to breach the 
regulations. Winter (2001) also argued that a company cannot comply with the regulations unless they 
have sufficient financial capacity to do so. 
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an act of ‘unfairness’ (see also MacGregor, 1995; Cottle, 1999; Arant and Anderson, 2001; 
Ursell, 2001; O’Sullivan and Heinonen, 2008; Russial, 2009; Valentine, 2009). 
  
When linking these organisational-level concepts with those at the external level, one can see 
how the producers arrived at this particular situation: technological advances coupled with 
deregulation led to the rapid expansion of broadcast platforms and channels, and the 
independent production sector; the rise in television companies and services increased the 
competitive pressure amongst producers and broadcasters; and the independent production 
sector, in particular, became populated with a large number of small to mid-sized new market 
entrants, such as Envision. These players tended to hold little market power and therefore 
agreed to produce content at highly competitive prices, which in turn meant that they had to 
work within tight budgets.  
 
The outcome was that programmes were often produced to difficult deadlines, so as to reduce 
the cost associated with hiring staff long-term. It also brought it about that management did not 
have the resources to hire an adequate number of sufficiently experienced workers, and so 
staff had to assume multiple roles, and unpaid interns and new-comers to the field were 
frequently hired. These individuals’ inexperience also served to intensify the issue of working to 
tight deadlines, as they often did not work as quickly or efficiently as did those with more 
experience. These factors, in turn, helped to lead to the situation that I just described at 
Envision, suggesting that the pressures that led employees towards non-compliance were both 
organisational and external. 
 
The final factor that influenced the producer’s compliance decision over Grey’s photographs 
was a perception that her act of ‘unfairness’ would go undetected and unpenalised. This was a 
perception that was reflected across the organisation and led to routine acts of non-
compliance.59  
 
In line with Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) concept of an ‘amoral calculator’ (and rational choice 
institutionalism which will be discussed shortly), the producers appeared knowingly to behave 
in an impermissible manner where they perceived the benefit of broadcasting the imagery to be 
                                                 
59
 In fact, Envision had a policy never to send contributors copies of the series, so unless they lived in 
Britain and had access to satellite/cable television, they could not view the programme and thereby not 
complain if the content revealed that they were treated unfairly. 
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greater than the likelihood of being caught by the regulator (i.e. greater than the cost) (see also 
Becker, 1968; Footer 2008). This corresponds with the work of other researchers who have 
found that actors’ perceived risk of detection is an important factor in influencing their 
compliance behaviour (Gray and Scholz, 1991; Burby and Paterson, 1993; Abusin and 
Hassan, 2011; Chiarini, Marzano and Schneider, 2011).60 In this equation, if the rules required 
individuals to “forgo substantial benefits, the predicted rate of evasion [was] high” (Diver, 1989: 
p. 225). This situation also reflects the ‘opportunity perspective’ which argues that people will 
break the rules when opportunities arise for them to get away with it (Angenent and Geeraets, 
1998). 
 
In the case of Grey, the likelihood of detection was small because he lived overseas where the 
programme was not broadcast, and so he was not in a position to see the episode and thereby 
to complain. (The act of getting footage from oversees was common in television, as 
globalisation made foreign travel and production feasible.) The ease of concealing the 
producer’s act of non-compliance therefore became an instrumental factor in motivating her to 
evade the rules; a finding that is on all fours with the argument of Diver, who claimed that “The 
likelihood and magnitude of non-compliance...depends on the ease or difficulty of concealing 
prohibited conduct” (p. 225; see also Mills, 1940; Sutinen 1999; Schuetze, 2002; Abusin and 
Hassan, 2011; Chiarini, Marzano and Schneider, 2011).61 
 
Another instrumental factor in the producer’s calculus pertained to the likelihood of getting 
penalised by Ofcom, which in this case was zero. Ofcom was only granted the power by the 
Communications Act 2003 to penalise broadcasters. It could not penalise independent 
producers for acts of non-compliance. It therefore appeared in the case study that this gave 
them less incentive than broadcasters to abide by the rules, and so they conformed to simple 
utilitarian maxims of conduct and evaded them (see also Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999: p. 179). 
 
This finding is opposite to, yet compatible with, the arguments of Farrington, Langan and 
Wikstrom (1994) and Langan and Farrington’s (1998) examination of crime and punishment 
                                                 
60
 While I have contended that the producers’ non-conforming acts were also fuelled by the 
unlikelihood of their detection by Ofcom, Hawkins argued this was because small companies, such as 
Envision, were less publically visible than large firms, and thereby less likely to encounter regulatory 
intervention (2002: p. 268).  
61 This is in line with Mills who noted that “Individuals confronted with ‘alternative acts’ perform one or 
the other of them on the basis of the...anticipation of named consequences” (1940: p. 905-906).  
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trends in England and the United States, as they found an association between an increased 
likelihood of conviction and a decline in crime rates. Studies such as these and my own help to 
confirm that “known penal threats can have a deterrent effect” (Hirsch et. al. 1998: p. 3), while, 
as I have pointed out, the absence of them can have the opposite.  
 
While this section has explained how graphic imagery was shaped and secured, the following 
section will explain the next stage in the production process – the interviewing of programme 
contributors. 
 
Phase 5: The interview process 
 
What follows will illustrate how interviewees’ statements were used to contextualise graphic 
content in a manner that would enable producers to bypass regulatory intervention. It will also 
review employees’ procedures for securing interviews, which would likely be deemed by Ofcom 
to be non-compliant under the regulatory rules.    
 
The purpose of interviews 
 
Once programme-makers uncovered a promising story, they contacted the participants 
involved to request interviews. Interviewees acted as the storytellers, knitting together 
sequences of events and adding personal accounts of their experiences. They further 
contextualized and added space between the graphic imagery to avoid a mere ‘gratuitous’ 
repetition of ‘money shots’. 
 
Interviewees were selected and used to underscore the so-called educational element of the 
series, otherwise referred to as the necessary “PhD” or the ‘thinking’ aspect denoted in the 
producer’s objective to make viewers “laugh, think and cringe”.    
 
While interviews with victims were used to explain the circumstances surrounding their injuries, 
conversations with their doctors and surgeons were added to provide the series with the 
educational element the producers felt necessary to justify the graphic content. These 
interviews offered viewers bits of medical information, such as how a knife can be successfully 
removed from a person’s skull without causing further cranial damage, or how a person’s legs 
can be surgically extended by several inches to increase their height. 
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Violent Rage was intended to take a more serious look at violence than Agony II; and there 
were therefore greater restrictions placed on the characteristics of their ‘expert’ interviewees. 
For example, the producer of Violent Rage informed me that the experts had to be male and 
between the ages of 30 and 45 years. It was reasoned that the intended audience was 
primarily male and that men were more likely to view middle-aged males as more authoritative 
sources of information than females.  
 
For Agony II, the producers preferred to include female experts who were young and physically 
attractive. They claimed that this was because the series was light entertainment television 
aimed at titillating rather than educating its young male audience. Its producer remarked that it 
was “sad to hear” but the difference between the two series was that “Violent Rage is being 
journalistic. Agony II is being entertaining.” 
 
Producers from both series also wanted the interviewees to communicate in an uncomplicated, 
non-academic style because they believed that their audience would have difficulty relating to 
and understanding experts who used professional jargon or complicated vocabularies. 
“Television,” they said, “is the stupid medium”.  
 
Entertainu’s effort to turn Agony II, a light entertainment programme about human injury, into 
an educational piece was evidently only superficial and in fact was actually a tool used to 
practice ‘creative compliance’. Securing young female experts aimed at entertaining rather 
than educating viewers; the need for experts to speak in simple, uncomplicated terms; the 
broadcast of supporting statistics which frequently lacked legitimacy (which will be discussed 
later in the chapter); and a sensationalistic approach to displaying graphic imagery, suggested 
that the series was geared less towards educational enlightenment than the broadcaster might 
have argued. To support this claim, the production director stated: 
  
I don’t think the actual premise of the programme is to educate. It’s not to educate. 
I think you might have those little bits to break it up, to go away from the gore, to 
say we’ve made this programme, it is full of gore, but we’ve added some 
[education]… Maybe it could be that the regulation board says, ‘okay you can show 
this gore, but give us some wine with our bread’…Because I think people who are 
watching it, they might take these little facts but if they are there, they are there, 
and if they are not, [they are not]. 
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It does not follow that the second series was entirely unsuccessful in increasing its educational 
content. It does nevertheless reveal that the television-makers used tactics to manoeuvre their 
business practices past the obstacles of regulatory compliance, as has been found to be 
common with other regulated bodies (Baldwin and Cave, 1999); and that they intentionally 
commercialised (or ‘dumbed-down’) aspects of the series to appeal better to audiences (see 
McManus, 1994; Glynn, 2000, Towler, 2002, Beam, 2003; Clarke, 2004 for similar accounts). 
And all of this was because, in essence, the series, referred to by one programme-maker as 
“trash television”, was intended for entertainment, not education. 
 
Gaining consent for interviews 
 
I have now examined the attributes producers looked for in interviewees and how they used 
their statements to contextualise graphic imagery. The next step in the sequence of producers’ 
decisions and actions was to gain contributors’ consent to be interviewed, so as to serve as the 
story-tellers to give context to the graphic images. It was a process framed by an 
organisational culture which condoned, and at times promoted, non-compliance, and a culture 
that was itself framed by forces relating to economic/project demands, tight time and resource 
constraints, incompatible business and regulatory responsibilities, and the influence of 
management over subordinates.  
 
In the words of a producer, Agony II epitomised “trash television” and so it was assumed that 
many programme contributors, especially experts, would not want to participate in it. 
Programme-makers were therefore instructed to provide potential interviewees with limited 
information about the series, including information about its actual nature or title. They were 
requested not to lie but to word their statements carefully in order to leave contributors with 
falsely positive impressions.   
 
Let me illustrate. In the final stages of production, staff found the series was short by several 
feature stories; one being in the episode Suffer to be Beautiful. The episode was about the 
extreme lengths individuals went to in the pursuit of ‘beauty’, such as having ‘full body’ 
cosmetic surgery, one’s foot surgically altered to fit into designer shoes62, or practising 
                                                 
62
 This includes the removal of bone within the toes to better allow patients to fit in the narrow confines 
of shoes. 
 120 
scarification, a form of body art that consists of scarring designs into one’s skin. (For examples 
see Figures 14 through 17). 
Figure 14: Full body cosmetic surgery 
  
 
Source: www.southfloridaplasticsurgery.com 
 
Figure 15: Cosmetic foot surgery to address bunions 
 
Source : Bradly Drawn Dad: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/dhedwards/249661028/sizes/n/in/photostream/
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Figure 16: Male scarification 
 
 
Source: artlex.com 
 
Figure 17: Image of scarification 
 
 
Source: Polentafria: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/polentafria/3581874937/sizes/m/in/photostream/ 
 
 
In an effort to secure an interview for a segment, I contacted a surgeon in Egypt who 
performed a procedure to lengthen legs. It was a form of cosmetic surgery intended to add 
between two and three inches to one’s height (See Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Leg lengthening procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the surgeon requested that Envision send a letter to the hospital to explain the 
programme’s subject matter and his desired contribution, the correspondence did explain the 
purpose of the interview yet failed to include full details about the programme’s topic, tenor and 
nature. It stated the programme segment was “…about individuals that have had the 
lengthening procedure for cosmetic reasons, such as with patients that do it for shortened 
stature”. The hospital and surgeon were given no further information about the programme’s 
“nature” and “purpose” as was required by the BSC Code on Fairness and Privacy (1997: p. 4).  
 
The surgeon expressed great interest in being featured in the segment, assuming that it was 
for a medical programme which would discuss leg lengthening in a serious manner. He thought 
that it would pose the surgery as a viable option for those facing shortened stature and could 
thereby improve his business prospects. He commented that another broadcaster had already 
done a positive feature about his medical work.63  
 
At no time did the producer or cameraman/interviewer correct his misinterpretation by 
informing him about the programme’s actual nature, or telling him the series and episode titles, 
Agony II and Suffer to be Beautiful. I also did not inform him of these factors as I attempted to 
behave in a manner which was consistent with my colleagues so as not to jeopardise or 
contaminate the research.  
                                                 
63
 Fieldwork journal: Paraphrased telephone conversation with the surgeon had on 18 February 2004. 
           
This image has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another party. 
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Envision’s interview consent form also omitted the title and details of the series. One of the 
reasons was that titles are often good indications of a programmes’ topic and nature. Their 
removal, along with the trick of asking contributors to sign consent forms when there was little 
time to read them, better enabled employees to skirt past the issue.  
 
A series producer revealed in an interview that it was also a trick (not used in this series) to list 
a different, less revealing, programme title on the consent form alongside the phase, ‘subject to 
change’, so as to further mislead contributors. The correct title would then be inserted just 
before the series is released. He stated, “It is occasionally practised to go in with one working 
name shown and in your release form it will say ‘provisionally titled xxx’ and then of course the 
name changes ‘bizarrely’ just before it goes to transmission to something completely different”. 
He also stated, “If you have socially conscious journalists you’d get sod-all made. There would 
be no tabloid industry.” 
 
The producers’ approach to deceiving programme contributors is not unlike a hustle, and it is 
reminiscent of Ned Polsky’s remarks about pool hustlers. In his 1964 paper, ‘The Hustler’ he 
found that hustlers coaxed their ‘victims’ into participating in pool matches by luring them with 
the false possibility of winning money. This is similar to programme-makers’ tactic of 
persuading individuals, such as the cosmetic surgeon, to contribute to Agony II by falsely 
presenting it as opportunity to get positive media coverage or to help a worthy cause. 
 
In addition to approaching the surgeon, the producer obtained permission from his patient to be 
interviewed and to allow his surgery to be filmed and broadcast, and the patient was also made 
insufficiently aware of the programme’s subject matter and purpose. Unlike most participants 
who did not receive financial compensation, Envision agreed to pay the patient $500 Australian 
dollars for his contribution. After the agreement was made, the surgeon mentioned that he had 
a second patient who was also interested in partaking in the programme. The patient however 
declined the interview upon discovering that Envision had no additional funds to compensate 
him financially for the interview. 
 
I asked the cameraman/interviewer to re-invite the second patient to an interview once he had 
arrived at the filming point, a medical centre in Egypt. Upon the cameraman’s return, he 
commented that he was able to secure the second patient’s interview by approaching him 
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directly after he had left the operation table whilst heavily sedated and not fully aware of the 
situation.64 Had this act been reported to Ofcom, it might well have been judged a potential 
infringement of privacy under sections 28 and 29 of the BSC Code on Fairness and Privacy, as 
the man was arguably not in a medically sound position to give his consent at the time (1997: 
p. 10).65 
 
This example helps to illustrate that staff were faced with conflicting project (or economic-
related) and regulatory (or social) responsibilities, and that they would often break the rules 
when they believed that it was necessary to achieve their organisational objectives (see also 
Makkai and Braithwaite 1993; Parker 2000; Nie, 2008; Nelson, 2011). 
 
More specifically, producers would deceive programme contributors about the nature of the 
series when they thought that they would be unwilling to participate in the programme once 
aware of the truth. The rules were followed only when producers thought that individuals would 
agree to participate in the programme despite having accurate knowledge of its nature. If, for 
example, a story centred on a dominatrix practising sado-masochism or a contributor wilfully 
injuring himself or herself, it was assumed that the individuals would want to appear in Agony 
II. If, however, the story was about a tragic accident or the contributor was a doctor, expert or 
business person who may not have wished to be associated with or represented in the style of 
Agony II, it was often assumed that he or she would not want to contribute. The programme-
makers’ honesty thus became quite instrumental and pragmatic.  
 
These deceptive practices were so widespread and taken for granted that programme-makers 
rarely reflected upon them. And, the absence of reflecting upon one’s deviant behaviour might 
be motivation in itself to continue acting unlawfully (see Sereny, 1995).66 
 
                                                 
64
 Fieldwork notes: Paraphrased from a conversation had in February 2004. 
65 Section 28, Suffering and Distress: Broadcasters should not add to the distress of people 
caught up in emergencies or suffering a personal tragedy. People in a state of distress must not 
be put under any pressure to provide interviews… Section 29, Suffering and Distress: 
Programme-makers should also be sensitive to the possibility of causing additional anxiety or 
distress when filming or recording people who are already extremely upset or under stress, for 
example at funerals or in hospitals. Normally, prior consent should be obtained from the family of 
their agents…No attempt should be made to enter wards or other places of treatment in 
hospitals without clear and informed authorization from the medical staff and the individuals 
concerned or those acting on their behalf. 
66
 This is reflected in the work of Sereny (1995), who examined Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s right-hand 
man, and his denial and lack of self-reflection regarding the events surrounding the Holocaust. 
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On occasion a programme-maker would express feelings of guilt if an interviewee was not 
portrayed sympathetically or the programme-maker developed a rapport with a contributor. 
Those moments of guilt were often brief though, as programme-makers appeared to be 
generally dispassionate because of the urgency surrounding the production process and their 
belief that they were easily disposable if they did not produce immediate results.  
 
In an attempt to assess whether this finding was unique or common, I turned to the media 
literature and found that researchers, such as Luljak, have claimed that acts of deception in 
media production are “routine” and “occur without much discussion or reflection” (2000: p. 
188). This suggests that the problem spreads beyond Envision. The Society of Professional 
Journalists, an organisation that aims to uphold high standards of ethical practice in journalism, 
also found, as I did, that deception “can take many forms from outright lying, to deceiving, or 
misleading, or misrepresenting, or merely being less than forthright” (Black, Steele and Barney, 
1992: p. 109). 
 
After asking a production coordinator how he felt about his use of deceptive practices, I was 
told that he had recently been contacted by angry participants whom he had misled and that he 
had felt bad about his behaviour. When they approached him, distraught about how they had 
been portrayed, he stated that he was no longer working on the production and was not in 
control of the segment’s editing. He claimed that he felt guilty about telling them this because 
he knew throughout the production how the segment was going to be angled and edited, yet he 
had nonetheless intentionally withheld such information from participants.67  
 
In this instance the coordinator appeared pleased that his job, which required him to shift 
between different production houses, often allowed him to avoid confrontation with disgruntled 
contributors, and therefore responsibility for his actions, as he had generally left an 
organisation by the time a programme was broadcast (since he was a freelancer) and a 
contributor had an opportunity to complain.  
 
The employee’s conflicting stance between feeling guilty, yet still behaving in a less than 
forthright manner, is reminiscent of the criminologist, Cohen’s, description of how workers 
within an organisation or culture take on “collective false selves” and show two faces. One is 
truthful – in it a worker describes to trusted individuals (e.g. spouses or friends) the sometimes 
                                                 
67
 Fieldwork notes from paraphrased conversation in February 2004. 
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dark realities of the workplace and its members. The other is a false version created for the 
‘public domain’ or  for individuals who are not trusted, and depicts the working environment in a 
‘glossy’ manner, noting how it is ‘inspiring’ and ‘stimulating’ (p. 61).   
 
So it was that, if the producers were speaking with a programme contributor, they would 
attempt to put them at ease and create a falsely positive image of the programme and their 
desired contribution. Conversely, if they were speaking with co-workers they would talk more 
honestly about the unflattering manner contributors would be portrayed in. In this sense, they 
also showed two faces (see also Scott and Lyman’s work on ‘face games’, 1970: p. 97-102). 
This stance also reflects what Goffman (1971) referred to as “dramaturgy”, which describes the 
different roles that people play when in front of different audiences. He used the analogy of a 
theatrical performance to describe how individuals who are on stage will act in a polished and 
carefully scripted way to portray a certain message to a particular audience, and when they are 
backstage their masks will come off and all of the activity that must occur to ensure the 
competent performance of the actors will end. 
 
While the employee in this instance expressed a momentary sense of guilt, other producers 
adopted an attitude which defended, or neutralised, their actions. They asserted that, following 
the doctrine of caveat emptor, programme contributors should be wary of the media, and that it 
was their responsibility to ensure that they had sufficient understanding of the series before 
agreeing to contribute.  
 
This form of ‘responsibilisation’, as criminologists have referred to it, is the act of endowing 
people with responsibility for protecting themselves. Adopters of this label claim that individuals 
must avoid risky situations, become knowledgeable about the circumstances surrounding 
them, and prepared to protect themselves from the harm of others (Wells 2007: p. 3; see also 
Hunt, 2003; Garland, 2003; O’Malley and Hutchinson, 2007). ‘Responsibilisation’, as with 
‘victim blaming’, enables rule offenders to avoid accountability for their actions by assigning 
blame to their victims (Lamb, 1996). In doing so, these individuals transform their victim into a 
“wrong-doer”, who is deserving of the treatment they received. This enables offenders to avoid 
viewing their victim’s injuries as actual injuries, but rather as suitable “punishment” for their 
naivety, lack of cautiousness and/or wilful involvement (Sykes and Matza, 1957). 
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The influence of the organisation’s culture on compliance behaviour: 
 
Given the nature of production at Envision, producers’ acts of deviance need to be examined 
within the context of the greater organisational culture, and how this influenced their 
perceptions of their roles and their subsequent actions (see also Breed, 1955; Manning, 1977; 
Jablin, 1982; Pfeffer, 1982; Punch 1985; Kim, 2002).  
 
Social learning theory argues that people’s decisions are shaped by the encounters they have 
with the individuals within their group (Akers, 1985; Bandura, 1969). For instance, individuals’ 
view-points and reactions to situations may be moulded by their peers’ opinions or by social 
pressures.68  
 
Sociological institutionalism too acknowledges the influence that social groups, and particularly 
the cultures within them, have on the shaping of individuals’ perceptions and thereby their 
behaviour. It reasons that people have shared cultural understandings and interpretive 
frameworks which not only influence their preferences and beliefs regarding what they should 
or should not do, but rather what is even possible or comprehensible to do (see also Zucker, 
1983; Berger and Luckmann, 1987; Meyer and Rowen, 1991; Hall and Taylor, 1994; Scott, 
1995). Within this model comes the assumption that individuals tend not to deviate from the 
cultural norms within their group for fear of alienation, even if they oppose wider social norms 
which counter mainstream culture.  
 
With this in mind, one must consider the organisational culture (or ideology) of the programme-
making environment as a prerequisite for understanding employees’ compliance behaviour. At 
Envision there was a general perception that programme-makers faced remarkable challenges 
while attempting to meet production goals deemed generally to be unachievable without 
bending the rules. Due to the various macro-level factors noted previously (e.g. technological 
advancements, and changes in politics and regulation) coupled with Envision’s organisational 
                                                 
68
 The process by which individuals’ perceptions and attitudes are influenced by their interactions with 
others is also discussed within the social constructionist literature. Hawikins and Thomas (1989), for 
instance, discuss the “shared meanings” that people ascribe to acts and events which emerge from 
patterns of interaction” (p. 10). Similarly, Blumer’s (1969) notion of ‘symbolic interactionism’ contends 
that "Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things”; "The 
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others 
and the society"; and "These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process 
used by the person in dealing with the things he/she encounters" (p. 2). 
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characteristics, employees had little time, money or resources to produce content, and so the 
creativity and persistence required to accomplish tasks, despite the use of deception, were 
viewed as commendable and better enabled employees to advance their careers.  
 
Acts of deception were therefore often not viewed by employees as deviant, but as reasonable 
decisions given the constraining circumstances, and thus as requirements of the job.69 
Individuals tended not to identify themselves as deceitful characters because others did not 
see them to be behaving improperly; the ‘do what it takes’ mentality was condoned and 
encouraged as a product of the employees’ collective drive to work within a single, narrow 
vision to produce a hit series.    
 
This is an important point as Gilboy noted that for a regulatory body to develop effective 
enforcement techniques it needs to understand whether non-compliant individuals “are 
deviating from the dominant culture or conforming to some subculture that contradicts the 
dominant culture” and approves of non-compliance (1998, p. 149). She noted that 
organisations which condone deviant behaviour need to be dealt with differently than 
organisations which condemn it. 
 
The producers’ content and compliance-related decisions were also largely shaped by 
Envision’s power structure, which gave management substantial control over the organisation’s 
priorities and methods of pursuing them. This point is reflected by Iggers, who studied 
journalists and found that their approach to cultivating news reports was “shaped by the 
relations of power and by the institutional priorities within the organizations that employ them” 
(1999: p. 1). It also corresponds to the words of Shoemaker and Vos who said, “News content 
should thus be expected to reflect the instrumental goals of those in charge...news media are 
driven by the profit-seeking goals or greed of management (2009: p. 74; see also Donohew, 
1967; Herman and McChesney, 1997; Chomsky, 2006). This stance is furthermore in tune with 
                                                 
69 This finding did not relate significantly to Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) ‘corporation as a citizen’ 
description, as the producers I examined did not express a general inclination to comply with the rules. 
Some claimed to see the logic in the social welfare benefitting purpose of the rules and argued that 
competition would drive businesses to negate the rules should enforcement procedures not be 
present, however, these very individuals also claimed that they fell into this category and aimed to 
circumvent the rules when it helped them to meet their business needs. Their attitudes towards 
compliance were therefore more reflective of Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) ‘amoral calculator’ 
description, as will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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the arguments of Makkai and Braithwaite (1993), who found that management’s control over 
staff affected their compliance with the regulations (see also Jones et al 2008). 
 
At Envision, upper-level management not only condoned non-compliance, but it educated its 
employees how to evade the rules and instructed them to do so, as a means to survive in the 
competitive market. Employees were particularly influenced by the series producer, who 
controlled her staff’s actions by publicly reprimanding those who failed to meet her 
expectations or questioned the compliance of content.  
 
To illustrate, and returning to the example I offered earlier about the images of tortured victims, 
I approached the series producer at the time and questioned her about the appropriateness of 
using these images in a satirical, light entertainment programme. She sharply retorted that 
‘researchers were not paid to have opinions’.70 This response was reflective of her general 
behaviour and representative of the programme-making atmosphere, as it was uncommon for 
employees to object to or question their superiors about the ethics surrounding the 
production.71  
 
If employees did not act in accordance with the company culture and failed to meet their 
working targets, they risked damaging their reputation and their ability to find future 
employment, removing whatever security they might have had in an already competitive 
industry. These individuals therefore tended to conform. This relates to Hutter’s description of 
individuals who conformed to peer group pressure to avoid the negative effects on career 
progression that individuals who do not conform can face (1989).72  Reflecting this, a personal 
note from my fieldwork journal stated: 
 
I see myself starting to fudge the truth to potential interviews, experts and film-
owners because the pressure of getting the project done is so great. I worked for 
10 hours on Sunday, my Christmas vacation, on Monday I left the office at 8:00pm 
only to work from home until midnight, and now I’m working until midnight again 
tonight. 
 
This illustrated how even I, as an academic researcher, experienced the pressure to ‘do what it 
takes to get the job done’, for if I had not followed the working practices of my colleagues and 
                                                 
70
 Fieldwork journal - This statement is paraphrased from an office conversation in 2004. 
71 Their non-response, in effect, also helped to exonerate them from moral complicity. 
72 While Hutter related this concept to regulators, I will show how it also applies to regulated bodies. 
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the directions of my manager, I would have not been employed long enough to conduct my 
fieldwork. 
 
The influence that a group’s culture and ideology has on its members’ decisions about content 
and regulatory compliance has been documented by numerous researchers (Tuchman, 1978; 
Gitlin, 1980; Braithwaite and Geiss, 1982; Punch, 1985; Shoemaker, 1987; Victor and Cullen 
1988; Soloski, 1989; Makkai and Braithwaite 1993; Entman and Rojecki, 2000; Hutter, 2001; 
Turner, 2002; Warren and Vavrus, 2003; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007; Nie 2008; Aaronson, 
2010; Harris-White, 2010; Wikström, 2010).73 This is particularly important among those who 
found that individuals are less likely to comply with the rules the more their community or peers 
do not comply (Vogel, 1974; Geerken and Gove, 1975; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; see also 
Reno, 1993; Paterson 1993; Wikström, 2010). 
 
I found the most interesting of these to be the research Maurice Punch conducted on deviant 
behaviour within police forces in Amsterdam. In Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction 
of Police Deviance and Control (1985), he noted that issues of deviance are concerns for 
virtually all organisations. 
 
Punch found that the majority of the police officers he examined believed they had to “cut 
corners” and “bend rules” to achieve needed results (p. 202). It was generally accepted 
amongst officers that the most successful were those who could ‘make things happen by 
breaking, bending, and twisting rules and cutting through red tape’ (Marx, 1982: p. 174).74 
Successful members were also those best able to “cope with uncertainty and prepared to 
innovate within the constraints placed upon them (Pfeffer, 1981)” (Punch, 1985: p. 204).  
 
                                                 
73 This influence that one’s culture and ideology have on their compliance behaviour is also reminiscent 
of Merton’s ‘anomie’ theory (1938). Among the five factors that Merton outlined to describe how 
individuals adapt to the conflict between socially desirable goals and an insufficient means to achieve 
them, ‘innovation’ is the element that relates most closely to this research, as innovators, like the 
producers I examined, were confronted with structural obstacles which inhibited their ability to achieve 
their goals. In response, they broke the rules to meet their objectives. Their peer group, which valued 
their achievement more than their means of achievement, praised them for their success, and so the 
cycle of non-compliance continued.   
74 Unlike Grasmick and Bursik’s (1991) finding that people’s motivation to comply with the rules comes 
from a desire to earn the respect and approval of the powerful individuals with whom they interact (this 
is termed “social motivation”), I found that producers’ earned respect from their peers by completing 
successful projects, even if it meant breaching the rules. This too is a form of social motivation, but one 
that opposes compliance-based objectives (see also Murphy, 2004).  
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Punch claimed that when officers were accused of deviant acts they argued that they were 
simply doing their jobs as required. The general consensus of opinion from the force was that 
such behaviour was either “actively condoned” or “passively accepted” (1985: p. 202; see also 
Klockars, 1980). The similarity in the two environments was summarized in Punch’s statement: 
 
“…occupational and organisational deviance is generated and sustained by the 
nature of the work which may be seen as impossible without short cuts and rule 
bending; by an occupational culture that condones illicit practices and that 
legitimates techniques of subterfuge and deception which undermine control; by an 
organisation that implicitly stimulates deviancy as a solution to getting results...” 
(Punch, 1985: p. 208)75 
 
The producers’ assertion that they were confronted with difficult challenges and needed to 
push regulatory limits to survive the market (as they argued other television-makers did), also 
reflects their denial of responsibility for their actions and their belief that these actions were 
somehow mitigated if their competition used equally deviant practices. This is reflective of one 
of the forms of ‘denial’ that Cohen (2001) presented in his book “States of Denial”76, which 
claimed that individuals or perpetrators will deny accountability for their actions by claiming that 
if they did not do the ‘dirty work’ someone else would have. There is an element here of 
surrender, of treating oneself as effect rather than cause, of object rather than subject, which 
was broached by Sykes and Matza (1957), who argued: 
 
It may also be asserted that delinquent acts are due to forces outside of the 
individual and beyond his control such as unloving parents, bad companions, or a 
slum neighbourhood. In effect, the delinquent approaches a “billiard ball” 
conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new 
situations (1957: p. 667). 
 
This claim, along with Parsons and Bales’ (1955) description of a ‘sick role’77, coincides with 
the actions of producers, as they appeared to believe that they needed to opt out of regular 
social responsibilities because of limitations beyond their control. 78 
                                                 
75
 The social constructionist perspective also helped to highlight issues within the environment, 
including how the interaction of employees served to generate shared objectives and practices. For 
example, when judging permissible content, the editors were guided by their previous experience of 
compliance and their understanding of the programme objectives. Their insights, reactions to scenes, 
and personal sensibilities influenced their editorial decisions. The interaction between the editors also 
contributed to the shaping of the series as they made decisions together, influencing one another’s 
interpretation of the regulation. To communicate effectively, employees constructed a common 
meaning to terms such as ‘shock’, ‘money shot’, and ‘boundary pushing’.  
76 Cohen argues that “Statements of denial are assertions that something did not happen, does not 
exist, is not true or is not known about” (2001: p. 3). 
77 Parsons and Bales argued that individuals who are ill sometimes enter into a role of ‘sanctioned 
deviance’. In this image, it is socially perceived that these individuals are not responsible for their 
illness, and so long as they do what is expected of them, which is to work with medical professionals to 
 132 
 
This understanding of Envision’s organisational culture gives force to the thinking behind 
sociological institutionalism, as employees’ perceptions of what they should do, and even more 
importantly what they could do and had to do, was shaped by their social environment. This 
stemmed from the various socially conceived barriers that were established, which guided the 
team along the same course and persuaded them to make like-minded decisions (with as I 
noted, management leading the way, yet also being bound by the same perceived constraints). 
 
This culturally-centered guise places a different slant on the ‘rational choice’ perspective I 
have, and will continue to, discuss here. The simple rational choice-based calculus, option A 
is better than option B, fails to take account of how individuals come to perceive behavioral 
constraints, to view costs and benefits, and to reconcile social acts of ‘illegitimate’ conduct. It 
also ignores such important factors as context, beliefs and culture. In other words, rational 
choice institutionalism tends to focus on individuals’ preferences at any given point and how 
they manage their pursuit of them. Conversely, sociology institutionalism tends to take a 
greater look at how and why their preferences were formed, and the factors that contributed 
to their development. Given the benefit of each approach, it is in the culmination of ideas from 
both theoretical traditions that my findings are best expressed.  
 
Phase 6: The filming process 
 
I shall now turn to a review of the filming process and explain how graphic scenes were 
captured. In doing so, I shall reveal some of the techniques that producers used to contend 
with regulations and how they enabled them to press skilfully the confines of acceptable 
content.   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
try and get well, they are exempt from the normal social responsibilities that are associated with being 
a productive member of society (see also Davis, 1961).  
78 Car Klockers, author of ‘The Dirty Harry Problem’ (1980), had similar findings in research on police 
enforcement. Klockers said that police officers sometimes felt the need to break the law in order to 
catch and punish criminals which would otherwise go unpenalized. Termed the ‘Dirty Harry’ problem or 
‘noble cause corruption’, rule breaking is done for the greater good, and colleagues and the public 
often support the officers for the prosperous outcome (see also Greene, 2006). Similarly, programme-
makers at Envision sometimes broke the regulatory rules by deceiving contributors to produce Agony 
and through doing so they produced the highest rated series in the broadcaster’s history and benefited 
from the acknowledgment that they received for a job well done. This suggests that in some situations 
television-makers, like police officers, could not meet the public’s demands (for safety or for 
entertainment) unless deviance or rule-breaking was used in some form. 
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Various scenes were filmed for Agony II, including individuals running nude in the snow, a 
dominatrix inflicting pain on her subject and a man using an electric baton on a woman as a 
device for intercourse. It was important to shoot particularly graphic scenes in a fashion that 
would not breach the regulation surrounding ‘taste’ and ‘decency’ (Section 1.1 in the ITC 
Programme Code, 2002).79  
 
There was therefore a reliance on techniques which ‘masked’80 the contentious elements of the 
footage. It enabled scenes to be suggestive of sex or violence yet not be too visually revealing. 
Camera operators’ tactics often included shooting a scene out of focus, inserting an object to 
obstruct the contentious elements of the scene or capturing the scene from an angle that did 
not expose its sensitive areas (see Figures 19-21 for examples.) 
 
Figure 19: Masking technique: blurring image 
 
Source: www.inmagine.com 
                                                 
79 Section 1.1, General Requirement: Section 6(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990 requires that 
the ITC does all it can to secure that every licensed service includes nothing in its programmes 
which offends against good taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to crime or lead 
to disorder or be offensive to public feeling. 
80   This is my own term, rather than a term of art. 
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Figure 20: Masking technique: Blocking contentious imagery 
 
Source: www.aatrevue.com 
 
Figure 21: Masking technique: Angled shot 
 
Source: Ambro: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/images/view_photog.php?photogid=1499 
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In addition to masking techniques, some employees adopted a filming process which allowed 
them interchangeably to edit hard and soft versions of scenes. The series producer of The 10 
Worst (2004) explained it:  
 
Normally when you shoot you have two cameras…You shoot essentially a soft-
core version and a hard-core version like they do with porn films. When people 
make porn films they shoot a soft-core version which goes out on television and a 
hard-core one which you buy from under the counter. 
 
…You have to bear in mind that if the ITC or the broadcaster says no to this item - 
that it is too strong for broadcast - you’ll need to be able to tell the same story with 
softer shots. So, we deliberately shoot a lot of it hard, like with the autopsy which is 
a classical example where [the mortician] saws the top of the head and cracks it 
and the brain comes out. But then I got him to…shoot it twice. So, the first time he 
cracked it, I got it full on. The second time I had it from behind him so you could 
sort of see an edge of it but you could not see all the gory details. So, if I need to 
use the second shot then I have got it. 
 
 
This strategy allowed programme-makers easily to adjust content to accommodate 
broadcasters’ requests and to work in and beyond the boundaries of acceptable imagery 
without a great loss of time or money. Producers could try to submit ‘hard’ versions of the 
imagery to the broadcaster for review. If the broadcaster argued that an image was too 
graphic, softer images were available for replacement. Equally, if a regulator upheld a 
complaint over a graphic scene, it could be edited without greatly affecting the broadcast 
schedule.  
 
These filming techniques better enabled producers to broadcast content on the border of 
impermissibility whilst adapting to regulatory restrictions. More generally, this example 
suggests that actors who wished to extend social boundaries developed strategies that would 
allow them to test those boundaries and also to protect themselves from reaping negative 
consequences should the regulator intervene. Such an approach minimized the ‘costs’ of non-
compliance in their cost/benefit analysis, thereby incentivizing them act in a non-abiding 
fashion. 
 
Now that I have explained the various stages actors underwent to produce segments, I shall 
review how the editors pieced the content together in an attempt to create coherent and 
engaging stories. 
 
 136 
Phase 7: The editing process 
 
The seventh phase of the production process entailed the editing of the series. This was a 
particularly significant phase because it was where producers made compliance decisions 
about what content could and could not be included in the programme. Given this 
responsibility, the editors were also required to have the greatest understanding of the 
regulatory rules. 
 
The editors’ objectives 
 
The editing phase took roughly six weeks, and involved the collaboration of the editor who 
operated the computer equipment and the producer who arranged the packaging of the story, 
advising on the appropriate edits.  
 
The producer’s aim was to create concise and engaging stories, each about four minutes in 
length, to total four stories per episode. Interviews with the central characters were used to 
explain harmful events and the feelings of suffering they produced. Secondary interviews with 
onlookers, relatives or friends were then introduced to recount the shocking experience of 
witnessing the incidents and the feelings it conjured up. Interviews with experts, such as 
medical practitioners, were then added to explain the injuries in medical terms. 
 
Tying the footage together were narrative comments that ensured the sensible flow of the 
storylines. Narration was also used to set the programme’s mood, provide audience warnings, 
and insert related facts and statistics to contextualize the segments, adhering to the regulator’s 
advice to make the violent scenes appear less voyeuristically gratuitous. Entangled throughout 
the segments were also background music and dramatic sound bites consonant with the light 
entertainment nature of the series.  
 
The focal point of a story was to feature the ‘money shots’ since all narrative comments and 
interview segments were used to elaborate on the graphic imagery. The desire to broadcast 
this graphic imagery needed to be balanced against the associated regulatory restrictions. 
Since Agony had been found to be in breach of the rules, the editors attempted to ensure that 
Agony II would not be similarly at risk.  
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Why the regulation was previously breached 
 
Previously the ITC held Agony in breach of Section 1.7(c) of the regulatory code, ‘imitable 
violence’ (meaning, violent scenes that could lead to viewers’ emulation).81 The television-
makers claimed that the rule was breached for two reasons – they did not believe in the 
reasoning behind, and thus the purpose for, the rule and they had an inadequate 
understanding of the regulation and of how to calculate risks effectively.   
 
More precisely, the producers generally claimed to believe that television violence does not 
lead to violent social behaviour. High-level employees, who had greater authority over the 
inclusion of violent imagery, were more aware of the media effects research than their lower-
level colleagues, yet they too declared themselves unconvinced about the negative effects. For 
example, the producer and editor of Agony II stated, “I don’t believe that violent movies make 
kids or people violent… I think the media is a lot less influential then we think”.82 
 
This stance was problematic, as the regulatory code prohibited content that incited violence, 
and so the holding of a belief that the media was unable to incite violence left producers with 
few reservations about broadcasting even the most contentious forms of violent imagery. That 
is part of the reason why, as I noted, they breached the regulations concerning ‘imitable 
violence’ in Agony. 
 
This situation revealed a more general point about actors’ compliance behaviour, which is that 
rule-breaking can stem from what purports to be a “principled disagreement with the 
regulations”, as Kagan and Scholz’ ‘corporation as a citizen ideal-type would suggest (1984: p. 
76-78).83 
 
                                                 
81
 Footnote omitted for confidentiality purposes. 
82
 The only employee who insinuated that there was a potential negative effect was the series producer 
of Violent Rage who declined to answer questions about his stance on media effects as he claimed 
that he was at risk of endangering his job if he responded honestly.  
83
 However, unlike this ideal-type (described in Chapter Two), the producers were not ‘good apples’, 
generally willing to comply with the rules, but rather ‘bad apples, who aimed to circumvent the rules. 
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The producers’ self-serving stance about violent content can also make some question 
whether they made these claims as a means of avoiding accountability for the potential 
negative effects of their actions.84 
 
Producers’ adoption of a rationale which argued, “no one really got hurt”, is a variant of 
Cohen’s (2001) and Sykes and Matza’s (1957) concepts of a perpetrator’s “denial of injury” or 
“denial of responsibility” (‘I did not know what I was doing’). This justification, or 
“rationalization”, as Sykes and Matza stated, protected actors from blaming themselves or their 
peers for their actions, thereby allowing the group to continue breaking the rules without 
individual or organisational objection. They stated: 
 
It is our argument that much delinquency is based on what is essentially an 
unrecognized extension of defences to crimes, in the form of justifications for 
deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or 
society at large. These justifications are commonly described as rationalizations. 
They are viewed as following deviant behaviour and as protecting the individual 
from self-blame and the blame of others after the act. But there is also reason to 
believe that they precede deviant behaviour and make deviant behaviour possible 
(Sykes and Matza: p. 666). 
 
The producers’ stance furthermore allowed them to reject the legitimacy of a ‘deviant’ identity, 
which is another form of denial of responsibility. This concept is otherwise referred to as 
‘deviance disavowal’, which is defined as “A refusal, on the part of those who have been 
labelled deviant, to accept this characterization (Oxford Dictionary; see also Davis, 1961).85  
 
Falling under the pool of theories that explain why organisations cannot comply with rules, the 
producers’ breach of the regulations also stemmed, as the ‘corporation as incompetent’ ideal-
type would suggest, from an inadequate knowledge of the regulation, which led to 
miscalculations in their decisions over the form and extent of violent imagery they could 
broadcast (Kagan and Scholz, 1984; see also Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Downs, Rocke and 
Barsoom, 1996). As knowledge about the regulatory rules is a “prerequisite to compliance”, this 
                                                 
84
 This is reminiscent of a statement made by Miss Rice-Davis, an escort who was found to be 
servicing one or more of the third Viscount Astor, William Waldorf Astor’s, house guests. When Miss 
Rice-Davis was told that Viscount Astor denied having met her, she replied, “Well they would, wouldn’t 
they?”, suggesting that he would obviously deny any responsibility (Banyard, 2004). 
85
 The concept was originally developed with reference to so-called social deviants, such as the 
physically handicapped, who had a strong interest in attempting to minimize the stigma of deviance in 
order either to appear normal or to normalize their interactions and relationships with the able-bodied. 
It is now used more widely, notably within the labelling perspective, to apply to all forms of deviant 
behaviour” (Oxford Dictionary; see also Davis, 1961). 
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was a handicap which inhibited the producers’ ability to work effectively (Winter, 2001: p. 679; 
Robens Report, 1972). 
 
Part of the reason that the producers were insufficiently aware of the rules was because the 
series was produced on a minimal budget, and so managers hired staff with less experience 
(typically five years or less) who commanded lower wages than more experienced staff (see 
also Diver, 1989). The tight budget and time-scales also meant that no resources were put 
towards improving their skills and knowledge.  
 
Yet it must also be noted that the producers seemingly willed their ignorance. They expressed 
little interest in learning about the media effects literature and about the formal regulations.86 
This was perhaps because a lack of knowledge about committing illegal or inappropriate acts 
could be somewhat mitigated by a claim that one had unintentionally breached the rules. 
 
The possession of a university education, such as a degree in media studies, which can 
familiarize television-makers with the media effects literature, was not held to be a necessary 
qualification to work in the industry. One employee, who had worked in television for three 
years, even noted that he had removed the education section from his curriculum vitae 
because he felt that it did not enhance his prospects of attaining work.  
 
When the company’s production director was asked if he thought programme-makers should 
be required to attend classes about regulation and media violence effects he stated: 
 
No, because I think it just puts up barriers. Because I think if you go to a course 
and it says that ‘this is our guidelines’, you are always going to be thinking within 
the guidelines. I think when you get too wrapped up in the ITC you might get stuck 
                                                 
86 To make compliance decisions more objective, producers can review the extensive public research 
about ‘taste and decency’ and the media’s potentially harmful effects (see Millwood Hargrave 1993; 
Morrison 1999; Anderson et al. 2003; Cumberbatch and Howitt 1999; Huesmann et al. 2003; Kuntsche 
2003; Savage 2004; Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis 2005; Millwood Hargrave and Livingstone, 2006, 
etc.). The evidence is, however, divided. Some researchers have found that television violence has no 
adverse effect on audiences while others have argued that it can have both short- and long-term 
effects, and can lead to violent behaviour and bullying, an increased fear of violence, and 
desensitization towards the harm of others. These effects are believed to be most significant amongst 
children (generally primary school age), youths (typically secondary school age), and other ‘vulnerable’ 
audiences (see American Association of Paediatrics, 2000; Anderson et al., 2003; Carter, 2002; 
Huesmann et al., 2003; Millwood Hargrave and Livingstone, 2006). Shoemaker and Vos (2009) also 
noted that, like the producer I examined, “studies have found that news reporters and editors generally 
ignore or reject market research on audience taste or interest and rely instead on their own stylized 
versions of audiences (p. 53; see also Gans, 1979; Jacobs, 1996).  
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in a box. Your box might be that you can’t really show this because of, because of, 
because of. That means that you won’t try to push it, which is what TV journalism is 
all about. 
 
This statement not only confirms my argument that producers had a general disregard for the 
rules, but also underscored how that disregard shaped their non-compliant behaviour. 
 
How editors learned about the boundaries of permissible content 
 
While, when asked, the producers I examined could not recall any of the specific rules which 
guided their industry, they did share an informal, common understanding of what content they 
could not show on television and this served as a codified or folk understanding of the rules.  
 
Let me proceed to explain how producers developed this understanding, and how their 
encounters with peers, and personal opinions and instincts (otherwise referred to as their “gut 
instincts”) shaped this process. I shall also reveal how their understanding of the regulatory 
boundaries helped them to develop more effective techniques to bypass the rules, especially 
when dealing with those which were ambiguous or ‘widely-scoped’ and allowed for a variety of 
interpretations. 
 
Erikson (1966) argued that the cultivating and sharing of information about social boundaries 
(or in this case regulatory boundaries) commonly takes place through an exchange of shared 
experiences and understandings. The production process served as an example of this very 
point.   
 
The producers learned about the boundaries of acceptable content by way of a ‘grapevine’ – 
not through reading books or instructional manuals, but by staying abreast of what was on 
television87 and constantly communicating with their peers about their opinions about the 
content.88  
                                                 
87
 As television in itself is a unique medium because it is used to spread social messages (Cohen, 
2002), producers established their sense of boundaries by watching the screen. Over the course of 
their lifetimes they saw how different forms of content were introduced and made permissible, and this 
developed their sense of what was and was not acceptable to broadcast in their day-to-day activities. 
In the case of the producers I examined, each time an increasingly graphic scene was broadcast 
without causing a regulatory intervention, they took it as a sign that they too could transmit similar 
content. 
88
 This is redolent of Lewis (1969) and Virts, 1978 who found that ‘community knowledge’ and the 
opinions of peers influenced one’s decisions about content.  
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In order to communicate effectively about the nature of television production, producers 
adopted and cultivated a common language which was specific to their industry. For instance, 
they talked about ‘water cooler moments’, ‘context’, ‘audience demographic’ and ‘gratuitous 
violence’ because they served as important aspects in the production process and were 
cultivated to get across messages which were integral to this field.  
 
Thus, while television violence was acceptable, ‘gratuitous violence’ was not, and the phrase 
was used to mark a social (or regulatory) boundary. The term ‘context’ too was very important, 
and as the amount of available content in the industry has expanded, its role in the 
interpretation of regulatory boundaries has risen. Whether or not an image of violence is 
deemed permissible by the regulator is dependent on its context. Did the offender hurt 
someone and get away without negative repercussions? If so, this might be deemed 
unacceptable because it could teach viewers that they can get away with crimes. Did a news 
story show the face of an adolescent rape victim? If so, it might be deemed inappropriate 
because society at large is held to believe that children should be protected from undue stress 
and harm.   
 
Television-makers also pooled their experiences of which tactics they and their peers had used 
and which had proved to be successful or unsuccessful in the past. Practical information and 
advice were therefore constantly passed between employees to keep them abreast of issues 
affecting their work, and over time they used this trial and error-based approach to develop 
their understanding of the industry and their attitudes towards compliance (for an interesting 
example see the footnote).89 One of the editors explained, “…if you know somebody that has 
got into trouble for leaving something in, you make sure the next time you take it out”.  
 
                                                 
89 For example, the series producer of The 10 Worst stated that he was the first producer to broadcast 
in-depth autopsy footage in Britain. He claimed to be anxious when submitting the segment to the 
commissioning editor to preview as he was certain that it would be deemed impermissible. By chance, 
however, the commissioning editor had hoped for a career as an undertaker before he had shifted into 
television. He therefore found the footage interesting and allowed it to be broadcast. In the end, the 
programme was aired without regulatory intervention. Since television-makers base many of their 
decisions about permissibility on whether previous content had been found to be in breach of 
regulations, this precedent may have encouraged other broadcasters to produce similar programming 
thereafter. An instance in which autopsies were later broadcast without regulatory infringement 
included the educational series The Autopsy (2005). Interestingly, The Autopsy, like Agony II, took an 
ostensibly educational approach to legitimising its inclusion of highly graphic content. 
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The editor and numerous other producers stated that this accumulated understanding 
congealed into what they referred to as a “gut instinct” which guided their decision-making and 
helped them to determine which content to prohibit.  
 
This process of learning by way of a ‘grapevine’ and practical apprenticeship was a product of 
the continually changing television environment. Since programmes possess different forms of 
content there is a continually shifting context within which judgements about permissibility may 
be made. It is only through long exposure to television and regulation compliance, and the 
sharing of professional knowledge, that a recognition of the nuances between acceptable and 
unacceptable programming can emerge.  
 
Let us now turn to an examination of how programme-makers interpreted the regulatory 
guidelines in practice. As some of the rules were broadly scoped (e.g. ‘do not broadcast 
‘offensive’ content’) and because television programming was diverse in content and context, 
the makers of Violent Rage and Agony II were rarely able to provide clear, practical guidelines 
for their editorial decisions. It did nevertheless become apparent through my interviews with the 
producers that certain guidelines were in play, and they indicated that the producers believed 
that if violent content met a number of requirements (specifically in relation to the series I 
examined), it could be permissibly broadcast if: 
 
 the scenes did not result in a person’s death; 
 sexual scenes appeared consensual and did not show penetrative sex or a penile 
erection; 
 scenes were appropriately contextualized and in alignment with the nature of the 
programme, schedule and channel; 
 scenes were appropriately filmed and edited to ensure that the contentious elements 
of graphic scenes were concealed, and that their display was not overly repetitious; 
 with few exceptions, those harmed were adults not children; 
 the audience was given sufficient warning about the nature of the content and the 
potential harm if audience members were to re-enact the violent scenes; 
 the programmes were aired reasonably late after the watershed (9pm); and 
 the content was appropriately aimed toward the audience ‘demographic’. 
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Some particularly revealing marginal cases demonstrate how editorial decisions were made 
about death and children – two key areas of concern for regulators. These case examples 
show how the rules were interpreted in practice. 
 
The first case touches on the prohibition of broadcasting a person’s death, which relates to 
Section 1.7 of the ITC’s code:  
 
1.7(ii) (c) Violence in News and other Programmes: 
Whether in news, current affairs or other programmes, actuality footage of 
executions or other scenes in which people are clearly seen being killed or about to 
die require exceptional justification. 
 
Violent Rage aired a story about Thomas Johnson, a young African-American man from 
Mississippi, who fled from the police after an incident of reported reckless driving. The police 
pursued Johnson for five miles before he stopped his vehicle in a convenience store parking lot 
and fled on foot for several yards before submitting by putting his hands into the air. He had no 
weapon and posed no serious threat to the police, but the police mistook a mobile phone in 
Johnson’s hand for a gun and repeatedly shot him at point blank range in the back, killing him.  
 
The event was caught on a camera attached to one of the police vehicles. When determining 
the permissibility of showing the content, the editor decided to broadcast the video up until the 
point before Johnson was shot. If Johnson had survived the shooting, Envision would have 
likely broadcast the entire clip, but because the shooting resulted in his death, the scene was 
deemed too violent for transmission. This marks the operation of a regulatory-enforced 
boundary at the extreme edge of violent imagery.  
 
It is, however, interesting to note that if two broadcasters aired identical scenes in identical 
circumstances, and one involved a narrator stating that the victim had died, the scene would 
probably have been deemed unacceptable, whereas if the other narrator had stated that he 
had survived, it was more likely to have been deemed acceptable.90 The regulator was 
responsible for developing evidence-based policy, and this guideline likely originated from 
research which revealed that the public finds non-fictional scenes of death distressing. It was a 
concrete restriction unless there was ‘exceptional justification’. Near-death, however, fell within 
                                                 
90 To substantiate this point, on 6 March 2009 BBC One aired a news report which showed a scene in 
which a train flew off the tracks and ran over a man. From viewing the scene, one would have 
assumed that the man had died. The news anchor, however, declared that the man miraculously 
survived, and because this statement was made, the scene was likely allowed to be broadcast. 
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a grey area of regulation where aspects surrounding contextualization could have been used to 
allow content to be shown. 
 
A second issue of concern, marking another stark regulatory boundary, related to the treatment 
of children. Programme-makers were advised to be very cautious when considering the 
inclusion of scenes which showed children being harmed. Most stories with children were 
therefore excluded in the early stages. One that was given significant consideration was about 
a Russian community which dipped their male babies into ice-cold water because they 
believed it toughened their spirits. The broadcaster decided to exclude the story because 
audience members might have viewed it as a form of child abuse.  
 
While these examples generally illustrated cases which were rather clear-cut, the following 
example will show that some scenes needed greater contextualisation to ensure that they 
could be successfully broadcast. 
 
How the editors used their understanding to navigate around the rules 
 
Apart from such explicitly prohibited boundaries, programme-makers believed themselves to 
be reasonably capable of broadcasting what many thought were some of the most violent 
scenes on British television, once they had been appropriately packaged in a fashion intended 
to circumvent regulatory intervention. These constituted some of the techniques the actors 
used to practice ‘creative compliance’ and what I will refer to as ‘rule reinterpretation’.  
 
To explain, in one Violent Rage episode about the abuse of authority, there was a graphic 
scene which displayed a man in a foreign country held in police custody. A policeman 
instructed the man to run into a field, only to command a police dog to chase and attack him. 
When the man tried to defend himself against the dog’s vicious and repeated biting, the police 
officer beat him severely. 
 
The segment was contextualized, albeit not in depth, by a narrative discussion of violence as a 
societal concern that needed to be addressed, it contained audience warnings, placed on a 
‘suitable’ non-terrestrial channel, aired after the watershed and targeted toward an audience of 
young adult males. 
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Despite these factors, intended to allow for its permissibility by regulatory standards, the 
production director described the programme as clearly “gratuitous”. In his words: 
 
If this were Channel 4, it might have gone a bit deeper into when and why it 
happened, whereas with Violent Rage it is not really a hard hitting documentary as 
such. It is just showing gratuitous violence, because you can. So there’s nothing in-
depth about it. 
 
It is evident that the director purported to believe that it was acceptable to broadcast 
‘gratuitous’ violence for the sake of ratings, when in fact ‘gratuitous’ violence was explicitly 
prohibited by the regulation. He did however make three things clear:  
 
 he was inadequately educated about the regulatory Code;  
 he intended to broadcast ‘gratuitous’ violence; and  
 in his eight years of experience, he found that when ‘gratuitous’ violence was 
appropriately packaged, it could successfully be broadcast without regulatory 
consequences.  
  
And in fact, the violent imagery was broadcast and the regulator did not find the series in 
breach of the Code.  
 
The producers’ ability to circumvent the rules and ultimately reshape the media’s landscape 
concerning violent content lends itself to one producer’s statement – “I think TV is being 
watered down. Like the rules and the morality of it are slowly eroding a little bit, and a little bit, 
and a little bit on what you can get away with. I don’t necessarily think it is a good thing.”91  
 
This situation adds to our understanding of compliance behaviour. This chapter, along with the 
forthcoming two chapters, offer examples of regulatory ‘non-compliance’ and ‘creative 
compliance’. This situation, however, offers a third perspective on compliance behaviour – one 
that I shall refer to as ‘rule reinterpretation’. While ‘non-compliance’ refers simply to the 
infringement of rules, and ‘creative compliance’ to an actor who follows the letter of rules but 
not their ‘spirit’ (as to avoid penalisation), ‘rule reinterpretation’ refers to those who flexibly 
reformulate the way that rules are interpreted so as to benefit their own purposes (and to 
evade penalisation).  
 
                                                 
91
 Interview, February 2004 
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In this situation the producers practiced both ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’. 
They followed the letter of the regulatory rules, but not their spirit, as a means to avoid 
regulatory intervention, thus practicing creative compliance. In the process of doing so, they 
also successfully reconfigured the practical interpretation of the rules on ‘offensive’ and 
‘gratuitous’ violence, thereby extending the limits of permissible graphic imagery (See Chapter 
Three for an elaboration of these rules, and Chapters Six and Seven for a further discussion of 
‘rule reinterpretation’).  
 
Phase 8: The final moments 
 
In the final stage of the editing process, the producer needed to ensure that each segment was 
complete and that the storylines were seamlessly connected and contained a sufficient level of 
background information. Such work was done in a hectic fashion that was made even more 
fraught by the departure of two-thirds of the staff prior to the completion of the series, leaving 
the remaining third to finish the project within a tight deadline. This led to the broadcast of 
seemingly inaccurate information. 
 
Two producers worked simultaneously to complete the editing, frequently contacting the two 
remaining researchers to locate supplementary information and statistics to substantiate the 
stories. The researchers had very limited time to find information which was often elusive 
because of its ‘random yet specific’ nature. For example, a researcher might have been asked 
to find out how many houses in a remote area of South America were burned down by 
cigarettes each year, although such statistics were never recorded.  
 
Some of the information was obtained through questioning relevant experts. Other information, 
namely statistics, was obtained through general internet searches where data were taken 
indiscriminately from random websites. Many of these links typically lacked the authority of, 
say, the American Medical Association’s website. Given the significant pressure to meet urgent 
deadlines, researchers did not check the statistics’ validity or sources, making the accuracy of 
the broadcast information highly questionable.  
 
The association between time constraints and the release of inaccurate information has been 
discussed by a number of researchers including MacGregor (1995), Cottle (1999), Arant and 
Anderson (2001), Ursell (2001); Berkowitz (2002); Rao, Zmikly and Tyree (2007), O’Sullivan 
 147 
and Heinonen (2008), Russial (2009) and Valentine (2009). Ursell, for example, conducted a 
study of broadcasters at the BBC, ITN and Yorkshire Television and found that errors in 
accuracy resulted from their not having had the time or resources to ensure that their material 
was properly developed and substantiated. She stated “Journalists complained of ‘no time to 
think, no time to check’; ‘I’ve never time to get out of the studio and dig out better information’” 
(2001, p. 193). 
 
Once this background information was in, despite its accuracy in question, the editor deemed 
the ‘off-line’ version of the series ready for the broadcasters’ review.92  
 
Submitting the series to the broadcaster: 
 
Agony II was then submitted to Entertainu’s compliance department and commissioning editor 
who reviewed the series to ensure that it abided by the regulations, that the stories were well 
constructed, and that they met the expected entertainment standards.  
 
Entertainu’s compliance and commissioning departments worked separately, in part because 
their objectives were at odds with one another and management wanted to impose a cordon 
sanitaire between them to insulate their engrained conflicts. The commissioner’s goal was to 
guarantee that the series received high ratings, while the compliance team’s objective was to 
guarantee that it met the relevant regulatory requirements. The commissioner therefore had a 
greater incentive to extend the limits of acceptable content than the compliance team.93 
 
After their review, the compliance team contacted Envision with several requests for changes 
such as the removal of a segment that appeared harmful to children; a limitation of the number 
of repetitions of graphic imagery; and the removal or augmentation of graphic content thought 
to be gratuitously extended.  
 
Entertainu’s commissioning editor requested changes to the storylines to ensure that they were 
adequately comprehensible, included a sufficient level of background information, provided a 
reasonable flow between segments, and carried the appropriate music, narration and sound 
                                                 
92
 ‘Off-line’ referred to the series prior to the broadcaster’s changes and approval; ‘on-line’ referred to 
the series post approval, marking its preparedness for broadcast. 
93 The next chapter will explain further how Entertainu’s departments operated. 
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effects. (These changes, and the broadcasters’ role in the shaping of the series, will be 
discussed further in the forthcoming chapter.) 
 
Having received Entertainu’s suggestions, programme-makers then worked quickly to 
implement the corrections and the series went ‘on-line’, ready to be broadcast to the public.  
 
The producers’ relationship with broadcasters and regulators 
 
It is important to examine Envision’s relationship with, and view of, the broadcaster and the 
regulator. In what follows, I shall explain how the producers’ opinion of Entertainu served to 
motivate them further to test regulatory limits, and how their relationship (or lack thereof) with 
Ofcom translated into a lack of accountability for their non-compliant actions and a 
disengagement from the regulation.  
 
Envision’s relationship with Entertainu was that of an employer/employee, with the broadcaster 
holding the final decision-making power. Some broadcasters gave the production companies 
they hired substantial creative freedom while others did not. Such an arrangement would have 
been agreed in the commissioning phase of the project. The parties’ understanding set out 
whether the programme was to be produced to the broadcaster’s particular specifications or if 
the production company itself was intended to make the majority of the decisions about the 
programme’s nature and content.  
 
In the case of Agony II, the series producer had a clear understanding of the production plan 
for the series as she had produced its prequel, Agony. Given that the broadcasters were 
confident about what to expect, they offered her a significant level of creative freedom. Little 
communication was therefore thought to be required between the organisations during the 
production process.  
 
The producers’ approach to compliance was however influenced by their view of the 
broadcasters. The producers saw Entertainu as a broadcaster that was “chasing the money”,94 
an entity which intentionally pushed the boundaries, yet would not intentionally and blatantly 
breach those boundaries out of fear of potential punishment. In other words, it was viewed as a 
                                                 
94
 Interview with production director, March 2004 
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company that would place its pursuit of ratings above its duty to comply with regulation 
whenever it felt capable of getting away with it.  
 
When the production director was asked if he thought it would be a good idea if Ofcom were to 
place more regulatory control into the broadcaster’s hands, he stated, “Not really – they will 
push it, and push it and push it until they get sued.”95 This perception of Entertainu led the 
producers to have few reservations about forcing regulatory limits themselves, as the 
broadcasters, their employers, appeared to support this approach. 
  
The producers, however, claimed that when the broadcasters’ actually breached the regulatory 
Code, their act flowed from a failure of judgment resulting from an inadequate understanding 
(whether wilful or not) of the regulation in question. The claim that the broadcasters were 
inadequately knowledgeable about the rules echoes Kagan and Scholz’s notion of 
‘corporations as incompetent’ entities (see Chapter Two). The relevant factor here was 
Entertainu’s ability to ‘calculate risks intelligently’. The organisation admittedly pressed the 
limits of graphic content. Its ability to exist on the line of permissibility, slowly extending its 
reach, yet not blatantly breaking through its borders, was a continual measure of its success at 
calculating risks.96 
 
In judging how decisions about this balancing act were made, the production director criticised 
Entertainu’s compliance team, noting that it primarily made minor changes to the programmes, 
not changes that were significant, “intellectual” or justified. The series producer of Agony II 
further stated that the compliance team had no apparent or rational reason for their regulatory 
decisions and that they too frequently relied on their ‘gut instinct’. 
 
The producers’ perception of broadcasters lacked a full understanding of how they operated in 
relation to compliance. They assumed that the broadcaster lacked a sophisticated strategy for 
decision-making. Yet, I shall show in the next chapter that the broadcaster did have a relatively 
thorough compliance process which relied on having a keen understanding of previous and 
current programmes broadcast across the collective networks. The producers’ own lack of 
                                                 
95
 Interview, March 2004 
96 This again relates to the amoral calculator theory as employees weighed the benefits of gaining 
footage and interviews against the costs of being caught.  
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understanding about this process, and compliance in general, simply led them to adopt their 
own somewhat misleading views. 
 
In my attempt to understand whether the relationship I examined between the producers and 
broadcasters could be generalised more widely, I asked one series producer how he and his 
peers tended to negotiate their position on compliance with other broadcasters. His reply 
suggested that they often saw themselves as autonomous creative directors who wanted their 
programmes to be broadcast exactly the way they had created them. They therefore viewed 
the commissioning broadcasters, who had the final say in approving the content before it was 
released, to be individuals who could stand in the way of this interest, and so the series 
producer explained that they sometimes employed crafty techniques to outmanoeuvre the 
broadcasters and keep them from changing a programme. 
 
The producer said, “The first layer of censorship is what the person that is buying it, the 
commissioning editor, personally finds offensive. If he doesn’t like it he will say something. So 
even if you can legally show it on television, but it offends his sensibilities and is too much, 
then that’s the way it goes.” He stated that most directors therefore “deliberately put in a couple 
of shots that they know will never make it into television; that are so ghastly and over the top.” 
They do so because they believe that commissioning editors feel the need to augment the 
programme in some form to put their mark on it – even if no change is necessary. Altering 
material allowed them to ‘imagine’ that they have made a difference and legitimises the need 
for their roles. The directors’ approach to adding shots that they knew the commissioning 
editors would remove allowed them to broadcast the series in the way that they had originally 
intended. The series producer stated: 
 
If you give them too much, give them shots you know they are going to take out, 
that will save them from touching the stuff that you really like. If I put it in straight, 
as I want it to go out on television, I’m guaranteed it won’t be out on television the 
way I want it to be because they would have felt that they have to change 
something. But if I put in a couple of glaring, horrible shots which are ghastly, they 
will say ‘there’s no way that can go in’, which then means that he psychologically is 
thinking, ‘oh brilliant, I’ve changed it; I’ve done something’. In fact, I know that he is 
going to change that so I’ve put it in deliberately so it goes back to what I wanted it 
to be. This is an unspoken trick that everyone does here. 
 
In relation to the producers’ relationship with the regulators, it is important to note once again 
that Ofcom only had the power to oversee the compliance of broadcasters, not of production 
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companies.97 The regulators therefore could not penalise production companies in any way for 
acts of non-compliance. In turn, they had practically no contact with independent producers, 
regardless of whether or not they infringed the rules. 
 
Rather, the regulators held the broadcasters responsible for all breaches of compliance, 
including those which were caused by external production houses. This was intended to 
encourage them to ensure that the independent producers they employed complied with the 
regulations.   
 
The producers’ incentive to comply rested on the presumption that in a highly competitive 
market they would not generate enough commissions to sustain their business if they were 
found to breach repeatedly the rules. Production companies were apparently further motivated 
as they signed contracts with the broadcasters promising to abide by the regulatory code.  
 
But I have already noted that the broadcasters did not keep close watch over the producers’ 
actions and did not penalise them in any way when they were found to be in breach of the 
regulation for Agony. To the contrary, after the programme’s success with ratings, they 
commissioned a second series, which provided the producers with additional work. This, 
coupled with producers’ belief that the breach from the first series only served to generate 
additional press and thereby ratings, motivated them further to test the regulatory limits, as 
they lacked an adequate system of accountability and suffered no negative repercussions for 
their non-compliant acts. 
 
When I asked the series producer of Agony II if the regulators had any particular faults, she 
said that their compliance decisions were inconsistent at times. For example, she asserted that 
Agony was reprimanded for broadcasting images of self-harming stunts while the footage was 
simultaneously being broadcast on other channels without regulatory interference. She claimed 
that this oversight occurred because the regulators did not watch the market closely enough to 
detect the full breadth of non-compliant acts that occurred. The producers therefore aimed to 
                                                 
97 Broadcasters were granted licences enabling them to broadcast once they had met the relevant 
qualifications and had signed a binding agreement to comply with Ofcom’s television regulation. If the 
broadcaster breached the agreement, the regulator had the power to enforce a series of penalties, 
from warnings and fines to ultimately revoking the licence, which would have effectively ended all 
business activity. 
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benefit from this oversight and extend the regulatory borders where they felt they could fall 
under the regulators’ scope of detection. 
 
In sum, the producers I studied had virtually no relationship with Ofcom at all; they did not even 
have a regulatory code book in their office. All forms of communication, negotiation and 
compliance-handling occurred solely between the broadcasters and the regulators.  
 
The result was that they were disengaged from the regulatory process. Their understanding of 
the regulations and of broadcasters’ and regulators’ compliance procedures was sketchy, 
inaccurate and prone to error (perhaps by design). And so, with little fear of reprisal, they 
placed their business needs above their regulatory duties. (This finding suggests that one’s 
involvement in the regulatory process, and with the regulators, is a necessary prerequisite to 
their compliance.) 
 
As noted, this compliance rationale was in tune with rational choice institutionalism and the 
amoral calculator typology. Like Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) ‘amoral calculator’, rationale 
choice institutionalism assumes that individuals have a set of preferences regarding their 
desires or goals, and in the process of seeking to attain these goals, they calculate the costs, 
benefits and risks of different courses of action before taking the most seemingly 
advantageous approach (see also Eggert and Lokina, 2010; Nguyen, 2011; Ostrovskaya and 
Leentvaar, 2011, Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar and Eizinga, 2011).  
 
Rational choice institutionalists’ emphasize the role that institutions play in this calculation. 
Institutions in their framework are “the rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990: p. 3). When 
applying this model to my research, institutions can be understood as the parameters of 
knowledge that affect how television-makers regard the potential consequences for their non-
compliance. These rules provide them with information about the likelihood that regulators will 
detect and penalise them for their misconduct (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In turn, they influence 
their strategic decision-making. 
 
There are two strands of thought within this tradition. The first views institutions and their rules 
as concrete exogenous constraints “or as an exogenously given game form” (Shepsle, 2005: p. 
2). In this view: 
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An institution is a script that names the actors, their respective behavioural repertoires (or 
strategies), the sequence in which the actors choose from them, the information they 
possess when they make their selections, and the outcome resulting from the combination of 
actor choices. Once we add actor evaluations of outcomes to this mix – actor preferences – 
we transform the game form into a game. 
 
The actors in this vision therefore do not have the independence or authority to change the 
rules of the game of the terms of engagement – these factors are externally set.  
 
The second strand of rationale choice institutionalism perceives institutions more fluidly by 
assuming that actors have the power to rewrite the rules of the game as it is played. “A group 
of children, for example, might take the official rules of baseball as a starting point to govern 
their interaction, but then adapt them to specific circumstances or tastes” (Shepsle, 2005: p. 3). 
One day a ball that lands in the creek might be considered out of bounds, while the next day 
the children choose to consider it a homerun. “In this view of institutions, there is nothing 
exogenous about the rules of the game...They do not compel observance, but rather reflect the 
willingness of (nearly) everyone to engage with one another according to particular patterns 
and procedures (nearly all the time)” (Shepsle, 2005: p. 3). Institutions in this perception are 
therefore fundamentally important because they are the focal points with which rules of 
engagement and socially acceptable conduct are formed.  
 
In application to my research, Ofcom’s lack of involvement with the producers, and 
consequentially their lack of management over them (in a punitive sense) served to diminish 
the television-makers’ appreciation for the ‘external’ barriers of permissible conduct. This made 
the ‘costs’ in the cost/benefit analysis appear small in relation to the benefits.  
 
The structure of this dynamic or ‘institution’, which put the broadcasters at the forefront of all 
regulatory activity, often overshadowing the independent producers, meant that the producers I 
examined had minimal regulatory involvement. This appeared to reduce their access to, and 
interest in, learning about the regulations. This was because they did not have an adequate 
system of accountability to ensure that they would be penalised if they infringed the rules, a 
relationship with the regulators whereby they felt that they could readily ask them questions, 
nor a forum in which they could discuss and debate the complaints viewers made about them 
with the regulators.  
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In other words, the independent producers had far less power in shaping the broader 
institutional parameters (or rules) than the broadcasters and regulators, and so they made a 
weaker commitment to conform to their external normative ideals. In turn, the producers 
created their own sense of ‘institution’, devised their own rules (and interpretation of rules) and 
developed their own counter-culture that only abided, in-part, to the dominant social construct. 
 
In a broader theoretical sense, the producers’ rationale towards regulatory compliance did not 
reflect what one might refer to as the ‘exogenous constraints’ model of institutions, but rather to 
a more fluid interpretation of institutions. While there were certainly more formal ways of 
conduct or ‘game play’ at the external level, particularly between the broadcasters and 
regulators, the independent producers appeared to exist and operate on a plain that was 
somewhat distant from these actors, and because of this, they appeared to (sometimes 
rightfully) believe that they had more freedom to dictate their own course of action with fewer 
external interventions. 
 
Conclusion and summary 
 
Let me now review my key findings, apply them to my overarching themes and note how they 
will contribute to the sociology of regulation and sociology of media literature. 
 
Throughout this chapter I have documented the producers’ wilful non-compliance in a variety of 
ways. I have also reported that producers’ decisions about regulatory compliance and the 
negotiation of boundaries were influenced by a number of micro- and maco-level factors (see 
Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22: The factors which influenced producers' compliance decisions 
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job security
Personal 
opinions 
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These factors are summarized in the following. 
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External level factors: 
 
 Deregulation: The television industry has undergone extensive deregulation since 
the 1980s and this has allowed for the rapid proliferation of channels and the 
relaxation of content controls, giving broadcasters greater freedom to transmit new 
forms of content.98 
  
 Technological advances: Technological advances supported the expansion of the 
market and led to an improvement in production equipment which enabled producers 
to improve their productivity. This made it possible for workers to perform multiple 
roles and this brought various effects, unwelcomed by staff, such as the added 
stress and rule infractions that flowed from producers being unable to juggle multiple 
responsibilities.99  
 
 Competition pressures / market growth: The rise in the number of television services 
led to a heightened increase in competition, and a culture of competition at the 
production company.100 
 
 Globalisation: The globalisation of media content meant that producers frequently 
collected and dispersed content outside of the United Kingdom. This influenced 
producers’ compliance-related decisions, as they believed that they could breach the 
‘fairness’ rules in other countries and the actors involved would not be in a position to 
inform Ofcom and therefore no penalty would be levied.  
 
 Rule ambiguity: Many of the regulatory rules were widely-scoped and this gave 
employees room to interpret their meaning in different ways and therefore to practice 
‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’.101 
 
 
                                                 
98
 Thussu’s (2002) and Kuhn’s (2002) work also discusses how the government/regulator effects 
media production. 
99
 See also Pavlik (2000), Gunter (2003) and Salwen (2005) 
100
 See also McManus (1994) and Beam (2003) 
101
 For additional comment on rule ambiguity, see Chayes (1993), Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996), 
Tallberg (2002) and Footer (2008). 
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Organisational level factors: 
 
 Conflicting objectives and duties: The producers’ need to achieve ratings, and in turn 
sustain their company financially, was sometimes at odds with their duty to comply 
with the television standards regulations. This led to compliance failures in instances 
in which both objectives could not simultaneously be met. 
 
 Organisation’s culture and ideology: In line with the previous statement, there was a 
culture of competition at Envision, whereby the perceived need to gain ratings and 
meet production targets exceeded the need to abide by the rules. The regulation was 
viewed as an obstacle that stood in the way of meeting one’s core objectives and 
therefore employees who met their goals, even if it took breaching the rules, were 
deemed respectable and were rewarded.102 
 
 Management’s power over subordinates: Upper-level management held significant 
power over the cultural values and practices adopted by the organisation, including a 
strong influence over lower level employees’ production of content and their 
compliance with the regulation.103 
 
 Economic interests and demands (and a drive for ratings): The formation of the 
company’s cultural values was influenced by economic constraints, as the president 
claimed that revenues were oftentimes dangerously low and therefore making 
money in order to survive had to be producers’ first priority.104 
 
 Capacity issues: As producers were eager to gain new commissions, they often 
agreed to produce programmes within tight budgets. Due to this lack of funding, the 
                                                 
102
 Howard-Grenville, Nash and Coglianese (2008) too argued that one’s organisational culture and 
personal identity shapes its residents’ compliance decisions. Meanwhile, Breed (1955), Jablin (1982), 
MacDougall (1988), Kim (2002) and Marcellus (2005) found that an organisation’s values/culture 
shape individuals’ decisions about media content. 
103
 Entman and Rojecki (2000), Turner (2002), and Warren and Vavrus (2003) similarly found that 
management’s power over their staff affected their decisions about media content.  
104
 This is in line with numerous researchers who found that ratings and the dynamics of a profit-
seeking business dictated the shape of media practitioners’ production decisions (Gans, 1979; Lewis, 
1969; Virts, 1978; Bantz, McCordle and Baade, 1980; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Shoemaker and 
Mayfield 1987; Beam, 2003; Alexander, 2004; Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn, 2004; Gentzkow and 
Shapiro, 2006). 
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company had limited staff and few highly experienced workers. This led to greater 
working pressures and affected the type of content television-makers produced and 
their ability to meet regulatory requirements.105 
 
 Tight time constraints: The tight budget led management to agree to produce 
programmes within short time scales, as to avoid the cost of hiring staff for prolonged 
periods. Having a short production schedule also appealed to the broadcasters, as it 
allowed them to air the content sooner.106 
 
 Insufficient regulatory training: Upper-level management did not train their staff about 
the regulations. Employees’ knowledge was therefore sketchy and prone to lead to 
compliance errors. The managers’ actions were rationalized because of tight time 
and budget restrictions, and a general lack of interest in regulatory training.107  
 
 Perceived likelihood of detection and the severity of sanctions: The increase in the 
number of channels made it difficult for regulators to watch them (as the IBA once 
did). They also regulated solely the broadcasters, with the expectation that they 
would in turn supervise the independent producers (which, in this case, the 
broadcasters did not). These factors led to a lack of transparency surrounding 
producers’ practices, leading them to believe that their non-compliant acts would go 
undetected and unpenalised. This, in turn, further motivated them to infringe the 
rules.108 
                                                 
105
 Related to this, Chayes and Chayes (1993), Tallberg (2002), Hutter and Jones (2006), Footer 
(2008) and Nie (2008) found that ‘capacity issues’ can lead to non-compliant behaviour, while Bantz, 
McCordle and Baade, (1980), Fishman (1982), O’Sullivan and Heinonen (2008) and Russial (2009) 
found that project demands and resource limitations can influence the media production process and 
the shape of content (see also Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Winter, 2001). 
106
 Similarly, the association between time constraints and the release of inaccurate information has 
been discussed by a number of researchers including MacGregor (1995), Cottle (1999), Arant and 
Anderson (2001), Ursell (2001); Berkowitz (2002); Rao, Zmikly and Tyree (2007), O’Sullivan and 
Heinonen (2008), Russial (2009) and Valentine (2009). 
107
 Fairman and Yapp (2005) noted that small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) had little 
knowledge about the regulations and of regulators enforcement of the rules on other companies, and 
the regulator’s enforcement was therefore sometimes ineffective (p. 506) (see also Genn, 1993; 
Dawson et al 1988). This was because they did not have the needed systems in place to both 
establish and monitor compliance (p. 516). They also noted that SMEs (like Envision) did not seek out 
information about regulations to improve their compliance. Rather, they simply reacted when the 
regulator intervened in their businesses practices (p. 506). 
108
 See also Becker, 1968; Sutherland, 1983; Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Hechter, 1987; Friedman and 
Hechter, 1988; Hawkins, 1990; Pearce and Tombs, 1990; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Footer, 2008; 
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 Audience profile: Agony II targeted young men and this demographic was believed to 
want to see images of violence, as was indicated by Agony’s success with ratings. 
They were also the least likely demographic to become offended by content and this 
encouraged producers to press the limits of graphic imagery.109 
 
Individual level factors: 
 
 A disregard for the rules and their purposes: Many of the producers expressed a 
blatant willingness to breach the regulation. This stemmed, in-part, from their (self-
benefiting) disbelief in the basis for the consumer protection-based rules, as 
producers claimed that the media had no harmful effects.110 
 
 Encounters with peers: Individuals’ selection of content and their understanding of 
the boundaries of permissible imagery were influenced by the way they were trained 
to perform their roles. This was similar to an apprentice-like style whereby individuals 
learned from their peers as they progressed.111 
 
 Reputation / job security: The producers’ behaviour was also shaped by their 
personal desire to maintain a positive reputation amongst their peers for being able 
to complete projects on time and within budget, as this helped to ensure their future 
employment.112 
 
 Personal opinions and instincts: Producers’ decisions were further influenced by their 
personal opinions (referred to as their “gut instincts”) about what was appropriate 
content to broadcast.113 
                                                                                                                                                    
Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Khanna and Widyawati 2011; Nelson, 2011; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 
2011; Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar and Eizinga, 2011 
109
 Napoli (2003) and Allen (2005) also note that the size and composition of audiences influence 
media practitioners’ decisions about content (see also Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). 
110
 See also Kagan and Scholz, 1984 
111
 For a similar account see Breed (1955), Jablin, (1982), McDougall (1988) and Kim (2002). 
112
 Similarly, Shoemaker and Vos (2009) stated, “...the employee suppresses dissident values in order 
to keep the job or perhaps even to work behind the scenes to further a goal” (p. 72).  
113
 See also White (1950), Bissell (2000) and Shoemaker and Vos (2009) 
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How these factors connected, affected compliance and led to regulatory weakness 
 
Now that I have outlined the various factors that I found to influence producers’ decisions and 
where these factors fall within my hierarchical model, I will attempt to paint a brief picture of 
how the industry has changed and how aspects at one level have influenced decision-making 
at other levels.   
 
Macro-level changes stemming from deregulation, globalisation and technological advances 
reshaped television’s oligopolistic environment, and allowed for the influx of hundreds of new 
television channels, and broadcasting and independent production companies. This 
proliferation in channels/companies made it difficult for the regulator to monitor the market as 
fully as the IBA once had. This resulted in television-makers gaining more control and 
autonomy, and in turn led them to allow audience ratings greater room to shape the evolving 
character of media content. It also diffused audiences across networks, allowing for the influx 
of ‘niche’ channels (like Entertainu which did not have to adhere to policies aimed at ‘family 
viewing’), and intensified the competition between broadcasters, thereby forcing them to make 
increasingly strenuous efforts to attain ratings.  
 
These changes had various knock-on effects. The increase in competition and reduction in the 
barriers to entry for new market entrants led to a rise in small to mid-sized production 
companies which, in the process of trying to survive in the highly competitive market, faced 
difficult resource and time constraints. This led the producers I examined to cut corners by 
hiring inexpensive, minimally skilled workers, not adequately training those workers about the 
regulations, and by implementing a strict managerial approach which placed the business’s 
economic objectives over its regulatory obligations. As a result, employees were faced with 
great job insecurity, which generated a ‘do whatever it takes’ attitude to fulfil their assignments 
and a subsequent disregard for the rules. This helped to breed a culture of non-compliance 
which was reinforced by producers’ perception that the likelihood of detection or penalisation 
was low.  
 
Collectively, these findings add to the sociology of regulation’s ‘compliance’ literature. In 
addition to the fact that the compliance literature offers next to no studies on television 
production, the current work on ‘compliance’ focuses heavily on the external factors that 
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influence actors’ compliance decisions, and not fully enough on the numerous influential 
organisational and particularly individual level factors. Similarly, this research adds to the 
sociology of media’s gatekeeping literature by answering a call for more research to be done to 
understand the elements that affect producers’ decisions about the shape of content 
(particularly environmental level factors), and to understand where these elements fall and how 
they inter-relate on a hierarchical model. 
 
The theory behind producers’ compliance behaviour 
  
The research also adds, to a lesser extent, to the compliance literature through its contribution 
of findings which can be compared to the theoretical literature.  
 
The producers appeared not to possess a sense of “normative commitment” or “civic duty” to 
comply with the rules, as would those who figure in Kagan and Scholz’s ‘corporation as a 
citizen’ model (see also Tyler, 1990; McGraw and Scholz, 1991; Burby and Paterson, 1993; 
Levi, 1997; Winter, 2001; Wingrove, Korpas and Weisz, 2011).  
 
Rather, their compliance behaviour reflected a hybrid form of the ‘amoral calculator’ ideal-type 
and the philosophy behind rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism – all 
of which appreciate the act of rational calculation. The producers’, who were confronted with 
conflicting economic and programme-making/regulatory objectives and obligations, weighed 
the costs and benefits of different courses of action, including their assumed likelihood of 
detection and penalisation, and selected the most advantageous option. This made them 
willing to practice ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’ in certain instances, and to 
test or breach the regulatory limits in others, as and when it appeared beneficial for them to do 
so (Kagan and Scholz, 1984: p. 67; see also Becker, 1968; Sutherland, 1983; Hechter, 1987; 
Friedman and Hechter, 1988; Hawkins, 1990; Pearce and Tombs, 1990; Hechter and 
Kanazawa 1997; Footer, 2008; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Khanna and Widyawati 2011; 
Nelson, 2011; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 2011; Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar and Eizinga, 
2011).114  
 
                                                 
114
 This finding echoes, amongst others, the work of Nelson (2011) who wrote: “Due to the effects of 
market forces, news is seen as a commodity and owners of media organizations are more concerned 
with financial gains rather than with the ethical aspects of news production”, (p. 188-189). 
 161 
Their calculus was also framed, as sociological institutionalists (and social learning theory) 
would suggest, by an organisational culture that not only condoned, but promoted, acts of non-
compliance (see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hutter 2001; Job, 
Stout and Smith 2007). It encouraged the producers to conform to the deviant social norms 
and constraints embedded in the sub-culture, and to become indoctrinated by shared 
understandings of what was acceptable conduct within their unique social world (see also 
Zucker, 1983; Meyer and Rowen, 1991; Scott, 1995). 
  
While the ‘benefit’ of financial gain was certainly an alluring factor which figured in to their 
pursuit of ratings, their decisions were also influenced by other elements, such as their desire 
to maintain a positive reputation amongst their peers (see also Grasmick and Bursik, 1991; 
Parker 2002; Gunningham et al 2005) and their moral position on media ethics (again which 
was an element that was shaped in-part by their organisational culture) (Sutinen, 1999; 
Braithwaite, 2002).  
 
The producers’ failure to abide by the regulations also stemmed from what appeared to be a 
wilful ignorance of what was required of them, not from ineptitude, reflecting an ‘amoral’ 
version of the corporation as incompetent ideal-type. The producers furthermore claimed to 
disagree with the rationale for the rules, which is considered a part of the corporation as a 
citizen notion (see also Nadler 2002; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005, 2007). Their beliefs, 
however, appeared to stem from an interest in mitigating responsibility for their rule-evading 
actions rather than from a genuine disagreement with the rationale of the regulations, thereby 
again putting an ‘amoral’ slant on their positions. It is therefore due to these multi-faceted 
reasons that the producers’ (non) compliance motivations stemmed from a blend of rational 
choice and institutional cultural influence. 
 
These findings also contribute to the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s ‘Table of Eleven’ compliance 
model (2004), as the model does not take account of: 
  
 actors who practice ‘creative compliance’ and deliberately create strategies to follow the 
letter of the rules, but not their ‘spirit’, thereby avoiding penalization whilst not 
complying with the underlying aims of the policy; 
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 actors who are uninformed about the rules by choice, as to mitigate responsibility for 
their non-compliant acts should they come under regulatory scrutiny; 
 
 actors who claim strategically to disagree with the principles of the rules, as a means to 
justify their infringement of them;  
 
 the organizational/industry cultures at play which shape actors’ compliance behaviour; 
 
 and the breadth of limitations/constraints an organization and its members face which 
can hinder their ability to comply. 
 
In sum, these accumulative findings are important because regulators must understand the 
variety of factors that can inhibit the effectiveness of their policies and their enforcement of 
them if they are going to put policies in place which can ensure that their public interest 
objectives get met.  
 
Now that I have explained my key findings from the production company, I shall turn to an 
examination of the broadcaster which commissioned the series I investigated. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The broadcast environment 
 
 
The second stage of the research included an investigation of the broadcasting environment 
through an examination of Agony II’s funding channel, which I shall call ‘Entertainu’. The 
broadcaster’s role included commissioning the series and ensuring that it complied with the 
regulations. This chapter will explore each of these areas, setting them alongside an 
understanding of the broadcasters’ programme-making objectives/obligations and what 
factors influenced the way they pursued these objectives/obligations, and in turn negotiated 
their compliance decisions with the production company and with Ofcom.   
 
My key findings were that the broadcasters, like the producers, were faced with conflicting 
economic and regulatory responsibilities, and that, due to a variety of individual, organisational 
and external-level factors, they generally opted to prioritise their economic objectives. The 
broadcasters’ frequently attempted to manoeuvre their television content past the regulations by 
developing crafty techniques to practice ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’. This led 
them to extend effectively the boundaries of permissible graphic content, and thereby reveal and 
exploit a weakness in the regulatory structure. 
 
An introduction to the broadcaster 
 
Entertainu was an entertainment channel which was launched first in the 1980s on cable 
television. It operated under a relatively large parent company which owned various channels 
across different genres. Its choice of programming reflected the growth of the ‘entertainment’ 
genre,115 which accounted for greater audience share between 2002 and 2007 than any other 
genre. The popularity of these channels led them to double in number over the period from 2002 
to 2007 (Ofcom, 2007). 
 
                                                 
115
 The entertainment (or ‘light entertainment and contemporary music’) genres includes: “All 
Entertainment, including situation comedy, other comedy, chat shows, variety, popular contemporary 
music, cartoons and animation (except children's cartoons and animation), quiz shows, game shows 
and family shows” (Ofcom, 2004c). 
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Entertainu underwent various transformations in its lifetime in an attempt to gain ratings by 
adapting its programming to various niche audiences. It has transmitted classic films, horror, 
science fiction and adult programming. More recently it broadcast a mix of sports, crime, action, 
drama and adult entertainment to target young men aged 16-34. In an online blog one writer 
stated “I think it changed in about 1995 to "TV that offends" (their tagline not mine) with loads of 
horror films and the like, which then in turn evolved into the laddy [Entertainu] that we know 
today” (August, 2004).116 
 
One of the reasons that Entertainu may have selected this younger ‘demographic’ is that it 
broadcasted via cable and satellite, and Ofcom’s research suggested that these platforms 
attracted younger audiences than analogue and digital terrestrial television (2007). Ofcom also 
found that these pay-television services accounted for a slightly more affluent ‘demographic’, as 
more than one-quarter of their viewers came from the ‘AB’ socio-economic group. This young, 
economically-advantaged group was attractive to advertisers, offering Entertainu an incentive to 
tap into it (Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: Platform demographics by age and social grade 
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Source: Ofcom, The Communications Market Report 2007 
 
The following will address how the broadcasters went about developing content to appeal to this 
population segment, alongside a discussion of their compliance behaviour. First, however, I shall 
note their objectives when commissioning Agony II. 
                                                 
116
 The reference has been omitted to protect the broadcasters’ confidentiality. 
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The commissioning of the series 
 
As the commissioning process was explained in the previous chapter, I shall focus here only on 
the commissioner’s role in making the series, including her initial programme-making objectives 
and the factors she considered when approving the series for broadcast. Given their 
interconnected nature, understanding the commissioner’s role serves as an important precursor 
to understanding the compliance team’s regulatory approach.   
 
Entertainu’s commissioning objectives 
 
Entertainu produced Agony II after the successful release of the first series; the commissioner 
believed that a sequel would garner similarly high ratings. She stated that she wanted the new 
series to be “intelligent, witty and irreverent” – the three key words she believed to embody 
Entertainu’s programming.  
 
These terms echoed a remark made by the series producer who stated that a successful 
programme made people “laugh, think and cringe” (as discussed in Chapter Five). Both 
statements related to the need to be humorous, intellectually stimulating and graphically 
“shocking”. The formation of these ideas came from industry research and the television-makers’ 
years of experience, which helped them to contend that they understood what content did and 
did not generate ratings. Each of these areas will be explored in turn. 
 
“Irreverent”: 
 
The term “irreverent” related to the commissioner’s belief that her young male viewers liked 
“graphic in your face, blood and gore”. She stated “The reason I think that [Agony II] works is 
because it is sensationalistic, it stands out, it is graphic and it is in your face.” The commissioner 
wanted Agony II’s violent imagery to be as ‘cutting-edge’ and extreme as possible. She said: “we 
will push it as far as we can push it, because that is what people like to watch”. In other words, 
she claimed that her young male target demographic was a key reason that she aimed to push 
the regulatory limits. 
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In line with this, Ofcom published a report in 2005 entitled, A Safe Environment for Children: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, which examined viewers’ perceptions of programme-
makers. In it “Respondents argued that programme-makers would always try to make a situation 
much more dramatic in order to try to increase ratings” (Ofcom, 2005e: p. 28).  
 
The commissioner charged that, due to the changing nature of the cable and satellite platforms 
and the increase in channels (competition), in order to gain ratings she needed to grab viewers’ 
attention within a few seconds of them turning on a programme by broadcasting repeated shots 
of graphic footage. Based on her experience in the field, she explained that while female viewers 
often made an “appointment to view” programming, meaning that they plan ahead to watch 
certain shows, Entertainu’s male viewers were “zappers” and “remote fanatics”, meaning that 
they ‘channel surfed’ (flipped through various channels) until they found content that interested 
them. She remarked: 
 
They are not going to sit there and think ‘I’m going to turn on Agony at 10pm’. They know that 
something is on at 10pm that is good for men. It will be dip in and dip out. If they don’t like 
that, they know that there will be something else that they pretty much would like.  
 
The commissioner’s statement was consistent in part with observations made by the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), which in the same year found that individuals in 
general who adopted pay television services were more likely to ‘surf’ and ‘browse’ channels 
than terrestrial viewers. The 2003 report, Dramatic Licence: Fact or Fiction?, noted that this led 
“to fewer programmes being watched all the way through” (Gatfield and Millwood Hargrave: p. 
30). It also reflects the findings of Langer (1998) and the BSC report which stated:  
 
Multichannel television seems to have affected audiences’ viewing habits of television itself. 
Due to the number of channels, participants suggested that broadcasters may feel that they 
have to engage or interest the viewer from the start or heavily advertise the programme. If 
not, the audience may move to another channel. 
 
Following this reasoning, Entertainu also introduced Agony II’s graphic imagery at the beginning 
of episodes rather than at the end, while terrestrial broadcasters, who had fewer channels to 
compete with, often aimed to retain an audience throughout a programme by keeping them 
waiting with anticipation to see the ‘money shots’ at the end of segments.  
 
The commissioner further showed the graphic footage in the commercials which advertised the 
series. While it was often irregular to show such content in commercials due to the lack of 
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contextualisation that can be provided in a 30 second spot, Agony II’s commercials were 
intended to lure in audiences by showing them the content ‘upfront’, so that they would know 
exactly what to expect from the series. The commissioning editor stated: 
 
With multichannel programming there has to be a tease. So at the top of the show you’ll see 
those great moments, whereas on terrestrial [television] you will tease [or suggest] that you 
know that something is going to happen, but you wouldn’t give it away in the menu. But in 
multichannels you are in such a competitive market that you almost have to show the knife 
going into the back and show the gruesome photos. You have to really go, this is what you 
are going to see, but you’ll want to see it again in the programme, because it is that good and 
that juicy.  
 
This approach to “shock-based” television-making is important to the topic of compliance 
because the commissioner wanted to “push” the limits as far possible to get ratings. She also 
provided less context surrounding violent scenes than broadcasters (both terrestrial and 
multichannel) typically supplied, and how an image is contextualised is a key factor in whether or 
not a scene has the potential to ‘harm’ or ‘offend’ audiences and thereby to breach the regulatory 
rules.  
 
The commissioner did this, in part, because of the resulting competition she experienced on the 
pay-television platforms. Competition is a key factor noted by other researchers to affect both 
content and compliance-based decisions, as are the requirements associated with a profit-
seeking business (Bantz, McCordle and Baade, 1980; Gans, 1979; Shoemaker and Mayfield, 
1987; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Fensch, 1990; Slapper, 2000; Alexander, 2004; Hoskins, 
McFayden and Finn, 2004; Lee 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). 
 
“Intelligent”: 
 
“Intelligent” was also a term that the commissioner used to define Entertainu’s style of 
programming. She claimed that although its male audience liked graphic imagery, they were also 
intelligent and enjoyed learning interesting facts that they could discuss with their peers. This 
was not to imply that the programme needed to be highly intellectual, as she believed that 
viewers wanted to relax and not concentrate in the late evenings when Agony II was broadcast. 
Rather she wanted the service to offer interesting “tit-bits” of information that could be used to 
generate conversation or “water-cooler moments”.117 She remarked: 
                                                 
117
 It may have been that the commissioner based her belief that males enjoy learning ‘interesting facts’ 
on her own acquaintance, and that she extrapolated from personal experience as well as research. 
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Males like graphic in-your-face blood and gore. But they are intelligent as well, so we need to 
give them that ‘oh, I didn’t know that’ factor. And blokes are very much ‘I know, well I knew 
that, I knew that and oh I didn’t know that’… And for males, they don’t want to sit there and 
concentrate, so it just gives these little cool facts that they can talk about in the pub, ‘oh my 
god, did you know that this freaky gang in China chop off their fingers.’ 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, it was the use of this educational theme that allowed the 
television-makers to justify the showing of highly graphic content by contextualising it in an 
informative manner that helped it to bypass regulatory intervention. The commissioner’s 
additional explanation of why the television-makers added education to the series illustrated a 
second reason it was included – because they thought it would prove interesting to their viewers.  
 
Her omission of the compliance-based purpose, which I came to understand at Envision was the 
paramount reason an educational theme was introduced to the series, also shows that the 
commissioner may have not been entirely open and honest in our interview. In this sense, she 
seemingly edited some of her statements to offer me more sanitised and politically correct 
answers. This supports my original claim that I would not have uncovered what actually 
happened in the making of Agony II had I only interviewed the producers formally, and not 
worked on the series and saturated myself in the production environment. 
 
“Witty”: 
 
The final term the commissioner used to embody Entertainu’s content was “wit”. This was 
consistent with the words of Agony II’s series producer who stated that the show needed to make 
people “laugh”. As noted in Chapter Five, narration was the filter between the images viewers 
saw and their interpretation of them. The voice-over framed the stories in an attempt to convey a 
particular emotional response. Sometimes the narrator sadly noted the anguish and pain 
individuals suffered, but most often she made comical remarks to bring humour to the 
programme. For instance, in one episode the narrator said “In many religions the ultimate 
sacrifice is blood and although it might seem a long way to the painful side of two choruses of 
‘Yes Jesus Love Me’, Christianity is right up there with the bloody best of them…” This shows 
how the narrator introduced and discussed imagery to give the series what purported to be a 
light-hearted, humorous tone. 
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This tactic of introducing humour was used by the producers and endorsed by the broadcasters 
as a means to re-contextualise the content to bring a light-hearted slant to scenes to prevent 
viewers from empathising with the characters and thereby from becoming offended by what the 
production director referred to as “gratuitous violence”.  
 
After the commissioner conveyed these three aims to the producer of the series, the producer 
constructed the series’ theme and layout. After the commissioner agreed to her ideas, production 
began and the commissioner was absent from the production process until she was sent the ‘off-
line’ version for her approval. 
 
This version was also sent to the compliance team for review. They watched the series 
independently, but shared their comments and corrections with the commissioner to ensure that 
they agreed with one another about the changes they wanted made. In this instance the 
commissioner informed Envision that she was generally satisfied with the series. She solely 
wanted the repetition of ‘money shots’ in some segments to be reduced and additional context to 
be added in others to ensure that the stories could be easily followed. The compliance team 
requested further changes and I shall now discuss their part in the making of the series. 
 
The compliance process 
 
The compliance team was responsible for handling the compliance of the various channels 
managed under the parent company. The unit consisted of five programme viewers and a 
manager. The programme viewers watched content to ensure that it was compliant with the 
regulatory code. The manager oversaw the team, handled the more difficult compliance 
decisions and dealt with the regulator when more serious complaints issues arose.  
 
Compliance members’ understanding of the regulation came from on the job training, just as 
it had for employees within the production company. The programme viewer I interviewed 
had earned a degree in media and performing arts, and then worked as a video technician at 
her university before accepting a role at Entertainu. She said that it was important to have an 
understanding of the market and to follow television programmes; however, the key to her 
training was in the “hands on experience” she had received at Entertainu.118 
                                                 
118
 Compliance team members did not have legal backgrounds although lawyers were available at the 
company should advice have been needed.  
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To understand Entertainu’s compliance procedures, I asked her to explain what she and her 
colleagues did in a typical working day. She said that each day a viewer examined various 
programmes for contentious content and for elements that needed to be reformatted (e.g. if a 
programme was acquired from the United States it had more commercial breaks than if it was 
produced in the United Kingdom and the gaps required editing, which she specified to the 
editor).  
 
Whilst doing this, viewers examined where the programme sat within the daily broadcast 
schedule to ensure that it was sensitively placed and would be less likely to cause harm or 
offence to the audience. To illustrate, she stated: 
 
One Ricki Lake
119
 [episode] looked at teen bonfires and the content was too much to put in 
day-time [6:30am – 6:30pm slot] so we had to put a time restriction on it…It’s all about how 
the whole day will look programming-wise. So if you have a bit of chat shows, then you have 
a bit of soaps, then all of a sudden you have a chat show that is all about blood-sucking 
teenagers and you know that would not fit [in the schedule] and that it will draw a lot of 
attention - the wrong kind of attention, i.e. complaints - you have to work out the whole feel of 
the programming for that day.  
 
Viewers watched between 20 and 25 hours of programming a week. In their remaining time 
they assessed the layout, story ideas and ‘voice-overs’ in scripts to ensure that they did not 
include anything that was libellous or that breached the regulations. They were obliged to 
have a strong grasp of the regulations, and unlike the producers, they appeared to do so.  
 
When a viewer felt that a programme had problematic elements, he/she would often discuss 
them with the production team to gain a range of views about the content before determining 
an appropriate approach to take. Particularly contentious cases were referred to the manager 
for assessment. If he thought it was necessary, he would instruct his staff to look out for the 
areas of concern in the series’ remaining episodes.  
 
Entertainu’s compliance approach – rationale for, and approach to, rule evasion 
 
While the compliance team was originally established to ensure that television programmes 
complied with the regulations, its manager held that he and his peers needed to “push the 
                                                 
119
 Ricki Lake was an American daytime talk show that discussed social life in its various forms. It can 
be compared to Donahue, Montel Williams, Oprah, Trisha and other such daytime shows.  
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boundaries” of permissible content to gain ratings and effectively contend in an increasingly 
competitive market. He noted that Agony was successful because it offered more shocking 
and graphic imagery than other programmes: “I think it has done well because it is kind of car 
crash TV. You will see things that you won’t see anywhere else”.  
 
It is here that one can see the organisation’s competitive culture and rationale about 
compliance, and how it allowed the company’s business/economic interests to over-shadow, 
in part, its regulatory responsibilities. Rather than simply fulfilling its core role – to ensure that 
programmes were compliant with the rules, like the commissioner, team members responded 
to the competition by challenging regulatory limits (see also Slapper 2000). The compliance 
manager stated:  
 
We try and push the boundaries. We are more into programme facilitation than programme 
prevention… We have had feedback from the channels that we are a compliance department 
that do listen and do try and get them the programmes they actually want rather than saying 
‘you cannot do that’. We have the reputation that we will try and facilitate all of their needs, so 
my view is not, ‘you can’t do that because it’s in the rules’, but I think, ‘okay, is there a way 
that we can do it’. So, we always try and push because we know the nature of the market is 
so competitive.  
 
The manager’s approach also appeared to be shaped somewhat by a disregard for the rules, 
as he expressed an interest in airing controversial content and in the regulatory dispute that 
sometimes followed. He remarked: 
 
I think some of the people that work in TV quite like the fight. I love the fight… I think that 
channel editors and channel controllers quite like the idea of putting something out that is 
going to be controversial. And it will all spread by word of mouth and there will be complaints 
reports before it is even aired. And I think they like that and that it’s good for other 
broadcasters. I don’t think you get anywhere without taking chances. I think it wouldn’t allow 
for creativity and potentially you would kill commercial TV, because there wouldn’t be that 
‘okay, well, Sky did this, so we want to do a show like this’ one-upmanship. I think that would 
get rid of one-upmanship. It would make a lot of similar programmes even more similar than 
they are. 
 
This comment suggests an element of competitiveness which goes beyond a simple desire to 
propagate controversial content and it is redolent of what Michael Josephson, writer for the 
TTNL Sports Network, refers to as the gamesmanship model (2000):  
 
Under the gamesmanship model, all that matters is winning. Gamesmanship approaches 
adopt the values of the marketplace, encouraging and sanctioning clever and effective ways 
of bending, evading and breaking the rules in order to gain a competitive advantage. This is 
considered part of the game… 
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Gamesmanship coaches and athletes often believe that they have no ethical or 
sportsmanship obligation to abide by rules because it is the official's job to catch violations 
and impose penalties. The operational standard of gamesmanship are: "If it works it's right" 
and "it's only cheating if you get caught”. 
 
In alignment with this model, the broadcasters devised strategies to extend regulatory 
limits and gain a competitive edge over their rivals. The manager claimed that their 
strategy included closely watching other channels’ actions and, when one pushed against 
the content restrictions – and managed to escape regulatory intervention – they would 
follow suit in order to protect their channels’ own market shares. Whether or not content 
had been found to be in breach of the rules on other channels was therefore instrumental 
in shaping the broadcasters’ compliance decisions.     
 
When a piece of content appeared potentially contentious they tried to develop a defence 
for why it would not be considered in breach the regulatory rules. If they believed that their 
defence was adequate enough, they would broadcast the material. When confronted with 
content that they believed was on the borderline, they discussed it with their colleagues to 
gain a variety of opinions before determining whether or not to transmit it. As a part of their 
‘cost-benefit’ analysis they also spoke with the commissioning editor to evaluate how 
essential he/she thought it was to the success of the programme.  
 
They claimed that most often they took the commissioning editor’s opinion on the matter, 
but only when they believed they could provide an adequate defence if confronted by the 
regulator. For instance, if the content included graphic scenes of violence they examined 
if: it was likely to encourage audiences to replicate the acts; it showed real-life violence 
towards children; it was scheduled for broadcast after the watershed; and if the 
programme included warnings. (These elements will be discussed in greater depth later in 
this chapter and the next chapter.) The manager explained his approach to calculating 
risks: 
 
If I think that I can defend it, as I’m viewing stuff I’ll think of potential conversations with a 
complainant of how I can defend it, and if I can defend it to myself and if it is robust enough [I 
will air it]… I think, if I defend this, will I get away with it?  
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This approach centered more squarely on whether or not the team could “get away with” 
pushing the regulatory borders, rather than on a willingness to abide by the rules due to a 
belief in their underlying consumer protectionist purposes.  
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This compliance rationale showed that the channel did not resemble Kagan and Scholz’s 
(1984) ‘corporation as a citizen’ ideal-type, as the broadcasters did not express a 
normative sense of commitment to protect viewers from harmful and offensive content 
(see also Winter, 2001), nor did they appear to want to comply with the rules to avoid 
damaging their public reputation, as Murphy (2004) found in her study of tax avoiders in 
Australia. It would therefore have seemingly little effect if the regulators were to appeal to 
the broadcasters “law abiding” selves and attempt to nurture trust in exchange for 
voluntary compliance, as Braithwaite and Makkai’s (1994) work noted (see also Feld and 
Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2004). 
 
Rather, their approach, along with their organizational culture, conformed to Kagan and 
Scholz’s (1984) model of an ‘amoral calculator’ and to sociological institutional theory, as 
the broadcasters would do a fairly crude cost/benefit analysis of the potential gain in airing 
specific content versus the perceived likelihood of getting caught and penalized. They 
would then select the most beneficial option; an approach found by a variety of 
researchers, including Stigler (1970), Ehrlich (1972), Slapper (2000), Footer (2008) and 
DeMuth and Ginsburg (2010). 
 
In their analysis, potential ‘gains’ were understood in terms of positive economic results, 
job security, and an improved reputation for ensuring high audience ratings and for 
outmanoeuvring the regulator, which was seen to be an entity that sometimes obstructed 
the broadcasters’ pursuit of ratings. These factors not only reflected the pursuit of financial 
benefits as economic theorists would note, but they also reflected gains in the social 
sphere as social bonds theorists would note, as these theorists have claimed that 
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individuals’ reasoning is often coloured by their desire to fit in within a group and to earn 
their peers’ respect (Humberts, 1991).   
 
The broadcasters’ perception of ‘costs’ in their calculus was understood in terms of their 
potential for getting caught by the regulator, fined, forced to publish a public 
apology/correction, or on a personal front, a potential loss in job security and respect from 
their peers should they incorrectly calculate compliance risks and thereby invoke external 
intervention. In other words, they risked being perceived as individuals who were not 
proficient at ‘playing the game’ and were therefore a liability. 
  
This equation, as with economic theory, was frequently void of moral reasoning, and put 
an ‘amoral’ slant on what would otherwise be an approach that mimicked a rational choice 
model (e.g. see also Becker, 1968; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Vaughan, 1998; Murphy, 
2004; Fairman and Yapp, 2005; Li, Zhang and Sarathy 2010).120 In taking this approach, 
members would frequently bend and twist the rules to accommodate their own businesses 
interests, and if the regulator failed to catch them, they felt successful and justified in their 
actions.  
 
This approach also reflected arguments within sociological institutionalism, as the 
broadcasters’ compliance decisions were largely shaped by their institutional culture which 
embedded certain shared social constructs and constraints in their minds (see also 
Zucker, 1983; Meyer and Rowen, 1991; Scott, 1995; Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2011).  
 
This is particularly visible by the fact that even the compliance members, whose primary 
job it was to avoid regulatory infringements, were so deeply entrenched in the competitive 
organizational culture that they too conformed to deviant social norms.  
 
                                                 
120
 While the rational choice model typically asserts that individuals have sufficient information to weigh 
accurately the costs and benefits of different courses of action, my analysis of the broadcasters revealed 
that they did a fairly crude analysis of costs and benefits. This was because the industry they were in did 
not allow them to project precisely the likelihood or cost of a penalty, nor the potential gain in ratings a 
particular piece of content might generate. This runs somewhat counter to Procter’s description of the 
rational choice model, “An act is rational if the agent has ordered preferences, has perfect information 
about how to achieve preferences and what the costs are, and correctly calculates the relationship of 
preferences and costs and thus maximizes the benefits to be achieved” (Procter, 2000; see also Hollis, 
1987; Becker, 1996). 
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Brinton and Nee (1989) argued that it is through structuring and confining social 
interactions that group performance emerges. In other words, it is through employees 
monitoring one another’s behaviour, and encouraging ‘acceptable’ acts and criticizing 
‘unacceptable’ acts that the group comes to work in a cohesive and like-minded manner 
(p. 19).121 This is why the commissioning editor would challenge the compliance team if 
they tried to stifle the organization’s competitive approach. It is also why community-
related factors, such as the desire for respect from one’s peers, shaded actors’ compliance 
behaviour.  
 
As a product of this approach, it appeared that the compliance team’s rationale had 
become so akin to that of its sister commissioning team that its members needed little 
encouragement to test the regulatory restrictions. Rather, their approach to challenge the 
regulation became so ingrained in their psyche that it seemed to be almost self-generated 
(see also Ruggie, 1998). This falls in line with March and Olsen’s (1989) argument that 
social norms and rules are of key importance in shaping organisatonal behaviour, and with 
Granovetter’s assertion (1985) that behaviour is nearly always modified to some respect 
by personal connections and interactions. 
 
Despite compliance members’ willingness to extend the regulatory parameters, those 
instances in which they were found to be in breach of the rules often stemmed from their 
miscalculation in the extent that they could push the boundaries, because their goal was to 
widen them slowly overtime as to avoid unnecessary detection and penalization. Their 
failure to calculate related risks intelligently resonates with the ‘corporation as incompetent’ 
ideal-type, showing how their behaviour reflected a mix of Kagan and Scholz’s models. 
This form of non-compliance, which stemmed from organizational failures, is echoed 
widely across the regulation literature, suggesting its centrality in the field (see Williamson, 
1975; Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Genn, 1993; Hopkins, 1995; Downs, Rocke and 
Barsoon, 1996; Van Snellenberg and Van de Peppel, 2002; Braun, 2003). 
 
                                                 
121
 This approach is also in line with aspects of social exchange theory (Homans, 1958; 1961; 1974). 
Through his case studies, Homans showed how individuals within a group establish, monitor and 
enforce social norms, and how these informal norms shape individuals’ incentives and confine their 
behaviour to certain socially accepted practices. “The great bulk of controls over social behavior are 
not external, but built into the relationship themselves, in the sense that either party is worse off if he 
changes his behaviour towards the other” (March and Olsen, 1989: p. 24). 
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The end result of the broadcasters’ competitive nature and reliance on violent imagery was 
that the rules governing the safeguarding of viewers were trumped, as content- and 
compliance-related decisions were often dictated by the pressures associated with a profit-
driven industry (see also Slapper 2000). This finding can be related more widely, as 
Langer, who studied television news journalists, discovered, (1998: p. 1): 
 
 “Television news is primarily a commodity enterprise run by market-oriented managers 
who place outflanking the ‘competition’ above journalistic responsibility and integrity… 
 
 Television news has set aside the values of professional journalism in order to indulge 
in the presentation of gratuitous spectacles.” 
 
Ensuring the permissibility of content 
 
To illustrate further how team members’ dealt with compliance issues, I shall review the details 
of Entertainu’s breach of the rules in Agony. As noted, Agony was found to have infringed the 
ITC’s regulation on ‘imitable violence’ and nearly infringe the regulation on ‘offensive 
violence’.122 
 
This case illustrates how issues of permissibility were understood and debated between the 
broadcasters and regulators. It shows how the broadcasters aimed to package content in a 
manner that would enable it to bypass regulatory intervention and the factors that influenced 
their compliance decisions, including: their target demographic; whether they believed that they 
could successfully navigate around the rules; the severity of the penalties they received for 
previous breaches; competition; ratings; conflicting objectives; and whether certain content had 
been shown on another channel without regulatory intervention. Lastly, it will examine the effect 
that the breach from the first series had on the broadcasters’ compliance approach in the 
making of the second, Agony II. 
                                                 
122
 Section 1.7(c), Imitable violence: “Violence portrayed on television may be imitated in real life. 
Portrayals of dangerous behaviour, capable of easy imitation, must always be justified by the dramatic 
and editorial requirements of the programme. Unfamiliar methods of inflicting pain and injury capable of 
easy imitation should not be included.”  
Section 1.7(a), Offensive violence: “At the simplest level, some portrayed acts of violence may go beyond 
the bounds of what is tolerable in that they could be classified as material which, in the words of the 
Broadcasting Act, is 'likely to be offensive to public feeling'. Licensees must consider the editorial 
justification carefully, including the context of the violence portrayed, the time of the broadcast, any 
warning provided and the likely audience. There can be no defence of violence shown or heard for its own 
sake, or for the gratuitous presentation of sadistic practices. Research indicates that viewers are most 
likely to be offended by explicit images of distress and injury, and of blood, particularly if they occur 
suddenly or unexpectedly.” 
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Agony breach case review: 
 
I remarked earlier that a television critic had written an article about Agony stating that it “breaks 
the ITC Code so flagrantly that the channel’s licence remit should be examined without delay.”123 
Directly after the article was published, the ITC regulator contacted Entertainu’s compliance 
team. 
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The ITC concluded that some scenes were in near breach of the Code and other scenes were in 
actual breach of the Code. The scenes that were in near breach of the rule on ‘offensive 
violence’ were thought to be on the brink of depicting violence in a ‘gratuitous’ fashion, which 
was prohibited by the Code. The regulators gave the broadcasters a warning to persuade them 
to comply with the Code in the future.  
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After these findings were delivered to Entertainu, the regulators published a summary of the 
case on their website, as a means of informing other industry members about the breach and of 
educating them about where the lines of permissibility had been drawn. The breach and the 
subsequent negative publicity served as a warning to Entertainu; no other form of penalty was 
imposed. 
 
This case raises interesting points about how the shape of rules can lead to compliance failures 
and how the complaints process can affect regulatory decisions. 
 
                                                 
123
 The reference for this article is not cited to preserve the broadcaster’s confidentiality. 
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How the shape of rules affected compliance: 
 
Some of the rules discussed were ‘widely-scoped’, leaving programme-makers with significant 
room to interpret their meaning and this not only led to unintentional compliance errors, but also 
gave them greater room to navigate around them, and practice ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule 
interpretation’. 
 
For instance, the broadcasters were required to understand what their audience would deem to 
be, for instance, ‘distasteful’, ‘indecent’, ‘harmful’ or ‘offensive’. These terms were largely 
undefined, subjective and difficult to measure. Millwood Hargrave and Livingstone, authors of 
‘Harm and Offence in Media Content: A Review of the Evidence’ argued: 
 
…‘harm and offence’ is often used as a single phrase, with little clarity regarding the 
difference between the terms or how they may each relate to legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Similarly, these terms are little discussed or distinguished in relation to the 
research evidence. It is suggested that harm is widely (though not necessarily) conceived in 
objective terms; harm, it seems, is taken to be observable by others (irrespective of whether 
harm is acknowledged by the individual concerned), and hence as measurable in a reliable 
fashion. By contrast, offence is widely (though not necessarily) conceived in subjective terms; 
offence, it seems, is taken to be that experienced by and reported on by the individual, and 
hence is difficult to measure reliably. 
 
This had the potential to confuse broadcasters, increase the likelihood of compliance errors, and 
lead to inconsistent decisions about programme standards. Entertainu’s programme viewer 
stated: 
 
It is really frustrating because they [the rules] are so woolly and loose. [For instance,] there is 
a part in the Code…that says that scenes which show someone’s actual death require 
exceptional circumstances. But then what is your definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’? 
 
In relation to the regulatory assessment of Agony, the broadcasters were not allowed to transmit 
material that was “likely to be offensive to public feeling”. The compliance manager, however, 
claimed that Entertainu had not received a single complaint about Agony from its viewers and 
therefore he had no evidence that the series caused offence, and he subsequently believed that 
the content fell within the rules. Meanwhile, the regulators argued that the content nearly 
breached the rules. The issue that became evident is that there were often no precise guidelines 
 179 
to help the broadcasters assess clearly whether or not they had crossed the line prior to 
broadcast.124  
 
The rules on ‘imitable violence’ posed a similar problem.  
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I have therefore included ‘rule ambiguity’ as a factor that affected the broadcasters’ compliance 
with the rules under the category of external forces. This finding has also been aired by Chayes 
(1993), Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996) and Footer (2008) who noted that rule ambiguity 
can lead to regulated bodies’ non-compliance, and Tallberg (2002) who found that compliance 
failures can stem from businesses’ misunderstanding of the rules. 
 
This example also indicates how broadcasters packaged violent content in a way that allowed 
them to avoid regulatory intervention and extend the limits of permissible graphic content. While 
the inclusion of widely-scoped rules had the ability to generate some confusion, it also gave the 
broadcasters greater room to argue their compliance cases (see also Davis, 1979; Diver, 1989; 
Gifford, 1989). This led those I examined successfully to practise ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule 
reinterpretation’, highlighting a weakness in the regulation. 
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How the complaints process affected compliance decisions: 
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 The broadcasters’ therefore relied heavily on watching what others transmitted and whether or not they 
were found in breach for it. They also sometimes complained anonymously to Ofcom about a competitor’s 
content to see if the regulators would find it in breach of the rules and subsequently to see if they too 
could transmit similar material. Lastly, they had tried previously to ask the regulators for their guidance 
about certain content prior to airing it, however, the regulators tended to not offer guidance on material 
prior to transmission because they did not want to promote censorship or make a decision prematurely. 
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To better understand the lines of permissibility, the broadcasters could have turned to audience 
research, as there were a variety of reports which attempted to explain audiences’ general offence 
to content (e.g. Independent Television Commission, 1998; Cupitt, 2000; Broadcasting Standards 
Commission, 2000; Ofcom, 2005).  
 
The broadcasters, however, preferred to learn about this area from the complaints process, which 
in turn served as another factor that influenced their compliance decisions.  
 
Complaints allowed the broadcasters to interact directly with their audience to understand their 
evolving attitudes and sensitivities towards content. There were, however, two drawbacks to 
relying on such complaints as a guide to making compliance decisions. The first relates to the 
compliance manager’s statement “it is a very small minority [of people] that complain”. And in fact, 
as I have noted, there were no complaints made about Agony, even though it was found in breach 
of the regulations and discussed in negative terms in online public forums.  
 
Entertainu’s broadcasters interpreted the viewers’ complaints-related silence as a form of 
acceptance of the material and used it as an artful defence or justification for the permissibility of 
their content. This indicated that not only the act of complaining, but also the act of not 
complaining, influenced the broadcasters’ compliance approach by providing them with an 
additional route for navigating around the rules.  
 
Audiences’ paucity of response also indicates that they might have been averse to complaining, 
which is consistent with other researchers’ findings. Virts (1984) conducted a study of programme-
makers and found that viewers seldom complained and that the outcome was that little of their 
input went into the making of production decisions. Similarly, Pritchard (2000) examined 
newspaper journalism and found that individuals were unlikely to complain when incorrect 
information was reported about them.125 Lastly, Ofcom conducted a study which found that 
viewers tended to change channels or to turn off the television when seeing ‘offensive’ or 
‘inappropriate’ content rather than complain to broadcasters or the regulator (2005c).  
 
                                                 
125
 Pritchard found that these respondents often believed that only they themselves could mend the 
resulting damage to their social status, by speaking with those around them to correct the false 
statements made. For example, if a journalist had reported that a man had one child when in fact he 
had two, the man believed that only he could remedy the hurt the other child felt through speaking with 
him or her.  
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This is an important issue because much of Entertainu’s compliance process rested on the receipt 
of complaints. This approach reveals a weakness in the compliance structure, as it can lead to 
rule infringements that go undetected. (It would therefore be fruitful if more research could be 
done to explain why many viewers do not complain.) 
 
The second issue relating to the complaints process is that Agony II gained its ratings by 
extending the parameters of graphic imagery, and so it was not in the broadcasters’ interest to 
soften their content to cater to complaints.126  
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To better understand Entertainu’s position on complaints, the compliance manager stated that 
although routinely offending many viewers would alienate them and eventually drive them away 
(thus diminishing ratings), “You don’t want to pander to the minority necessarily, but you just need 
to be aware that some people will not like it”. In other words, the manager recognised that 
Entertainu’s “laddy” type of programming would not appeal to everyone, however, it would attract 
enough viewers to keep the channel successfully in business.  
 
The manager’s argument for not “pandering” to small numbers of complainants also suggests that 
ongoing complaints from numerous viewers might have had more effect on the shaping of 
television content standards decisions than sporadic complaints from a few viewers, as the 
broadcasters did not want to alienate a significant proportion of their audience. This appears to 
emphasize the importance of organised consumer groups. 
 
The manager’s statement also illustrated how he employed what Sykes and Matza (1957) referred 
to as a ‘technique of neutralization’. This is an act that temporarily neutralizes individuals’ values 
or moral positioning which might otherwise prevent them from committing acts of wrong-doing. In 
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 Interestingly, I uncovered statements from viewers in online blogs which expressed that they did 
get offended by the content. Rather than taking their concerns to the broadcasters, these viewers 
publicised their concerns more widely online. While this form of user-generated journalism removed 
traditional modes of interaction between the viewers and the broadcasters, it was important because it 
forged relationships between audience members, who ultimately held the power over the series’ 
ratings. 
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other words, it is a way in which people justify their ‘improper’ behaviour to both themselves and to 
others. In this instance, the manager used the defence ‘you cannot make everyone happy’ to 
justify not accommodating some complainants. 
 
Sykes and Matza (1957) noted various forms of neutralisation, such as one’s ‘denial of 
responsibility’, ‘of another’s injury’ or ‘of another as a victim’. This particular example reflects the 
broadcasters’ denial of responsibility, as they claimed that they could not adhere to all of the 
complaints and that the situation was therefore beyond their control. In other words, they claimed 
that their personal limitations prohibited them from following the rules.  
 
The broadcasters’ assertion that viewers were evidently not harmed or offended by Agony’s 
content because they did not receive any complaints represents a further form of denial. In this 
instance their defence was ‘no one really got hurt’, and this falls under the ‘denial of injury’ 
category, which explains that some people insist that their actions have not resulted in any harm 
of damage. This stance is problematic, as I noted that viewers’ were often found not to complain, 
even when they had been offended by content (see also Virts, 1984; Pritchard, 2000; Ofcom, 
2005c). One can therefore not assume that a lack of complaints always equates to a lack of 
problems.  
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Remedying the compliance problems in Agony II 
 
As will be discussed in the following, after Agony was found in breach of the regulatory rules, 
Entertainu adjusted its compliance approach for the making of the second series, Agony II. The 
breach did encourage the broadcasters to take greater measures to ensure that the series 
complied with the regulation – by re-contextualising some of the graphic content and removing 
other content to safeguard minors more fully – however its effect was only moderate. This could 
have been, in part, because the breach carried no penalty, which might have had a greater 
deterrent effect than the warning Entertainu received. As noted earlier, the breach also led the 
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series to receive more press coverage, which the television-makers argued served to bolster its 
ratings, rather than to drive audiences away. 
 
Regulating for context: 
 
To ensure that Agony II complied with the Code, the broadcasters needed to contextualize more 
appropriately its graphic imagery, as non-contextualized violent imagery increased the risk that 
viewers would emulate the harmful acts and become unsympathetic to others’ pain.  
 
To address this issue, as noted, the compliance team gave Agony II an ostensible educational 
theme and used experts to contextualize the imagery with background medical and psychological 
information. I discussed in the previous chapter how this was referred to as gearing the 
programme toward “a lad with a PhD”. The compliance manager stated “I think the images in the 
second series were probably as strong as the first series - what changed was the tone of the 
programme.” 
 
The programme’s narration and sound effects were also adjusted as to appear (somewhat) less 
comical, as the regulator had claimed that they set a flippant tone in the first series when 
discussing victims’ injuries. Entertainu’s compliance manager stated: 
 
Now the problem for the regulators was that they found the voice over [of Agony] a bit 
flippant. And I thought, for Entertainu, it was very Entertainu. On another channel, it could 
come across as being very flippant…[For example, seeing] someone falling into a cement 
mixer and then hearing a quirky sound effect like a burger being squashed…it kind of 
undermines it. So it’s those things, the juxtaposition between images and sounds…if you put 
those together it could cause offence.  
 
The manager also reduced the repetition of ‘money shots’ in Agony II as he asserted that the 
initial level was too high and appeared gratuitous: “We saw the [violent] image and then we saw 
it again, and we saw it again, and then we saw it again. That for us gets to the point where it 
becomes a bit gratuitous.” (Despite this reduction, the programme still contained, on average, 
one violent/graphic shot every 17 seconds.) 
 
The protection of minors: 
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Laws and policies were formed in the UK to protect young people from potentially damaging or 
offensive television content. In research carried out by Ofcom, 77% of participants believed that 
the primary purpose of television regulation was to “protect children and young people” (Ofcom, 
2005a: p. 270). In accordance with this view, five of the ten sanctions Ofcom imposed between 
December 2003 and October 2006 related, at least in part, to the protection of minors. Ofcom’s 
revised Broadcasting Code also placed greater emphasis on the protection of minors than the 
2002 ITC Programme Code had done. 
 
Given that emphasis, and the fact that Agony was found in breach of the regulation relating to 
‘imitable violence’ (a rule that generally applies to the safe-guarding of youth), Entertainu’s 
compliance team was particularly cautious about approving any content that related to children 
in Agony II. 
 
The most significant rule associated with the protection of minors was the watershed. 
Broadcasters had to transmit programming that was suitable for children until 9pm, after which 
time they could gradually show more ‘adult’ content. Agony II, with its highly graphic material, 
was broadcast at 10pm or later. The manager stated: 
 
Something which is quite strong like [Agony II] shouldn’t go out at 9 o’clock, so we had it 
going out at 10 o’clock or 10:30pm because we thought, on the cusp of the watershed is 
probably too much. Watching something with your family at 8:50pm and then seeing [Agony 
II] at 9 o’clock is a bit of a sea change. 
 
In addition to the watershed, staff tried to ensure that their programming did not unduly offend 
audiences with scenes of children being harmed. For instance, in one episode a group of 
Russians dunked their male babies into ice cold water because they believed that it would 
toughen their spirits. The commissioning editor wanted to include the segment, but the manager 
feared that it looked too much like child abuse to justify its presence in the programme. After he 
failed to construct what he believed was a sufficient defence should Ofcom contest the piece, he 
removed the segment to avoid a potential regulatory infringement: 
 
[In one episode] we had Russians who dunk their babies into frozen water, which was a 
fantastic piece of TV and it is that real, ‘fucking hell, look at that’ kind of reaction. But there is 
a thing in the Code, cruelty to children, and which ever way we looked at it, we thought, I 
don’t know how we would defend showing this footage if we had a complaint about it…  
 
It’s more of a fact that it looked like child abuse. I think the argument would be that we are 
showing images of child abuse and whichever editorial stamp we could have gotten the 
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narrator to take in the voice over we didn’t think that we could have defended complaints 
about why we were showing this baby, in effect, being abused. The channel wanted it in, we 
tried to work it out, but at the end of the day we couldn’t come up with a defence that we’d be 
happy with standing by. Especially because it was the second series and we had [the breach 
from] the first series, and knew we had to try and be proactive to stop from getting any 
complaints. 
 
After the first breach, the compliance team also removed programming that they thought could 
lead to viewers’ imitation of harmful acts. Agony included material from Dirty Sanchez and 
Jackass, two programmes which showed young men performing dangerous stunts for their 
audiences’ entertainment. These programmes had gained a reasonable degree of popularity in 
the United Kingdom and material from them was being shown on a variety of channels. The 
regulators disapproved of some of this type of content because they believed it could lead to 
audiences’ emulation, particularly amongst children, so they found the content in breach of the 
rules to deter broadcasters from airing similar material. In response, the manager removed 
various scenes from Agony II that came from these stunt-oriented programmes. 
 
These examples reveal that the breach from the first series had some positive effect on the 
broadcasters’ approach to compliance in the second series. However, it was apparent that this 
effect was only moderate as the compliance manager admitted that he attempted to evade the 
regulatory guidelines in Agony II and that the violent scenes were as strong in the second series 
as they were in the first.  
 
Potentially part of the reason that his compliance approach was only moderately affected is that 
his team had been found to breach the regulations on numerous occasions, yet they had never 
been penalised.127 Rather, the (current and former) regulators only repeatedly warned them.  
 
In fact, in Ofcom’s first three years of operation it had levied a mere ten sanctions (penalties), 
indicating a reluctance to practice heavy-handed enforcement.  
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 In 2003, Entertainu’s compliance manager claimed that he was contacted by the regulator to review 
approximately 15 complaints, up from ten complaints the previous year. He also stated that Entertainu 
was found to be in breach of the Code on multiple occasions.  
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Entertainu’s compliance manager claimed that he had come close to getting fined, yet avoided it 
by rapidly adhering to the regulators’ warnings when they found him to be stretching the limits 
too far. This responsiveness was seen to indicate to the regulators that he was willing to comply 
with the Code and therefore they only went as far as to publish the breaches and not levy 
financial penalties.  
 
When the ‘dust had settled’ so to speak, the broadcasters would again slowly try to press the 
regulatory borders. They therefore attempted to press the limits of acceptable behaviour in small 
increments over-time, pushing when they thought that they could “get away with it” and pulling 
back when they got caught. This ‘two steps forward, one step back’ approach was more likely 
than an abrupt or forceful approach to generate warnings from the regulator than it would 
penalties. 
 
While in some cases Ofcom’s cooperative enforcement style (which is based on communication, 
trust and a presumption that broadcasters want to protect their reputation), has been found to be 
effective in other industries (e.g. Winter, 2001; Murphy, 2001, 2004), it appeared that it was not 
as effective with Entertainu, as its broadcasters’ actions more accurately resembled Kagan and 
Scholz’s ‘amoral calculator’ than their normative ‘corporation as a citizen’ ideal-type. According 
to the amoral-calculator ideal-type, a regulator should respond to such a company with a firmer 
enforcement approach, which actively escalated on-going warnings into financial penalties. This 
is in line with Jenny (2006), who found that sanctioning positively influenced actors’ compliance 
behaviour and Sutinen (1999) who argued that regulators should levy harsher penalties to 
repeat offenders. In other words, other researchers’ findings would suggest that Entertainu’s 
compliance approach would be better addressed by a model that employed more ‘deterrence-
related’ tactics.  
 
The Fairness and Privacy Regulations 
 
As I noted previously, Ofcom’s negative content regulations fell into two categories, the 
‘programme standards’ rules, which dictated what content could not be shown on television, 
and the ‘fairness and privacy’ rules, which governed how programme contributors should be 
treated in the making and broadcast of programmes. The aspects that I have discussed thus 
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far relate to Entertainu’s compliance with the programme standards regulations, not the 
fairness and privacy (F&P) rules.  
 
Although Envision produced Agony II, Entertainu was accountable to Ofcom for all 
compliance failures, including those made by Envision. This was because Ofcom regulated 
broadcasters and not independent producers, thereby requiring them to ensure that the 
producers they hired abided by the rules.  
 
In my time working at Envision and interviewing individuals at Entertainu I, however, never 
once witnessed or heard of the broadcasters discussing the fair treatment of programme 
contributors with the producers to ensure that compliance was being achieved. As I detected 
the producers practicing routine acts of deception, this suggests that the broadcasters did not 
fulfil this regulatory requirement.  
 
This was the case despite the compliance manager’s assertion that production companies 
were often unknowledgeable about the regulation, alluding to the fact that they were 
potentially, or even likely, fallible. The compliance manager stated: 
 
A lot of production companies and a lot of people that make programmes have no idea about 
the rules that they are supposed to be working to. And that is one of the major frustrations. 
Even basic things about language and ‘taking the piss out of people’; they have got no 
idea…[In relation to] the feedback we’ve given on previous off-line versions of programmes 
for the production companies, you get questions where they say, ‘well why can’t we do that’ 
and on some of the things you think, ‘you have never picked up the programme Code in your 
life’ - you have no idea which rules you are supposed to be working to, yet you sign a 
contract saying that you can deliver a compliant programme when you seem as if you don’t 
know what you are doing’...  
 
They [producers] want to make programmes. I think sometimes they get so impassioned 
about what they want to make that regulation is secondary, and I completely understand that. 
I also realistically do not think that anyone that is that impassioned about making 
programmes would really be that interested in the research about the effects of TV. My 
personal view is that people think ‘well, that’s not really my job, I am making a programme, 
you can comply it, and just give us some advice.’ I don’t think it interests people. I think it’s a 
bit short sighted because I think it would facilitate people making better programmes. 
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The broadcasters’ approach of ‘turning a blind eye’ to the producers’ contentious acts may have 
been tactical, as it enabled them to deny any knowledge, and thereby mitigate responsibility, for 
the acts should Ofcom have intervened. This form of wilful ignorance or what is referred to by 
Walton (1996) as ‘plausible deniability’, was similarly used by the producers, who could avoid 
blame for their compliance failures by claiming ignorance about the rules, while simultaneously 
making few efforts to learn about them (see also Sykes and Matza, 1957).  
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The fact that the broadcasters failed to ensure, or seemingly even attempt to ensure, that the 
producers followed the F&P rules furthermore suggests that they were insufficiently motivated to 
do so and lacked an adequate system of accountability which would serve as a mechanism to 
gain their compliance.  
 
There also appeared to be an insufficient level of transparency surrounding the producers’ 
production practices and transparency is considered a key factor in enforcing companies’ 
compliance (Tallberg, 2002). This lack of transparency was not only an issue between the 
broadcasters and regulators, but also between the broadcasters and producers.  
 
As was common in the industry, the broadcasters made the producers sign a legal agreement to 
comply with the regulations whilst creating the series. The broadcasters could not, however, 
watch over the producers to ensure that they were enforced, as they operated from different 
locations. This separation appeared to reduce broadcasters’ perceived responsibility for 
ensuring that F&P regulations were adhered to. They seemed to be more concerned with 
content standards decisions, as they reviewed and approved material, and therefore became 
personally accountable for it. 
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There were also next to no complaints from the programme contributors128 and therefore the 
producers’ questionably contentious F&P-related actions were generally not brought to light and 
the broadcasters faced no negative consequences for their inaction. 
 
Collectively this suggests that an insufficient system of accountability, a lack of transparency and 
a lack of complaints influenced the broadcasters’ compliance approach (see also Virts, 1984; 
Tallberg, 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, from the offset it appeared as if the commissioner and the compliance team had 
innately conflicting economic/business and regulatory-based objectives and obligations – to 
produce a highly rated series with boundary pushing violent content and to ensure that the 
content complied with the relevant regulations.129  
 
In practice, this chapter has shown that the company’s business/economic interests took 
precedence. Rather than serving as an independent party as the compliance team was intended 
to be, it was seemingly swayed by competition pressures, and often tested the regulatory 
confines and devised schemes to defend its actions should it come under regulatory scrutiny.  
 
While a significant reason for this approach was economic-based, there were a variety of other 
factors that played a part in both the broadcasters’ non-adherence with the rules and their 
approach to ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’ (Figure 24). 
 
                                                 
128
 Footnote omitted for confidentiality purposes. 
129
 This is in line with various other researchers who have pointed to the conflict between organisational 
goals and regulatory responsibilities, such as Hawkins and Hutter (1993), Parker (2000) and Nie (2008). 
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Figure 24: The factors that influence broadcasters' compliance decisions 
External level Competition
pressures 
Technological
advances
Deregulation Rule ambiguity If content 
was found in 
breach 
elsewhere
Organisational
level
Conflicting
objectives and 
duties
Economic
interests and 
demands (drive 
for ratings)
Organisation’s 
culture
Severity of 
penalties
Target 
demographic
Complaints 
received
Individual level Disregard for 
the rules and 
their purposes
Personal 
opinions and 
instincts
Encounters 
with peers
 
 
While external elements, such as technological advances and deregulation, helped to further 
competition pressures (as I have previously noted), this chapter has shown that the way the 
rules were sometimes ambiguously written also had an impact on broadcasters’ compliance 
(see also Chayes, 1993; Worsfold, 2001; Tallberg, 2002). This not only led to broadcasters’ 
confusion over how to interpret the rules and thereby to unintentional compliance errors, but it 
also gave them additional room to navigate the rules to their own advantage (see also Davis, 
1979; Diver, 1989; Gifford, 1989). 
 
The broadcasters’ willingness to test regulatory limits was also a product of individuals’ personal 
opinions towards the validity of the rules and what were frequently subjective content decisions. 
Individuals’ opinions were often reinforced by their colleagues who appeared to hold similar 
views and this collectively fed into the formation of their organisational culture, which appeared 
to condone the placement of profit-driven objectives ahead of regulatory responsibilities and the 
safeguarding of viewers from potentially harmful and offensive content (see also Sutinen, 1999; 
Jenny, 2006; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007; Nie, 2008).130 
  
The broadcasters were also influenced by their viewers (young men) and their competitors. 
Viewers tended to engage with broadcasters in two ways, by watching content (which generated 
ratings) and by contacting the broadcaster with feedback (e.g. by complaining). In this instance, 
Enertainu had received its highest ever ratings for Agony and no viewer complaints for its 
graphic content. The broadcasters were therefore encouraged to continue to transmit such 
                                                 
130
 Nie (2008) also found that compliance can be weakened by an agency’s culture, while Jenny (2006) 
noted that personal morals and social norms affect compliance, and Sutinen (1999) argued that 
individuals are more non-compliant the more their community is non-compliant. 
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material. They also emulated their competitors’ content decisions and chose to “up-the-ante” 
when others “got away with” displaying what they considered to be contentious forms of 
imagery. 
 
When comparing the broadcasters’ compliance approach to that of the producers’, it seemed 
that the producers were less knowledgeable, seemingly by design, about the regulatory rules 
and more willing to breach them outright. The broadcasters, who, unlike the producers, were 
accountable to Ofcom for acts of non-compliance, were generally knowledgeable about the rules 
and did not aim overtly to breach them, but rather to worry away at their limits over time. They 
were more sensitive to rule-evasion due to the potential regulatory repercussions they could 
face if they were seen to flaunt the rules blatantly and/or repeatedly.  
 
This suggests that the inclusion of a system of regulatory accountability proved to be an 
important factor in the overall effectiveness of the compliance process. More broadly speaking, it 
also suggests, in this instance, that a ‘command and control-oriented’ enforcement system 
would likely have been more effective at governing these regulated entities than a self regulatory 
system. 
 
As noted, the system of accountability that the broadcasters worked under also had its 
limitations. The broadcasters did little to ensure that the producers followed the rules governing 
‘fairness’ and ‘privacy’, and due to the lack of transparency surrounding the production process, 
the regulator remained unaware of this and therefore no enforcement action was taken (see also 
Tallberg, 2002; Phillips, 2010).  
 
The broadcasters also developed savvy techniques to skirt around the rules and, although the 
regulators repeatedly warned them about their programme tactics, they never penalised them 
and so the broadcasters were only motivated to adjust moderately their compliance approach. 
They were thereby able to broadcast new forms of violent imagery, widen the limits of 
permissible behaviour and, in turn, weaken the regulator’s control over this area of the market.  
 
They did this by changing the way that rules were interpreted over time and by relaxing previous 
concepts of unacceptable forms of conduct. As previously discussed, this use of ‘rule 
reinterpretation’ offers a unique perspective to our understanding of compliance behaviour. It 
can also serve as an extension to the concept of ‘creative compliance’. While ‘creative 
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compliance’ refers to an actor who follows the letter of rules but not their ‘spirit’ (as to avoid 
penalisation), this perspective shows how one can gain further power over rules by also 
reinterpreting the ‘letter’ (or meaning) of rules, as to benefit their own purposes.  
 
As I have shown, this reconfiguration was most easily done in regulatory settings in which rules 
were written in a widely scoped manner so as to remain loosely interpretable and thus relevant 
over time. This afforded actors the ability to apply the rules to a variety of contexts and to allow 
for evolving interpretations, which in turn allowed regulated entities greater room to manoeuvre 
their meaning to their advantage. 
 
This is a useful addition to our understanding of compliance because as Black said, “The battle 
for interpretive control in regulation is a critical one...Control over interpretation is thus control 
over a central power resource” (2002: p. 194). As I was regularly informed that broadcasters 
often follow their competitors, this approach in turn opened the door for others to follow suit and 
make a more widespread impact on the television landscape.  
 
How social boundaries become pushed and reshaped – the social control literature: 
 
This dialogue regarding the pushing and reshaping of social (regulatory) boundaries naturally 
links with the social control literature. This represents a sub-theme in my research and the 
following summarizes my generalised findings in relation to how the actors I examined learned 
about the social boundaries which prevailed in their industry and how they, in turn, managed to 
reshape them. This constitutes my contribution to the sociology of deviance and social control 
literature. 
 
As noted, regulation is often instituted out of a demand from society to protect the population 
from social ills (Erikson, 1966). Once such rules are established, is it important that the 
‘regulated’ population clearly understands the contours of permissible behaviour in order to 
comply with them. The producers and broadcasters I examined learned about regulatory 
boundaries through: the television content they watched; their conversations with colleagues; 
the mistakes they made in the past which were caught by the regulator; and the language they 
used to describe their environment. 
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Once their folk understanding of the guidelines was established, I found that they pushed and 
reshaped the limits of the tolerable over time through a process by which:  
 
1) they became motivated to extend the rules or limits of permissible behaviour to 
benefit their own private interests;  
 
2) they assessed the lines between permissibility and impermissibility, and worried 
away at these limits over time through the practice of ‘creative compliance’, ‘rule 
reinterpretation’ and ‘non-compliance’. This practice was done in small increments 
rather than large increments, because large shifts were more likely to be noticed, 
complained about and penalised than small shifts, which were less likely to be 
detected and, if detected, more likely to receive a warning than a penalty; 
 
3) the body that was intended to police those boundaries (the regulator) did not, or 
could not, effectively monitor the actions of the regulated and so rule infringements 
occurred without detection or penalty. The regulator’s enforcement was also 
inflexibly bound by the letter of the rules and therefore it was outmanoeuvred by 
regulated entities’ use of ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’;     
 
4) the public (or consumers), which often turned to the media for an understanding of 
social boundaries, rarely complained, and when they did complain, the rule enforcer 
often did not take sufficient action to ensure future compliance;131 
 
5) other regulated entities noticed that these individuals/organisations acted beyond the 
understood limits of permissibility and did not face negative consequences, and so 
they copied their behaviour;   
 
6) and this repeated cycle led to the extension of accepted forms of behaviour. 
 
This simplified addition to our understanding of how social/regulatory limits can become 
extended is important because regulators must understand such processes so that they can put 
effective means of social control in place should the population at large demand it. 
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 This is consistent with Virts (1984) who said that viewers’ feedback (i.e. their complaints) was not a 
significant factor in influencing the production process. 
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Now that I have explored the production company’s and broadcaster’s procedures, I shall 
examine Ofcom’s regulation enforcement process to offer a more holistic understanding of the 
regulatory process. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The regulatory environment: inside Ofcom 
 
This chapter has been omitted due to confidentiality purposes. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through the analysis of regulatory compliance and enforcement, this thesis has attempted 
to explain how and why the regulator’s grip over the television market has loosened over 
time, and how producers and broadcasters have gained an increasing level of control over 
the shape and character of content. The aim in doing this was to employ a single detailed 
case study so as to provide an empirically rich, ethnographic account of how and why a 
state of regulation and its enforcement can become weakened, and to set these findings 
within a broader historical context. 
 
To examine this process of regulatory decline, I have explained how the television industry 
and its regulation historically evolved. I then used in-depth, ethnographic analysis to 
explore what the working objectives and responsibilities of the regulators and television-
makers were.  I further examined how their pursuit of these elements was shaped by an 
array of forces at the individual, organisational and external levels, and how the 
consequences of this interplay subsequently led to the relaxation of the television 
standards rules and their enforcement. 
 
In this concluding chapter I shall summarize these findings and outline the contribution this 
work has made to the analysis of regulation.   
 
Empirical findings - the factors that shaped actors’ regulatory approaches 
 
My core contribution is intended to be to the literature in the sociology of regulation and, in 
particular, to an examination of the reasons that can lead industry members to breach 
rules and regulators to relax their rule enforcement.132 It aims to address a deficiency in 
the existing empirical literature by outlining various forces at the organisational and 
                                                 
132
 For examples of other justifying arguments given to describe the process of regulatory 
weakening see: Truman, 1951; Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Mitnick, 1980; 
Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Levine and Forrence, 1990; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Black, 2002; 
Feintuck and Varney, 2006. 
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individual levels which affect regulated entities’ compliance behaviour. While this study is 
principally empirical, it also adds, to a limited extent, to the theoretical literature by 
comparing my research to existing relevant theories and offering a reformulation of certain 
concepts which assisted in the description of my findings. 
 
It is hoped that my results may help regulators practically and academics conceptually to 
better understand what types of flaws can arise in systems of enforcement and how they 
can, in turn, lead to a reduction in the effective oversight of a market or group.     
 
This work also adds, again to a limited extent, to the sociology of media’s ‘gatekeeping’ 
literature (Shoemaker and Mayfield 1987; Soley, 2002; Beam, 2003; Price, 2003; Barzilai-
Nahon, 2005; Lee, 2005; Vettehen, Nuijten and Beentjes, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 
2006; and Barzilai-Nahon, 2007).133  Pamela Shoemaker, a leading scholar of 
gatekeeping, has called for more research to be done to explain the environmental factors 
that shape media practitioners’ decisions about content production, and how these factors 
correlate with other organisational and individual level influences (Shoemaker, 2001; 
Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). I hope that I have served this aim.   
 
I should note that the regulatory compliance literature offers few studies on the television 
market and on content production in particular, tending to focus instead on other sectors 
such as the environment, railways and fisheries. I would therefore encourage more work to 
be done on the media market. I would also encourage researchers to conduct further in-
depth ethnographic analysis of regulatory institutions, as regulatory decision-making is 
often veiled under a layer of confidentiality which is otherwise inaccessible to outsiders 
and thus unavailable for learning or critical comment.     
 
Finally, I believe that the regulation literature would benefit from more research that 
simultaneously looks at states of regulation from the perspective of both the regulator and 
the regulated. This approach would offer valuable insight into regulatory mechanics and 
into how, in practice, regulators’ actions can be interpreted and responded to by industry 
                                                 
133
 As noted previously, as a minor theme, my findings also inherently build on the sociology of 
deviance and control literature, as they explain how forms of permissible behaviour can become 
pushed and extended. For the purposes of needed brevity, I shall not review these findings again 
here, but will instead direct readers to my summary of them on pages 205-207.  
 198 
members. This is a useful, but to date rarely used, way of identifying which regulatory 
tactics are effective and which fail.  
 
My key findings are summarized in Figures 34 through 36. For purposes of brevity, I shall 
review only the most significant factors here. A fuller description of these elements can be 
found in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
 
Figure 34: The factors which influenced producers' compliance approach 
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Figure 35: The factors which influenced broadcasters' compliance approach 
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Figure 36: The factors which influenced Ofcom's enforcement approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External level influencing factors 
 
Macro-level changes stemming from evolving politics, globalisation and technological 
advances have dramatically reshaped the television industry over time, introducing an 
influx of hundreds of new television channels, and broadcasting and independent 
production companies. They have led to a shift towards deregulation and, in turn, a 
relaxation of the standards of television content, together with their rules and enforcement.  
 
The UK television industry, in parallel to many other industries, has been moving towards 
deregulation since the 1980s. The television sector was previously regulated by the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), which was government-run and had ultimate 
pre-monitoring control over the nature of programme output. The Independent Television 
Commission (ITC) subsequently came into force in 1990, relaxing many of the regulations 
and shifting to a post-monitoring system. The Office of Communications (Ofcom) was then 
established in 2003 and adopted the powers of the previous regulators and continued to 
further the passage of the industry down this deregulatory path.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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These actions were the result of a variety of influential macro-level, or external, factors, 
including:   
 
Changing technology: Technological advancement and, in particular, the introduction of 
cable, satellite and, most importantly, digital television, enabled the market to shift from 
just a handful to hundreds of channels. It also made it more feasible to distribute broadcast 
content globally. In doing so, the justification for imposing burdensome content standards 
regulations declined in the UK.  
 
Such regulatory softening was justified by the argument that when there were only a few 
channels in operation they needed to cater for the whole UK population and therefore 
centred on what was referred to as ‘family viewing’. When the number of channels 
broadcast rose, audiences dispersed across them as ‘niche’ channels flooded the 
market.134  These channels uniquely targeted specific audience ‘demographics’, leading 
regulators to adapt their rules so that they could be flexibly applied to what were assumed 
to be the particular sensitivities of different audience members, with what were deemed to 
be more ‘vulnerable’ viewers, such as children, being given tighter content restrictions than 
less vulnerable ones, such as young men. The result was the reduction of restrictions on 
the content destined for certain groups. 
 
Economic incentives: A desire to maximise the industry’s economic gain also led 
regulators to embrace the ‘digital revolution’. The consequential growth of numerous new 
broadcasters and producers led to a reduction of the market’s barriers to entry and the 
relaxation of the more socially protectionist regulations of content standards. In turn, there 
was to be a shift in focus from the regulation of content to that of market competition 
(Feintuck, 1999). 
 
Changing politics/globalisation: Political shifts brought on, in part, by globalisation and 
technological advancement similarly spurred the shift towards government deregulation. 
This move began during the years of the Thatcher government (1979-1992) when 
Margaret Thatcher moved the UK towards a ‘free market economy’, with the sale of 
                                                 
134
 ‘Niche channels’ are services that cater for a specific ‘target demographic’ (or audience profile), 
such as children or young men. 
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government-run industries to the private sector and a reliance on the ‘free market’ to 
manage the economy with a lessening of government restrictions (Underwood, 2003).  
 
The resulting deregulation and re-regulation of numerous sectors included, for instance, 
the ITC’s loosening of regulatory restrictions in broadcasting and the introduction of 
Channel 4 in 1982, which initiated the widespread take-up of external production facilities. 
The government also decided to grant the ITC only the power to regulate broadcasters 
and not independent producers, which were set to operate under a system of self-
regulation. Such changes, as I have shown, were significant factors in the sector’s 
regulatory erosion.  
 
Later, in 2005, the European Union’s Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) Directive led 
Ofcom to publish a new broadcasting code which was in line with the codes used in other 
European Union (EU) Member States. This changed the language used in Ofcom’s code 
and one could argue led to a further reduction of the content standards rules.135 The AMS 
Directive also encouraged the ongoing growth of the independent production sector, as it 
required broadcasters across the EU to allocate a proportion of their television production 
commissions to independent producers. 
 
Increased competition: The outcome of the above changes was the opening of over 800 
independent production companies and the launching of more than 400 television 
channels, which produced in excess of two million hours of programming every year. The 
immense increase in content made it no longer feasible regulators to monitor everything 
that was broadcast and they, in turn, relaxed their enforcement monitoring approach even 
further. 
 
Organisational and individual level influencing factors 
 
These external changes brought forth consequences at the organisational and individual 
levels, which had additional effects on regulation and the industry.  
 
The regulatory level 
 
                                                 
135
 E.g. the rules governing ‘offensive’ content. 
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This section has been removed for confidentiality purposes. 
 
The industry 
 
Just as had been the case with the regulators, the producers and broadcasters also faced 
conflicting economic and public interest objectives and obligations, which were 
simultaneously to comply with the socially protectionist regulations and to make a 
successful television series on time and within budget.   
   
Reflecting the logic behind rational choice theory, the television-makers loosely weighed the 
costs and benefits of different courses of action and selected the most advantageous option. 
The ‘costs’ in this equation equalled their anticipated likelihood of getting caught and 
penalised by the regulator; a possibility which they presumed to be either low or 
nonexistent. The ‘benefits’ included completing the series on time and to budget, which 
enhanced the individuals’ and the organisations’ reputations for successful project delivery 
and thereby their economic positions.136 
 
The television-makers therefore practiced ‘creative compliance’ and ‘rule reinterpretation’ in 
certain instances, and tested or breached the regulatory limits in others, as and when it 
appeared beneficial for them to do so (Kagan and Scholz, 1984: p. 67; see also Becker, 
1968; Sutherland, 1983; Hechter, 1987; Friedman and Hechter, 1988; Hawkins, 1990; 
Pearce and Tombs, 1990; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Footer, 2008; Abusin and Hassan, 
2011; Khanna and Widyawati 2011; Nelson, 2011; Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar, 2011; 
Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar and Eizinga, 2011). And, as my findings reveal, the benefit of 
deviating from the rules routinely outweighed those of complying with them. Accordingly, 
instances of non-compliance were commonplace.  
 
To comprehend why the television-makers were so prone to regulatory infringement, I 
shall review the various inter-related factors that shaped their working environment and 
thus their compliance decisions. I have already outlined the different external factors, such 
as advances in technology and changes in politics, which led to a rapid rise in broadcast 
                                                 
136
 Individuals’ acts of non-compliance also stemmed from, amongst other things, an insufficient, 
sometimes calculatedly insufficient,  knowledge of the rules and an inability to calculate regulatory 
risks effectively, which reflected an interesting mix of Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) ‘corporation as 
incompetent’ and ‘amoral calculator’ ideal types. 
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channels and production houses, and a loosening of the regulations. Here I shall explain 
how these factors had a knock-on effect on the television-makers that I examined and 
affected their commitment to compliance.  
 
Economic interests and demands (drive for ratings): The rise in the number of channels 
and production houses led to a steep increase in competition, and the opening of hundreds 
of small- to mid-sized operations, such as those I investigated in this study. These 
television-makers needed to compete fiercely to survive in the market and their economic 
interests (that is, their drive for ratings, thus advertising revenue) were their core priority. In 
turn, the safeguarding of their financial welfare often took precedence over their public 
interest (or regulatory) duties, with most of their resources being devoted to ensuring their 
economic sustainability rather than their regulatory compliance. 
 
Resource constraints: In a similar vein, the rise in competition also meant that individual 
organisations often operated on tight budgets with limited resources. This led the 
producers that I examined to cut corners by hiring inexpensive, minimally skilled workers 
and not adequately training those workers about the regulations. This tactic again placed 
the business’s economic objectives over its regulatory obligations. It is a finding which 
echoes that of other researchers including, for instance, Arant and Anderson (2001), 
Hutter and Jones (2006), Russial (2009) and Valentine (2009). 
 
Insufficient regulatory training and lack of knowledge: As a result, the producers failed 
to abide by the regulations because they lacked the knowledge needed to comply. Hutter 
(2001) once argued that one needs to understand rules in order to abide by them. The 
producers did not seek to understand them because their wilful lack of education bred non-
compliant behaviour (see, for example, Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2004; Feld and Frey, 2006; 
Furnell and Thomson, 2009; Sarkheyli et al, 2011; Tabrizian, et al 2011; Vassiliki et al 
2011).137 
                                                 
137
 It should, however, be noted that producers’ ignorance of the rules was sometimes wilful, rather 
than solely the bi-product of limited resources, as they understood that ‘boundary pushing’ content 
spurred ratings and thus enhanced their economic positions. Their resistance to learn about what 
was expected of them therefore reflected an ‘amoral’ version of Kagan and Scholz (1984) 
‘corporation as incompetent’ ideal-type, as it was not only due to a simple lack of knowledge about 
the rules that led to acts of non-compliance, as this ideal-type would suggest, but rather a deviant 
and purposeful ignorance used to mitigate responsibility should their actions come under external 
scrutiny. The producers also claimed to disagree with the rationale for the rules, which is a reason for 
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Reputation and job security: The pressurised working environment that employees 
faced, together with the shift in the industry to employ freelance (i.e. not permanent) staff, 
also brought it about that employees were faced with great job insecurity. It was a situation 
that generated a ‘do whatever it takes’ attitude to fulfil assignments and so enhance one’s 
reputation for successful task completion, resulting in a disregard for the rules.138  
 
As I have shown, it was common for new market entrants to find it difficult to secure paid 
employment. In turn, people often accepted internships and worked long hours with little (if 
any) pay in order to secure paid roles in the sector. And, once they were formally 
employed, the level of pressure continued, as they were often expected to work extensive 
unpaid overtime, to assume multiple roles (e.g. camera operator, interviewer, researcher, 
etc.), to complete difficult tasks in short timeframes while operating on greatly restricted 
budgets – and to do all of this with little financial compensation.  
 
This resulted in workers often bending or breaking the rules in order to meet tight 
deadlines, and generating various forms of justification to mitigate or explain their deviant 
behaviour. These techniques of neutralisation included, for instance, their claiming that 
they could not do their jobs without breaching the rules, denying that their actions caused 
anyone harm and blaming their ‘victims’ (i.e. programme contributors) for allowing certain 
unruly incidents to occur. (This adds to similar work from: Parsons and Bales, 1955; Skyes 
and Matza, 1957; Klockars, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; Punch, 1985; and Cohen, 2001.)  
 
The outcome was the formation of a ‘deviant’ sub-culture which condoned and 
perpetuated acts of non-compliance.  
 
Non-compliant organisational culture: The producers’ approach to compliance, together 
with their cost/benefit analysis, was framed by an organisational culture that not only 
condoned, but promoted, acts of non-compliance (see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hall 
                                                                                                                                                    
non-compliance given within the ‘corporation as a citizen’ ideal-type (Kagan and Scholz, 1984; see 
also Nadler 2002; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005, 2007). Their beliefs however appeared to stem, 
again, from an interest in mitigating responsibility for their rule-evading actions rather than from a 
genuine disagreement with the rationale of the regulations, thereby again putting an ‘amoral’ slant on 
their positions.  
138
 Reputational issues were also found to influence compliance behaviour by Parker (2002) and 
Gunningham et al. (2005). 
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and Taylor, 1996; Hutter 2001; Job, Stout and Smith 2007).139 It encouraged members to 
conform to the deviant social norms and constraints embedded in their sub-culture, and to 
become indoctrinated by shared understandings of what was acceptable conduct within 
their unique social world (see also Zucker, 1983; Meyer and Rowen, 1991; Scott, 1995). 
 
This competitive culture was unique and interesting because it led producers, and 
particularly management, not only to tolerate acts of non-compliance, ‘creative compliance’ 
and ‘rule reinterpretation’, but actively to promote them. For instance, management trained 
its staff both how to circumvent and breach the rules without getting caught or penalised. 
 
Like the producers, the broadcasters that I examined aimed to extend the limits of permitted 
conduct. However, they were better educated about the rules than the producers and so 
took more calculated risks in their compliance management. They were also directly 
regulated by Ofcom and so at risk of being sanctioned, and therefore their aim was to push 
slowly the regulatory limits over time, without blatantly breaching them; a tactic that was 
thought to be less likely to incite the awareness and intervention of the regulator than one 
resulting from a more bullish approach.140  
 
Perceived likelihood of detection and severity of penalties: The producers’ culture of 
non-compliance was reinforced by the fact that they were not regulated by Ofcom and 
therefore could not be penalised by it. They had little incentive to comply.141 Instead, the 
system in the UK held broadcasters responsible for all compliance breaches – even those 
made by producers. The rationale that followed from this tactic was that broadcasters were 
supposed to be incentivised to ensure that producers complied with the rules in order to 
protect themselves from negative regulatory intervention. 
                                                 
139
 The influence that a group’s culture and ideology has on its members’ decisions about content and 
regulatory compliance has been documented by numerous researchers (Tuchman, 1978; Gitlin, 
1980; Braithwaite and Geiss, 1982; Punch, 1985; Shoemaker, 1987; Victor and Cullen 1988; Soloski, 
1989; Makkai and Braithwaite 1993; Entman and Rojecki, 2000; Hutter, 2001; Turner, 2002; Warren 
and Vavrus, 2003; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007; Nie 2008; Aaronson, 2010; Harris-White, 2010; 
Wikström, 2010). This is particularly important among those who found that individuals are less likely 
to comply with the rules the more their community or peers do not comply (Vogel, 1974; Geerken and 
Gove, 1975; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; see also Reno, 1993; Paterson 1993; Wikström, 2010). 
140
 Due to this approach, the broadcasters considered it an inability to calculate risks effectively 
when the regulator found them to be in breach of the rules. 
141
 For related accounts see Van Snellenberg and Van de Peppel (2002); Carmichael et al (2005); 
Chiarini, Marzano and Schneider (2011); Khanna and Widyawati (2011); Nguyen (2011); 
Ostrovskaya and Leentvaar (2011). 
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However, I have revealed that the broadcasters I examined, like the producers, aimed to 
extend the parameters of what could be shown on television, and that they did not monitor 
the producers’ compliance with the ‘fairness and privacy’ rules to any perceptible extent. 
Furthermore, when the prequel to the particular series that I examined was found by the 
regulator to have breached the rules, the negative publicity only served to win the series 
more ratings than any other in the channel’s history. This gain, coupled by the fact that the 
regulators let the broadcasters off with a warning and no penalty, meant that the ‘benefit’ 
of deviant practice routinely outweighed the ‘cost’ of full compliance.  
 
So it was that, when the television-makers I examined were confronted with conflicting 
economic and regulatory obligations, they often preferred to prioritise their financial 
interests.  
 
Both producers and broadcasters therefore appeared not to possess a sense of 
“normative commitment” or “civic duty” to comply with the rules, as would those who 
feature in Kagan and Scholz’s ‘corporation as a citizen’ model (1984; see also Tyler, 1990; 
McGraw and Scholz, 1991; Burby and Paterson, 1993; Levi, 1997; Winter, 2001; 
Wingrove, Korpas and Weisz, 2011).  
 
Rather, their compliance behaviour reflected a hybrid form of the ‘amoral calculator’ ideal-
type and activity in accordance with rational choice institutionalism. As noted previously, no 
one theory I found in the literature could fully explain the television-makers’ compliance 
behaviour. However, I was able to draw on useful aspects of a handful of concepts to write 
my own explanation of their conduct. It is the similarities that I drew from each of them that I 
shall briefly outline below.   
 
The core argument behind Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) ‘amoral calculator’ and rational 
choice institutionalism is that actors rationally weigh the costs and benefits of different 
courses of action, and then select the most advantageous option. In other words, the two 
concepts are bound by a philosophy couched in the language of rational choice theory.  
 
Rational choice institutionalists, however, place a distinctive slant on rational choice theory 
by emphasizing the role that institutions play in the shaping of actors’ understanding of their 
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roles, objectives and, in particular, the likely consequences of different courses of action. 
Institutions, in this sense, are considered “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally...humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: p. 3; see 
also Shepsle, 2005). In relation to the topic of compliance, institutions in this tradition 
become the parameters of knowledge which affect how regulated entities regard potential 
regulatory consequences, such as the likelihood of detection or penalisation of certain forms 
of misconduct (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This understanding, in turn, shapes actors’ decision-
making about which strategic path to take. 
 
I have demonstrated that the producers and broadcasters that I examined loosely weighed 
the costs and benefits of different courses of action before determining which compliance 
approach to take. Similar to the model of rational choice institutionalism, the producers’ 
calculus, in particular, was also heavily influenced by the institutional setting in which they 
resided. As noted, they were not regulated by Ofcom (only broadcasters were) and this led 
them to believe that their acts of non-compliance would likely go un-detected and un-
penalised; and this encouraged them to infringe the rules. 
  
The ‘amoral calculator’ ideal-type also puts a unique and useful slant on the standard 
rational choice cost/benefit equation. Thus, “When decision-makers' calculations of costs 
and benefits are tainted by self-interest, economics, or politics so that intentional 
wrongdoing and/or harm result, their calculation becomes amoral” (Vaughan, 1998: p. 1-2). 
Echoing this statement, the producers’ decision-making was greatly influenced by their 
deviant organisational culture which not only tolerated, but promoted, acts of non-
compliance.142  
 
                                                 
142
 The importance of this culture further reflects the concept behind sociological institutionalism, as 
it emphasizes, as I have done, the role that one’s culture and peer group can play in influencing 
members’ behaviour. Sociological institutionalists examine how actors are persuaded to hold 
certain preferences and to conform to certain social norms through the interactions they have with 
others, which mimic the social constructs and constraints embedded in their environment (Meyer 
and Rowen, 1991; Zucker, 1983; Scott, 1995). I too have explained how the producers were 
encouraged to conform to the deviant social norms within their sub-culture which promoted non-
compliance and the mitigation of responsibility for such misconduct. I have also shown how aspects 
of the broadcasters’ behaviour reflected Kagan and Scholz (1984) ‘corporation as incompetent’ 
ideal-type – a concept that attributes non-compliance to inadequate education. This was the case 
because the broadcasters believed that their rule infringements stemmed from an inability to 
calculate risks effectively which is similarly the product of insufficient education and training. 
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Taken together, these concepts support my explanation of the television-makers’ 
compliance approach, which again could be best described as a loose ‘cost/benefit’ 
calculation, which was tainted by a deviant sub-culture that promoted regulatory non-
abidance and the mitigation of such rule infringing behaviour.    
 
Key messages – adding to our understanding of regulation and compliance 
 
Before I conclude, I shall note a few of the key messages or generalised findings that one 
can take away from this research. This study has shown that: 
 
 Both regulators and regulated entities can be presented with conflicting public 
interest and economic objectives and obligations. And, due to an array of 
individual, organisational and external forces, they can be drawn to prioritise their 
economic interests.  
 
 Regulated entities’ decisions to breach rules can often be dictated, or coloured, by 
the overarching views found within the culture (or sub or counter culture) which 
their members bear. This culture can perpetuate acts of non-conformity and the 
development of reasons to justify or mitigate such behaviour so as to reinforce 
such conduct. It can also lend to the alienation or punishment of those who choose 
to deviate from the culture by acting in accordance with more normative or 
principled ideals (see also Vogel, 1974; Geerken and Gove, 1975; Punch, 1985; 
Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Reno, 1993; Paterson 1993; Wikström, 2010). 
 
 Bodies which are directly regulated can better support management which is more 
likely to ensure that their employees are educated about the rules and compliant 
with them. This is in contrast to those bodies whose actions are not overseen by a 
regulator and thus operate under a system of self regulation. Therefore, regulatory 
oversight can be critical in the achievement of compliance (see also Carmichael et 
al 2005; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; Khanna and Widyawati 2011; Chiarini, 
Marzano and Schneider, 2011).  
 
 Regulated entities are more likely to breach the rules in circumstances in which 
they can conclude that their actions will go undetected, unpunished or when the 
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form of penalty presented (or anticipated) is outweighed by that of the potential 
gain found in non-conformity (see also Schuetze, 2002; Van Snellenberg and Van 
de Peppel, 2002; Baldwin, 2004; Carmichael et al 2005; Abusin and Hassan, 2011; 
Chiarini, Marzano and Schneider, 2011; Nguyen, 2011; Ostrovskaya, Leentvaar 
and Eizinga, 2011). 
 
 Traditionally, compliance or ‘cooperative’ regulation enforcement approaches rely 
on warnings or techniques of negotiation as a means to achieve compliance, rather 
than a punitive approach. However, regulated entities whose underlying objective 
is to breach or extend the rules can often not be effectively coaxed into compliance 
via such means. Therefore, they may be better managed through a more penal (or 
‘deterrence’ based) approach which aims at ensuring that the ‘costs’ of non-
compliance do not outweigh the ‘benefits’.  
 
 Regulated entities can weaken states of rule enforcement not only by breaching 
the rules or practicing ‘creative compliance’, but also by what I have described as 
‘rule reinterpretation’, so as to reconstruct the interpretation of rules to use to their 
own advantage. Widely-scoped rules are particularly at risk here, as they can be 
vague and non-descriptive and thereby open to a wider range of interpretations 
than narrowly defined rules (see also Davis, 1979; Diver, 1989; Gifford, 1989). 
 
 Regulated entities can also weaken regulatory guidelines by eroding rules little-by-
little over time, rather than making obvious or abrupt infractions. This interventionist 
approach can be less likely to be detected by regulators. And, if detected, 
regulators (particularly those who adopt a ‘cooperative’ rather than ‘deterrence’ 
approach) can be more likely to levy a warning rather than a sanction, as they may 
view the regulated entity as sufficiently cooperative to gain their forthcoming 
compliance.   
 
 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXX          TEXT OMITTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY PURPOSES      XXXXX 
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 Regulatory decisions can be dictated or shaped by historical precedents which can 
lead to cognitive structures which inform actors of not only how they should act, but 
also what forms of actions are even feasible. This, in turn, can lead to what 
historical institutionalists refer to as ‘path dependence’ and the formation of certain 
patterns of behaviour from which it can be difficult to deviate (see also Thelen, 
1999; Pierson and Skocpal, 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
 
These cumulative findings go beyond traditional ‘capture’ theory-related assumptions 
regarding regulatory softening simply being the product of the industry outmanoeuvring the 
government, so as to take account of numerous other issues, such as the influence that 
one’s culture and the shape of governing rules can have over regulatory outcomes (see 
also Berry, 1984; Levine and Forrence, 1990; Baldwin and Black, 2008).   
 
I hope that my findings may have helped to broaden our understanding of the ways in 
which regulation can decline (or evolve in favour of economic over public interests) by 
invoking the raft of interrelated factors that can cocoon and constrain regulators’ and 
industry members’ actions, often regardless of their formal  normative positioning.  
 
It is an understanding that may prove useful because regulators must understand the 
plethora of factors that can inhibit the effectiveness of their policies if they are going to put 
systems in place which can ensure that needed public interest objectives are met.  
 211 
Bibliography 
 
 
AARONSON, SUSAN ARIEL 2010 How China’s Employment Problems Became Trade 
Problems: Labour Law and the Rule of Law, Institute for International Economic Policy Working 
Paper Series, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Working 
paper number 2010/03, February 2010: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Aaronson_IIEPWP2010-11.pdf 
 
ABUSIN, SANA and HASSAN, RASHID 2011 ‘Non-compliance with fishery regulation/the 
determinants of frequency of violation in Sudan’, Conference paper – CSAE 25th Anniversary 
Conference 2011: Economic Development in Africa, 20-22 March 2011, St. Catherine’s 
College, Oxford: 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2011-EdiA/papers/182-Abusin.pdf 
 
AGRE, P. 2002, ‘Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process’, The Information 
Society, Vol. 18, No. 5: p. 311-331. 
 
AHMED, ELIZA and BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE 2004 ‘When Tax Collectors Become Collectors 
for Child Support and Student Loans: Jeopardizing or Protecting the Revenue 
Base?’; Kyklos Vol 3: p. 303–26: 
http://demgov.anu.edu.au/papers/AhmedBraithwaite2004KYKLOS.pdf 
 
AHMED, ELIZA and BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE 2005 ’A Need for Emotionally Intelligent 
Policy: Linking Tax Evasion with Higher Education Funding’, Legal and Criminological 
Psychology Vol. 10: p. 1–19. 
 
AHMED, ELIZA and BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE 2007 ‘Higher Education Loans and Tax 
Evasion: A Response to Perceived Unfairness’, Law and Policy, Vol 29, Issue 1: p. 121. 
 
ALEXANDER, A. 2004 Media economics: Theory and practice (3rd edition), Mahwah, New 
Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
ALLEN, C. 2005 ‘Discovering ‘Joe Six Pack’ content in television news: The hidden history of 
audience research, news consultants, and the Warner class model’, Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, Vol. 49, Issue 4: p. 363-382. 
 
ALTHEIDE, D. L. 1976 Creating Reality: How TV News Distorts Events, Beverly Hill, CA: Sage. 
 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PAEDIATRICS 2000 Joint Statement on the Impact of 
Entertainment Violence on Children: http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm 
 
AMERCIAN ASSOCIATION OF PEDIATRICS 2001 ‘Children, Adolescents and Television’, 
Pediatrics, Committee on Public Education (2001) Vol. 107, No. 2: p. 423-426. 
 
ANDERSEN, JORGEN GOUL 1998, Citizens and the Law, News from the Rockwool 
Foundation Research Unit No. 3: p. 1. 
 
 212 
ANDERSON CRAIG A, et al. 2003 ‘The influence of media violence on youth’, Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 4, No. 3. 
 
ARANT, M. D. and ANDERSON, J. Q. 2001 ‘Newspaper online editors support traditional 
standards’, Newspaper Research Journal, Vol. 22, Issue 1: p. 57-69. 
 
ARCHER, MARGARET and TRITTER, JONATHAN 2000 Rational Choice Theory: Resisting 
Colonization, Florence, KY: Routledge.  
 
AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE 1998, ‘Improving tax compliance in the cash economy: Cash 
Economy Task Force Report’. 
 
AXELROD, ROBERT M. 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. 
 
AYRES, IAN and BRAITHWAITE, JOHN 1992 Responsive Regulation, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
BAILY, ELIZABETH 1986, ‘Deregulation: Causes and Consequences’, Science, Vol. 234, No. 
4781: p. 1211 – 1216. 
 
BAILEY, G.A. and LICHTY, L.W. 1972 ‘Rough Justice on a Saigon Street: A gatekeeper Study 
of NBC’s Ted Execution Film’, Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 49: p. 221-229. 
 
BALCH, G 1980 ‘The Stick, the Carrot and Other Strategies: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Government Intervention’ in J. Brigham and D. W. Brown (eds), Policy Implementation: 
Penalties or Incentives, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications. 
 
BALDWIN, ROBERT and BLACK, JULIA 2008 ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, The Modern 
Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 1: p. 59-94.  
 
BALDWIN, ROBERT and CAVE, MARTIN 1999 Understanding Regulation – Theory, Strategy 
and Practice, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
BALDWIN, ROBERT; CAVE, MARTIN and LODGE, MARTIN 2011 Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy and Practice, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
 
BALDWIN, ROBERT and McCRUDDEN, CHRISTOPHER (et al.) 1987 Regulation and public 
law, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
BALL, LINDEN and ORMEROD, THOMAS 2000 ‘Applying ethnography in the analysis and 
support of expertise in engineering design’, Design Studies, Elsevier Science Ltd: p. 403-421. 
 
BANTZ, C.R. 1985 ‘News Organization: Conflict as a Crafted Cultural Norm’, Communication, 
Vol. 8, Issue 2: p: 225-244. 
 
BANTZ, C. R. 1990 Organizational Communication, Media Industries and Mass 
Communication, Vol. 13 J. Anderson (Ed.) Communication Yearbook, Newbury Park, 
California, Sage: p. 133-141. 
 
BANTZ, C.R., MCCORKLE, S. And BAADE, R.C. 1980 The News Factory, Communication 
Research, Vol. 7, Issue 1: p. 45-68. 
 213 
 
BANYARD, PETER 2004 ‘Well they would, wouldn’t they?’, Business Services Industry, Credit 
Management, November: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5308/is_200411/ai_n21358628 
 
BARDACH, EUGENE. and KAGAN, ROBERT, A. 1982 Going by the Book: The Problem of 
Regulatory Unreasonableness, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
BARNETT, STEVEN 1998 Dumbing Down or Reaching Out: Is it Tabloidisation wot done it?, 
Oxford, UK: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., Ltd., Blackwell Publishers. 
 
BARNETT, STEVEN and SEYMOUR, EMILY 1999 A Shrinking Iceberg Travelling South: 
Changing Trends in British Television: A Case Study of Drama and Current Affairs, London: 
Campaign for Quality Television Ltd.   
 
BARTRIP, P.W.J. and FENN, P.T. 1980 ‘The Administration of Safety: The Enforcement Policy 
of the Early Factory Inspectorate’, Public Administration, Vol. 58, No. 1: p. 1844-1864. 
 
BARZILAI-NAHOM, KARINE 2004 Gatekeepers and Gatekeeping Mechanisms in Networks, 
unpublished dissertation, Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University. 
 
BARZILAI-NAHOM, KARINE 2005 Gatekeeping in Networks: A Meta-Theoretical Framework 
for Exploring Information Control, presented in the JAIS Sponsored Theory Development 
Workshop, ICIS 2005. 
 
BARZILAI-NAHOM, KARINE 2007 ‘Toward a Theory of Network of Gatekeeping: A Framework 
for Exploring Information Control’, Jasist-Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology, December. 
 
BBC, BSC, ITC 1998 Violence & the Viewer: Report of the Joint Working Party on Violence on 
Television, London, UK: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/uploads/VIOLENCE_AND_THE_VIEWER.doc 
 
BBC, BSC and ITC 2002 Briefing Update: Depiction of Violence on Terrestrial Television: 
www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/research/depiction_of_violence_on_tv.pdf 
 
BEAM, R. A. 2003 ‘Content differences between daily newspapers with strong and weak 
market orientations’, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, vol. 80, Issue 2: p. 368-
390. 
 
BECKER, GARY 1968 Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach". The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 76, Issue 2: p. 169–217. 
 
BENKLER, YOCHAI 2000 ‘From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access’, Federal Communications Law 
Journal, Vol. 52, No. 3: p. 561-579. 
 
BENKLER, YOCHAI 2006 The Wealth of Networks. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
BENSON, R. And NEVEU, R. 2005 ‘Introduction: Field theory as a work in progress’, in R. 
Benson and E. Neveu (eds.), Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 
1-25. 
 214 
 
BERKOWITZ, DAN 1990 ‘Refining the gatekeeping metaphor for local television’, Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 34, No. 1, p: 55-68. 
 
BERKOWITZ, DAN 1991 ‘Assessing Forces in the Selection of Local Television News’, Journal 
of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 35: p. 245-251. 
 
BERKOWITZ, DAN 1992 ‘Routine Newswork and the What-a-Story: A Case Study of 
Organisational Adaptation’, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 36, Issue. 1: 
p.45-60. 
 
BERKOWITZ, DAN 1993 ‘Work roles and news selection in local TV: Examining the business-
journalism dialectic’, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 37, Issue 1: p. 67-83. 
 
BERKOWITZ, DAN, ALLEN, C and BEESON, D. 1996 ‘Exploring newsroom views about 
consultants in local TV: The effects of work roles and socialization’, Journalism of Broadcasting 
and Electronic Media, Vol. 40, Issue 4: p.447-459. 
 
BERNSTEIN, M. H. 1955 Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press. 
 
BERRY, WILLIAM D. 1984 ‘An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of 
State Public Utility Commissions’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28,  
No. 3: p. 524-558. 
 
BFI 1999 Television Industry Tracking Study: Third Report, British Film Institute. 
 
BIRNHACK, M. and ELKIN-KOREN, N. 2003 ‘The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of 
the State in the Digital Environment’, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology: 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol8/issue2/v8i2_a06-Birnhack-Elkin-Koren.pdf 
 
BISSELL, K. L. 2000 ‘A return to ‘Mr. Gates’: Photography and objectivity’, Newspaper 
Research Journal, Vol. 21, Issue 3: p. 81-91. 
 
BLACK, JAY, STEELE, BOB and BARNEY, RALPH 1992 Doing Ethics in Journalism: A 
Handbook with Case Studies, Society of Professional Journalists: Ebsco Media. 
 
BLACK, JULIA 1998, ‘Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and Lessons Of Regulatory 
Failure’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 6: p. 789-820. 
 
BLACK, JULIA 2000 ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 4: p. 597-614. 
 
BLACK, JULIA 2002 ‘Regulatory Conversations’, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, 
March: p. 163-196. 
 
BLACK, JULIA 2002 ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy, Vol. 27: p. 1-35. 
 
BLACK, JULIA and ROUCH, DAVID, ‘The Development of the Global Market as Rule-makers: 
Engagement and Legitimacy’, Law and Financial Markets Review, Vol. 2, No. 3: p. 218-232. 
 215 
 
BLUMER, HERBERT 1969 Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
BLUMER, J. 1992 A Review of Children’s Television: 1982-1992, London: Broadcasting 
Standards Council. 
 
BOONSTRA, WIEBREN and DANG, NGUYEN BACH 2010 ‘A history of breaking laws – Social 
dynamics of non-compliance in Vietnamese marine fisheries’, Marine Policy 
Vol 34, Issue 6: p. 1261-1267. 
 
BOWERS, P.J. 1998 Taylor’s Practical Reason and Moral Decision-making Among Journalists 
(Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University 1998), Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 59, 
No. 10, 3684A. 
 
BORDEN, S.L. 2000 ‘A Model for Evaluating Journalist Resistance to Business Constraints’, 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 15, No. 3: p. 159-166. 
 
BORDEN, S.L. and PRITCHARD, M. 1997 ‘News Sources and Deception’, in Cohen and D. 
Elliot (Eds.), Journalism Ethics: A Handbook, Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc: p. 
102-106. 
 
BOX, S. 1983 Power, Crime and Mystification, London: Tavistock. 
 
BRADLEY, S. GAYLEN 1995 Conflict of Interest, in Francis L., Scientific Integrity, ASM Press.  
 
BRAITHWAITE, JOHN 1985 To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety, 
Albany, State University of New York Press. 
 
BRAITHWAITE, JOHN and GEISS, G. 1982, ‘On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime 
Control’, Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 28: p. 292 - 314. 
 
BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE 1995 ‘Games of engagement: Postures within the regulatory 
community’, Law & Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 3: p. 225-255. 
 
BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE and ELIZA AHMED 2005 A Threat to Tax Morale: the Case of 
Australian Higher Education Policy, Working Paper No. 68, May 2005, Centre for Tax System 
Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University: 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/68.pdf 
 
BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE and ELIZA AHMED 2006 Australia’s HECS Policy: Fewer Social 
Barriers but More Political Ones, RegNet Occasional Paper No. 8. Canberra: The 
Australian National University. 
 
BREED, W. 1955 ‘Social Control in the Newsroom’, Social Forces, Vol. 33, No. 4: p. 326-335. 
 
BRINTON, MARY and NEE, VICTOR 1989 The New Institutionalism in Sociology, Russell 
Sage Foundation, New York. 
 
BRITISH FILM INSTITUTE 1999 Television Industry Tracking Study: Third Report, London: 
British Film Institute. 
 216 
 
BRITISH THEATRE GUIDE 2004 Censorship: the Legal Position, 4 August, 2004: 
http://www.britishtheatreguide.info/articles/040804.htm 
 
BROMLEY, MICHAEL 1997 ‘The End of Journalism? Changes in workplace practices in the 
press and broadcasting in the 1990s’ A Journalism Reader, Bromley, Michael and O’Malley, 
Tom (eds), London: Routledge. 
 
BROWNE, KEVIN D. and HAMILTON-GIACHRITSIS, CATHERINE 2005 The influence of 
violent media on children and adolescents: A pubic health approach, Lancet, 365(9460). 
 
BRYMAN, ALAN 2001 Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
BSC 1998 Code on Fairness and Privacy, London: BSC. 
 
BSC 2000 Consenting Adults?, research conducted by the Stirling Media Research Institute, 
London: BSC. 
 
BURBY, RAYMOND and PATERSON, ROBERT G. 2007 Improving Compliance with State 
Environmental Regulations, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 12, No. 4 
(Autumn), pp. 753-772. 
 
BURGESS, ROBERT, G. (eds) 1985 Strategies of educational research: Qualitative Methods, 
Philadelphia: Palmer. 
 
CARMICHAEL, S., LANGTON, L., PENDELL, G., REITZEL, J. D. and PIQUERO, A. R. 2005 
‘Do the Experiential and Deterrent Effect Operate Differently across Gender?’ Journal of 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 267–76. 
 
CARTER, CYNTHIA and WEAVER, C. KAY. 2002 Violence and the Media, Maidenhead, UK: 
Open University Press. 
 
CHAYES, ABRAHAM and CHAYES, ANTONIO HANDLER 1995, The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press. 
 
CHERMSIDE, HERBERT B. 2005 Conflict of Interest: Theory and Practice for Research 
Administrators, Southern Section, Society of Research Administrators, Chermside: 
http://www.srainternational.org/sra03/uploadedFiles/m15.ppt 
 
CHIARINI, BRUNO; MARZANO, ELISABETTA and SCHNEIDER, FRIEDRICH 2011 ‘Tax rates 
and tax evasion: An empirical analysis of the long-run aspects in Italy’, European Journal of 
Law and Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9247-6: p. 1-21. 
 
CHIBNALL, S. 1975 ‘The crime reporter: A study in the production of commercial knowledge’, 
Sociology, Vol. 9, Issue 1: p. 49-66. 
 
CHIBNALL, S. 1981 ‘The production of knowledge by crime reporters’, In S. C. J. Young (Ed.), 
The manufacture of news: Deviance, social problems and the mass media, Sage, Beverly 
Hillls, CA: p. 75-97. 
 
 217 
CHOMSKY, D. 2006 ‘‘An interested reader’: Measuring ownership control at the New York 
Times’, Critical Studies in Media Communications, Vol. 23, Issue 1: p. 1-18. 
 
CHOMSKY, N. 2006 Failed states: The abuse of power and the assault on democracy, 
Metropolitan books/Henry Holt, New York. 
 
CLARKE, STEVE 2004 Television, Dumbing Down the BBC, Royal Television Society: 
http://www.rts.org.uk/magazine_det.asp?id=1944 
 
CLAYTON, D. A.; GRIFFITH, C. J., PETERS, A.C. and PRICE, P. 2002 ‘Food handlers’ Beliefs 
and self-reported practices’, International Journal of Environmental Health Research, Vol. 12, 
Issue 1: p. 25-39.   
 
COFFEE, JOHN 1981, ‘No soul to damn: no body to kick: An unscandalised inquiry into the 
problem of corporate punishment’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 79: p. 386-459. 
 
COHEN, STANLEY 1985 Visions of Social Control, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.  
 
COHEN, STANTLY 2001 States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Polity 
Press, Malden, Massachusetts.  
 
COLE, PETER 1999 Dumbing down: bottoming out?, Aslib Proceedings, Vol. 51, No. 3: p. 72-
77. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 2009 Special Report on Regulatory Reform – 
Modernizing the American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving 
Oversight, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Stability: 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf 
 
CORNISH, D. and CLARKE, R. V. Eds. 1986 The Reasoning Criminal, New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
 
COTTLE, S. (1999) ‘From BBC Newsroom to BBC News centre: On Changing Technology and 
Journalist Practices’, Convergence, Vol. 5 Issue 3: p. 22–43. 
 
CRUNDALL, DAVID; POULTER, DAMIAN; BIBBY, PETER; CLARKE, DAVID D. and 
CHAPMAN, PETER 2010, ‘Truck drivers’ compliance with road laws, regulations and 
researchers, Behavioural Research in Road Safety 2008 Eighteenth Seminar: 
http://www2.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roadsafety/research/rsrr/theme2/researchreport/pdf/annual-
seminar18.pdf#page=75 
 
CULHANE, P. J. 1981 Public Lands Politics, Baltimore, John Hopkins University. 
 
CULTSOCK 1999 Broadcasting in the UK, Cultsock: 
http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/index.html 
 
CUMBERBATCH, GUY and HOWITT, DENNIS 1989 A Measure of Uncertainty: The Effects of 
the Mass Media, London: John Libbey. 
 
 218 
CUPITT, MARGARET 2000 Community Views about Content on Free to Air Television, 
Sydney, Australian Broadcasting Authority: 
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib100068/community_views_free_to_air_99.pdf 
 
DANACEAU, P. 1982 ‘Developing Successful Enforcement Programs’ in E. Bardach and R. A. 
Kagan (eds), Social Regulation: Strategies for Reform, New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, p. 139-158. 
 
DANIEL, D.K. 2000 ‘Best of Time and Worst of Times’, In M. Greenwald and J. Bernt (Eds.), 
The Big Chill: Investigative Reporting in the Current Media Environment, Ames: Iowa State 
University Press: p. 11-34. 
 
DEMUTH, CHRISTOPHER C. and GINSBURG, DOUGLAS H. 2010 ‘Review: Revesz & 
Livermore: Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the 
Environment and Our Health’, Michigan Law Review, April 2010, 108, Mich. L. Rev. 877. 
 
DIMAGGIO, PAUL and POWELL, WALTER 1983 ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Field’, American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 48, No. 2, p.147-160. 
 
DIMENTO, JOSEPH 1989, ‘Can social science explain organizational non-compliance with 
environmental law?’ Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 45, No. 1: p. 109-132. 
 
DIVER, COLIN 1989 ‘Regulatory Precision’ in Making Regulatory Policy, K. Hawkins & J. 
Thomas eds., Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
DONAHUE, G. A., OLIEN, C., N. and TICHENOR, P. J. 1989 ‘Structure and Constraints on 
Community Newspaper Gatekeepers’, Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 66, Issue 4: p. 807-812. 
 
DONOHEW, L. 1967 ‘Newspaper gatekeepers and forces in the news channel’, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, Issue 1: p. 61-68. 
 
DOUGLAS, JACK D. 1970 Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral 
Meanings, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, US and London, UK. 
 
DOWNES, DAVID and ROCK, PAUL 1996, Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology 
of Crime and Rule Breaking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK.  
 
DUTCH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 2004 The ‘Table of Eleven’ – A versatile tool, Law 
Enforcement Expertise Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, Netherlands: 
http://www.sam.gov.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/item_618_NL_The_table_of_Eleven.pdf 
 
ECKERSLEY, ROBYN 1995, ‘The State and Environmental Management in Australia’, in The 
State in Question, Jones, P. And Emy, H., Eds, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
 
EGGERT, HAKAN and LOKINA, R. 2010 ‘Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries’ 
Environment and Development Economics Vol. 15, Issue 2: p.197-217. 
 
ELKIN-KOREN, N. 2001 ‘Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to 
Exclude Indexing’, Dayton Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2: p. 180-209. 
 
 219 
ELLIOT, D. 1989 ‘Journalistic Deception’, in P.Y Windt, P.C. Appleby, M.P. Battin, L.P. Francis, 
and B.M. Landesman (Eds.), Ethical Issues in the Professions, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall: p. 144-146. 
 
ENTMAN, R. M. 2007 ‘Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power’, Journal of 
Communication, Vol. 57, Issue 1: p. 163-173. 
 
ENTMAN, R. M. & ROJECKI, A. 2000 The black image in the white mind: Media and race in 
America, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
EPSTEIN, E. J. 1973 News from Nowhere: Television and the News, New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
ESSER, FRANK 1999 ‘Tabloidization of News’, European Journal of Communication. Vol. 14, 
No. 3: p 291-324. 
 
EUROPA 2005 Television broadcasting activities: "Television without Frontiers" (TVWF) 
Directive: p. 6: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24101.htm   
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1997 Second Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee on the Application of 
Directive 89/552/EEC ‘Television Without Frontiers’, para 4.2. 
 
FAIRMAN, ROBYN and YAPP, CHARLOTTE 2005 ‘Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription and 
Conceptions of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement’, Law and 
Policy, Vol. 27, No, 4: p. 491-519. 
 
FARRINGTON, D. P., LANGAN, P. A, and WIKSTROM, P-O 1994, ‘Changes in Crime and 
Punishment in America, England and Sweden between the 1980s and the 1990s’, Studies in 
Crime Prevention, Vol. 3: p. 104-131. 
 
FEINTUCK, MIKE 1999 Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
 
FELD, LARS P. and FREY, BRUNO S. 2006 Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological 
Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, April 2006, available at: 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900366. 
 
FEINTUCK, MIKE 2004 The Public Interest in Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
FENSCH, T. 1990 Associated Press Coverage of a Major Disaster: The Crash of Delta Flight 
1141, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
FERREE, MYRA MARX; GAMSON, WILLIAM ANTHONY; GERHARDS, JURGEN and 
RUCHT, DIETER 2002 Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in 
Germany and the United States, Cambridge University Press.  
 
FINLAY, LINDA 2002 ‘“Outing” the researcher: the provenance, process and practice of 
reflexivity’, Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 12, Issue 3: p. 531-545. 
 
 220 
FISHMAN, M. 1982, News and Non-events: Making the Visible Invisible, In J.S. Ettema and 
D.C. Whitney (Eds), Individuals in Media Organizations: Creativity and Constraint, Beverly Hill, 
California, Sage: p. 219-240. 
 
FISSE, BRENT and BRAITHWAITE, JOHN 1993, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
FOLGER, R. And KONOVSKY, M. A. 1989 ‘Effects of Procedural and Distributive Justice on 
Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32: p. 115-130. 
 
FOOTER, MARY E. 2008, ‘Some theoretical and legal perspectives on WTO compliance’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXXVIII (2007): p. 61-112. 
 
FREY, BRUNO S. and FELD, LARS P. 2002, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical 
Analysis, CESifo Working Paper No. 760, August 2002. 
 
FRIEDMAN, DEBRA and HECHTER, MICHAEL 1988 ‘The Contribution of Rational Choice 
Theory to Macrosociological Research’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 6, Issue 2: p. 201 - 218. 
 
FRIEDRICHS, DAVID 1996, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 
Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, California. 
 
FULPONI, L. 2006 ‘Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective of  
major food retailers in OECD countries’, Food Policy, Vol. 31: p. 1-13. 
 
GALTUNG, J., & Ruge, M. 1973, ‘Structuring and selecting news’, In S. Cohen & J. Young, 
(Eds.), The Manufacture of the News, London, Constable: p. 62-73. 
 
GANS, H. J. 1979 Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, 
Newsweek and Time, New York, Pantheon. 
 
GARCIA MARTINEZ M., FEARNE, A., CASWELL, J.A., and HENSON, S. 2007 ‘Co-regulation 
as a possible model for food safety governance: opportunities for public-private  
Partnerships’, Food Policy, Vol 32, Issue 3: p: 299-31. 
 
GARLAND, D. 2003 The Rise of Risk. In Ericson, R and Doyle, A (eds) Risk and Morality. 
London: University of Toronto Press.  
 
GATFIELD, LUCY and MILLWOOD HARGRAVE, ANDREA 2003 Dramatic Licence: Fact or 
Fiction?, London, UK, produced on behalf of the Broadcasting Standards Commission. 
 
GAUNTLETT, DAVID 1998 ‘Ten Things wrong with the “effects model”’, in O. Linne, R. 
Dickinson and Ro. Harindranath (eds), Approaches to Audiences: A Reader, London: Arnold. 
 
GEEN, RUSSELL 1994 ‘Television and Aggression: Recent Development in Research and 
Theory’, in D. Zillman, J. Bryant and A. C. Hutson (eds), Media, Children and the Family, 
Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p. 151-163.  
 
GEERKEN, M. and GOVE, W. R. 1975 ‘Deterrence: some theoretical considerations’, Law and 
Society Review, Vol. 9: p. 495-513. 
 
 221 
GELLER, KEN 2004 Conflicts of Interest and Human Subjects Protection, IRB Meeting: 
www.research.temple.edu/irb/docs/eduppt/Conflict%20of%20Interest%20(COI)_IRB%20Talk.p
pt 
 
GENN, H. 1993, ‘Business responses to the regulation of health and safety in England’, Law 
and Policy, Vol. 15: p. 219-233. 
 
GENTZKOW, M. And SHAPIRO, J. M. 2006 ‘What drives media slant? Evidence from U.S. 
daily newspapers [Electronic version], Social Science Research Network: 
www.nber.org/papers/w12707.pdf 
 
GIBBONS, THOMAS 1998 Regulating the Media, Modern Media Studies, second edition, 
London, UK: Sweet and Maxell. 
 
GIEBER, WALTER 1956 ‘Across the Desk: A Study of 16 Telegraph Editors’, Journalism 
Quarterly, Vol. 33, Fall: p. 423-432. 
 
GILBOY, JANET 1998, ‘Compelled third-party participation in the regulatory process: Legal 
duties, culture and noncompliance’, Law and Policy, Vol. 20, Issue 2: p. 135-155. 
 
GITLIN, T. 1980 The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of 
the News Left, Berkeley, California, University of California Press. 
 
GLASER, BARNEY and STRAUSS, ANSELM 1968 The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London. 
 
GLYNN, KEVIN 2000 Tabloid Culture: Trash Taste, Popular Power, and the Transformation of 
American Television, Durhan North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
 
GLYNN, KEVIN Tabloid Television, The Museum of Broadcast Communications: 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/T/htmlT/tabloidtelev/tabloidtelev.htm 
 
GOFFMAN, IRVING 1971, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin. 
 
GRABOSKY, P. N. 1995 ‘Counterproductive Regulation’, International Journal of the Sociology 
of Law, Vol. 23: p. 247-269.  
 
GRAHAM, COSMO and PROSSER, TONY (eds), 1998, Waiving the Rules: the Constitution 
Under Thatcherism, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
 
GRANOVETTER, MARK 1974 Getting a Job: A Study of Contracts and Careers, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
GRASMICK, H. G. and BURSIK, R. J. 1990 ‘Conscience, Significant Others and Rational 
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model’, Law and Society Review, Vol. 24: p. 837-861. 
 
GRASMICK, H. G., BURSIK, R. J. And KINSEY, K. A. 1991, Shame and embarrassment as 
deterrents to noncompliance with the law: The case of an antilittering campaign. Environment 
and Behavior, Vol. 23: p. 233-251. 
 
 222 
GRAY, W. and SCHOLZ, J. T. 1991 ‘Analyzing the equity and efficiency of OSHA 
enforcement’, Law and Policy, Vol. 13: p. 185-214. 
 
GRINDSTAFF, LAURA 2002 The Money Shot: Trash, Class, and the Making of TV Talk Shows 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
GUNNINGHAM, NEIL. 1987 ‘Negotiated Non-Compliance: A Case Study of Regulatory 
Failure’, Law Policy, Vol. 9: p. 69-95. 
 
GUNNINGHAM, NEIL 1994, ‘Beyond compliance: Management of environmental risk’ in Boer, 
B., Fowler, R. & Gunningham, N. (eds) Environmental Outlook: Law and Policy, Federation 
Press, Sydney, p. 254-281. 
 
GUNNINGHAM, N., THORTON, D. and KAGAN R. 2003 Shades of green: business,  
regulation and environment, Stanford University Press Stanford, California. 
 
GUNNINGHAM, N., THORTON, D. and KAGAN R. 2005, ‘Motivating Management:  
Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection’, Law and Policy, Vol 27, No 2: p. 289-316. 
 
GUNTER, B. 2003 News and the Net, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, New Jersey. 
 
HAINES, FIONA 1997, Corporate Regulation: Beyond “Punish or Persuade”, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
 
HALL, P.A. and TAYLOR, R. C. R. 1996 ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, Vol. 44: p. 936 – 957. 
 
HARGREAVES, IAN and THOMAS JAMES 2002 New News, Old News, An ITC and BSC 
research publication, London: ITC, BSC. 
 
HARGREAVES, IAN 2003 The ethics of journalism: a summing-up for Lord Hutton, Cardiff 
Centre for Ethics, Law and Society, Cardiff University: 
http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/publications/2003/hargreavespaper.pdf 
 
HARRIS-WHITE, BARBARA 2010 ‘Work and Wellbeing in Informal Economies: The regulatory 
roles of institutions of identity and state’, World Development, Vol. 38, Issue 2: p. 170-183. 
 
HASNAIN, ZAHID 2011 Incentive Compatible Reforms – The political economy of investments 
in Mongolia, Policy Research Working Paper # 5667, The World Bank, East Asia and Pacific 
Region, Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Unit: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/05/24/000158349_2011052408
1958/Rendered/PDF/WPS5667.pdf 
 
HAVINGA, T. 2006 ‘Private regulation of food safety by supermarkets’, Vol 28, Issue 4, Law 
and Policy, p: 515-533. 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH 1989 FATCATS and Prosecution in a Regulatory Agency: A Footnote on 
the Social Construction of Risk, Law and Policy, Vol. 11: p. 370-391. 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH and THOMAS, JOHN (eds) 1984 Enforcing Regulation, Boston, MA: 
Kluwer-Nijhoff. 
 223 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH 1990 ‘Compliance Strategy, Prosecution Policy, and Aunt Sally: A comment 
on Pearce and Tombs’, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 30, No. 4, Autumn 1990: p. 444-446 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH 1991 ‘Enforcing Regulation: More of the Same from Pearce and Tombs’, 
British Journal of Criminology, Autumn, Vol. 31, No. 4. 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH 1992 The Uses of Discretion, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
HAWKINS, KEITH 2002 Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory 
Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
HERMAN, E. S. and CHOMSKY, N. 1988 Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of 
the Mass Media, New York, Pantheon. 
 
HERMAN, EDWARD and MCCHESNEY, ROBERT 1997 The Global Media, London and 
Washington: Cassell. 
 
HERTZ, R. 1997 Reflexivity and voice, London: Sage. 
 
HECHTER, MICHAEL 1987 Principles of Group Solidarity, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
HECHTER, MICHAEL and KANAZAWA, SATOSHI 1997 ‘Sociological Rational Choice 
Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23: p. 191-214. 
 
HENNINGHAM, J. 1997 ‘The journalist’s personality: An exploratory study’, Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 3: p. 615-624. 
 
HERMAN, E. S. and MCCHESNEY, R. W. 1997 The global media: The new missionaries of 
corporate capitalism, Cassell, London, Washington, D.C. 
 
HIRSCH, ANDREW, BOTTOMS, ATHONY E., BURNEY, ELIZABETH and WIKSTROM, P-O. 
1998 Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research: 
http://members.lycos.co.uk/lawnet/SENTENCE.PDF 
 
HIRSCHI, TRAVIS 2002 Causes of Delinquency, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey. 
 
HOPKINS, ANDREW 1995, Making Safety Work, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW. 
 
HORNING, N. R. 2000, Explaining compliance with rules governing common-pool forest 
resource use and conservation: Dynamics in Bara County, Southwestern Madagascar: 
www.dlc.dllib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/05/69/dlc- 
000005696-00/horningn052300.pdf. 
 
HOSKINS, C., MCFADYEN, S. and FINN, A. 2004 Media economics: Applying economics to 
new and traditional media, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California. 
 
 224 
HOWARD-GRENVILLE, JENNIFER, NASH, JENNIFER and COGLIANESE, CARY 2008 
‘Constructing the License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate 
Environmental Decisions’, Law and Policy, Vol. 30, No. 1: p. 74-107. 
 
HUBER, GEORGE P. 1974 ‘Multi-Attribute Utility Models: A Review of Field and Field-like 
Studies’, Management Science, June, Vol. 20: 1393 – 1402. 
 
HUCKINS, K. 1999 ‘Interest-group influence on the media agenda: A case study’, Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 76, Issue 1: p. 76-86. 
 
HUESMANN, L. ROWELL, MOISE-TITUS, JESSICA, PODOLSKI, CHERYL-LYNN, and 
ERON, LEONARD 2003 ‘Longitudinal relations between children’s exposure to TV violence 
and their aggressive and violent behaviour in young adulthood: 1977-1992’, Developmental 
Psychology, Vol. 39, Issue 2: p. 201-221. 
 
HUGHES, HELEN MACGILL 1968 News and the Human Interest Story, Greenwood Press, 
New York.  
 
HUNT, A. 2003, Risk and Moralization in Everyday Life in Ericson, R. and Doyle, A. eds., Risk 
and Morality, London: University of Toronto Press. 
 
HUNTINGTON, S.P. 1952, ‘The Marasmus of the ICC’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61 (April): p. 
467-509. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 1997, Compliance: Regulation and Environment, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 1988 The Reasonable Arm of the Law, Claredon Press, Oxford.  
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 1989 ‘Variations in Regulatory Enforcement Styles’, Law and Policy, Vol. 
11, No. 2 (April): p.153-174. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 1997, Compliance: Regulation and Environment, Clarendon Press. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 2001, Regulation and risk: occupational health and safety on the railways,  
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET 2004, ‘Risk management and governance’, in Designing government: 
from instruments to governance, Eliadis, P.; Hill, M.M.; Howlett, M. (eds) McGillQueen's 
University Press, p: 303-321.  
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET and JONES, C 2007, ‘From government to governance: external 
influences  on business risk management,’ International Journal of Regulation and  
Governance, Vol. 1, Issue 1, p: 27-45. 
 
HUTTER, BRIDGET and AMODU, TOLA 2008, Risk Regulation and Compliance:  
Food Safety in the UK, report produced in association with LSE Enterprise: 
http://new.wales.gov.uk/ecolidocuments/NCP/NCP.04219.pdf 
 
 225 
IKENBERRY, G. J. 1994, History’s heavy hand: Institutions and the Politic of the State, 
Presented at conference on the New Institutionalism, University of Maryland, October 14-15, 
1994. 
 
ITC 1998 Television on Trial: Citizens Juries on Taste and Decency, London, UK: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/itc_publications/audience_research/index.asp.html 
 
ITC 2002 Television, The Public’s View, London: ITC: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/research/tv_publics_view_2002.pdf 
 
ITC 2002 The ITC Programme Code, London: ITC. 
 
JABLIN, F. M. 1982 ‘Organizational communication: An assimilation approach’, in M. E. Roloff 
and C. R. Berger (Eds), Social Cognition and Communication, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA: p. 255-
286. 
 
JACOBS, R. N. 1996 ‘Producing the news, producing the crisis: Narrativity, television and 
news work’, Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 18, Issue 3: p. 373-397. 
 
JEPPERSON, KOELBLE, T. A. 1995 ‘The New Institutionalism in Political Science and 
Sociology’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 231. 
 
JOB, JENNY; STOUT, ANDREW and SMITH, RACHEL 2007 ‘Culture Change in Three 
Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to Responsive Regulation’, Law & 
Policy, Vol. 29, No. 1, p: 84-101, January 2007.  
 
JOSEPHSON, MICHAEL 2000, Sportsmanship vs. Gamesmanship, TheNextLevel.org: 
http://www.tothenextlevel.org/docs/program_development/sports_vs_gamemanship.html 
 
KAGAN, ROBERT 1994 ‘Regulatory Enforcement’, in David H. Rosenbloom and Richard D. 
Schwartz, eds.  Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law  (New York:  Marcel Dekker, 
Inc: p. 383-422. 
 
KAGAN, ROBERT and SCHOLZ, JOHN 1984 ‘The “Criminology of the Corporation” and 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategy’, found in Hawkins and Thomas, Enforcing Regulation, 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group. 
 
KAHNEMAN, D., SLOVIC, P. And TVERSKY, A. 1982 Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
KATO, J. 1996, ‘Review Article: Institutions and Rationality in Politics: Three Varieties of Neo-
Institutions’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26: p. 552 – 582. 
 
KATZMAN, R. A. 1980 Regulatory Bureaucracy: The FTC and Antitrust Policy, Cambridge, 
MID Press.  
 
KEISER, K.R. 1980 The News Regulation of Health and Safety, Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 95 (Fall): p. 479-491. 
 
KELMAN, S. 1981 Regulating American, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of 
Occupational Safety and Health Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
 226 
 
KHANNA, MADHU AND WIDYAWATI, DIAH 2011 ‘Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The 
Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies’, Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 7, 
Issue 1, Article 7. 
 
KIERAN, M. 1997 Media Ethics: A Philosophical Approach, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 
 
KIM, H. S. 2002 ‘Gatekeeping international news: An attitudinal profile of U.S. television 
journalists’, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, Vol. 46, Issue 3: p. 431-453. 
 
KING, BARRY et. al. (2003), Television Violence in New Zealand: A study of Programming and 
Policy in International Context, Auckland, New Zealand: Centre for Communication Research, 
Auckland University of Technology. 
 
KINSEY, KARYL 1992, ‘Deterrence and alienation effects of IRS enforcement: An analysis of 
survey data’ in Slemrod, J. (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes, University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor. 
 
KINSEY, K. A. GRAMICK, H. G. and SMITH, K. W. 1991 ‘Framing Justice: Taxpayer 
Evaluation of Personal Tax Burdens’, Law and Society Review, Vol. 25: p. 845-873. 
 
KLOCKARS, CARL, B. 1980: The Dirty Harry Problem, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, No. 452 (November): p. 33-47. 
 
KOHLMEIER, L.M. 1969, The Regulators, New York: Harper and Row. 
 
KOLKO, GABRIEL 1965 Railroads and Regulation, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
KUNTSCHE, EMMANUEL N. 2003 ‘Hostility among adolescents in Switzerland? Multivariate 
relations between excessive media use and forms of violence’, Journal of Adolescent Health, 
Vol. 34, No. 3: p. 230-236. 
 
KUHN, R. 2002 ‘The first Blair government and political journalism’, in R. Kuhn and E. Neveu 
(Eds.), Political Journalism: New challenges, new practices, Routledge, New York: p. 47-68. 
 
LAMB, SHARON 1996 The Trouble with Blame: Victims, Perpetrators and Responsibility, Hard 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
LANGAN, P. A. and FARRINGTON, D. P. 1998 Crime and Justice in the United States and 
England and Wales, 1981-1996, Bureau of Justice Studies, Washington D.C. 
 
LANGER, JOHN (1998), Tabloid Television: Popular Journalism and the ‘Other news’, London: 
Routledge. 
 
LATHER, PATTI 2001 ‘Postbook: Working the Ruins of Feminist Ethnography’, Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 27 Issue 1: p. 199-227. 
 
LEE, SEOW TING 2005 Predicting Tolerance of Journalistic Deception, Journal of Mass Media 
Ethics, Vol. 20 Issue 1 (March): p. 22-42. 
 
 227 
LESSIG, L. 2006, Code: Version 2.0. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
LEVI, MARGARET 1997 Consent, Dissent and Patriotism, Cambridge University Press. 
 
LEVI, MARGARET 1998 ‘A State of Trust’, In V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (Eds), Trust and 
Governance: p. 77-101. 
 
LEVIN, F. J. And TAPP, J. L. 1977 ‘The Dialectic of Legal Socializaton in Community and 
School’ in Tapp, J. L. And Levine, F. J. (Eds), Law, Justice and the Individual in Society, 
Psychological and Legal Issues, Holt Rinehart and Winstone, New York, NY. 
 
LEVIN, MICHAEL and FORRENCE, JENNIFER 1990 ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and 
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 6, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
LEVY, B. And SPILLER, P. T. 1996 Regulations, Institutions and Commitment, Cambridge. 
 
LEWIS, DAVID 1969-70 ‘Programmer’s Choice: Eight Factors in Program Decision-Making’, 
Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. 14: p. 71-82.  
 
LI, HAN; ZHANG, JIE and SARATHY, RATHINDRA 2010 ‘Understanding compliance with 
internet use policy from the perspective of rational choice theory’, Decision Support Systems, 
Vol. 48, Issue 4, March 2010: p. 635-645.  
 
LINCHBACH, M. I. And ZUCKERMAN, A.S.eds 1997 Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture 
and Structure, New York, Cambridge University Press: p. 321. 
 
LIND, E. A. and TYLER, T. R. 1988 The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, New York: 
Plenum. 
 
LINDEN, TOM 2010 ‘Reporting TV Docs in Haiti Raises Ethical Issues’, Electronic News, 
Sage, No. 4, Issue 2: p. 60-64: http://enx.sagepub.com/content/4/2/60.extract 
 
LULJAK, T. 2000 ‘The Routine Nature of Journalistic Deception’, In D. Pritchard (Ed.) Holding 
the Media Accountable: Citizens, Ethics, and the Law, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
LODGE, MARTIN 2002, ‘The Wrong Type of Regulation? Regulatory Failure and the Railways 
in Britain and Germany’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3: p. 271-297. 
 
MACDOUGALL, A. K. 1988 ‘Boring from within the bourgeois press’, Part one, Monthly 
Review, Vol. 40, Issue 7: p. 13-24. 
 
MAKKAI, TONI and BRAITHWAITE, JOHN 1993, ‘Praise, pride and corporate compliance’, 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 21: p. 73–91. 
 
MAKKAI, TONI and BRAITHWAITE, JOHN 1994 ‘Reintegrative shaming and regulatory 
compliance’, Criminology,Vol. 32: p. 361–385. 
 
MARCELLUS, J. 2005 ‘Gender and newsroom cultures: Identities at work’, Feminist media 
studies, Vol. 5, Issue 3: p. 298-400. 
 
 228 
MARCH, JAMES and OLSEN, JOHAN, P. 1989, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational 
Basis of Politics, Free Press, New York. 
 
MARQUETTE, C. 1998 ‘Land Use Pattern Among Small Farmer Settings in the Northeastern 
Edudorian Amazon’, Human Ecology, Vol. 26, No. 4: p. 573-598. 
 
MAXMANIAN, D. A. and SABATIER 1980 ‘A Multivariate Model of Public Policy-Making’. 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24 (August), p: 439-468.   
 
MEDIATIQUE 2005 From the Cottage to the City: The Evolution of the UK Independent 
Production Sector, An independent report commissioned by the BBC, London: 
http://www.mediatique.co.uk/reports/BBC_report.pdf 
 
MACGREGOR, BRENT 1995 ‘Our Wanton Abuse of the Technology: Television News 
Gathering in the Age of the Satellite’, Convergence, Vol. 1, Issue 1: p. 43–65. 
 
MAIMBO, SAMUEL MUNZELE 2002, ‘Explaining Bank Regulatory Failure in Zambia’, Journal 
of International Development, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of 
Manchester, UK, Vol. 14, Issue 2: p. 229-248. 
 
MAKKAI, TONI and BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE 1993 ‘Professionalism, Organizations and 
Compliance’, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter edition: p. 33-59. 
 
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW 1961, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, (originally published in 
1922), US: E P Dutton. 
 
MARCH, J. And OLSEN, J. 1984, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political 
Life’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78: p. 734. 
 
MAY, PETER J. 2004 ‘Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases’, Law and 
Society Review, Vol. 38, No. 1: p. 41-68. 
 
MCGRAW, K. M. and SCHOLZ J. T. 1991 ‘Appeals to civic virtue versus attention to self-
interest: Effects on tax compliance’, Law and Society Review, Vol. 25: p. 471-291. 
 
MCMANUS, J. H. 1994 Market-driven journalism: Let the citizen beware? Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, California. 
 
MEYER, J. and ROWAN, B. 1977 ‘Institutionalised Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth 
and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, No. 340. 
 
MILLMORE, A. and GAGE, L, 2004: Complaining Made Easy, Harbottle and Lewis LLP 
website: http://www.harbottle.com/hnl/pages/article_view_hnl/1787.php 
 
MILLS, C. WRIGHT 1940 ‘Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive’, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 6: p. 904-913. 
 
MILLS, C. WRIGHT 2007 ‘White ignorance’, in S. Sullivan and N. Tuana (Eds), Race and 
epistemologies of ignorance, State University of New York Press, Albany: p. 13-38. 
 
 229 
MILLWOOD HARGRAVE, ANDREA 1993 Violence in Factual Television: Annual Review 1993, 
London: Broadcasting Standards Commission. 
 
MILLWOOD HARGRAVE, ANDREA AND LIVINGSTONE, SONIA 2006 Harm and Offence in 
Media Content: A review of the evidence, Bristol, UK: Intellect Books. 
 
MOHTADI, H and KINSEY, J.D. 2005 ‘Information exchange and strategic behavior in  
supply chains: application to the food sector’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 
87, Issue 3: p: 582-599. 
 
MORAN , ALAN, CHISHOLM, ANDREW and PORTER, MICHAEL 1991 Markets, Resources 
and the Environment, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
 
MORRISON, DAVID 1999 Defining Violence: The Search for Understanding, Bedfordshire, UK: 
University of Luton. 
 
MORRISON, DAVID E. and MICHAEL, SVENNEVIG 2000 The Public Interest, the Media and 
Privacy, A report for the BBC, BSC, ITC, RA, Institute for Public Policy and Independent 
Committee for the Supervision of Standards of Telephone Information Services, London, UK: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/radio/reports/bcr/ 
 
MOSEY, ROGER 2003, Dumbing-Down or Wisening Up, Speech given at the Society of 
Editors Conference, 24 November, 2003, as found in the BBC’s press office website: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/speeches/stories/rogermosey_editors_conference.shtml 
 
MOSS, STUART 2009 The Entertainment Industry: An Introduction, Cabi Tourism Text, 
Oxfordshire, UK. 
 
MURPHY, ELISABETH and DINGWALL, ROBERT 2001 The Ethics of Ethnography, in P. 
Atkinson et al. (eds) Handbook of Ethnography: Sage, p. 339–50. 
 
MURPHY, K. 2002 Procedural Justice and teh Australian Taxation Office: A Study of Scheme 
Investors, Centre for Tax System Integrity Working Paper No. 35, Canberra, The Australian 
National Univerity, National University, The Centre for Tax System Integrity, Research School 
of Social Sciences. 
 
MURPHY, K. 2003 Procedural Justice and Tax Compliance. Australian Journal of Social Issue, 
Vol. 38, Issue 3: p. 379-408. 
 
MURPHY, K 2004 The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax 
Avoiders, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 2, April edition: p. 187-209. 
 
MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMMUNICATIONS: 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/T/htmlT/tabloidtelev/tabloidtelev.htm 
 
NADLER, J. 2002 Flouting the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General 
NonCompliance? Law and Economics Research Paper no. 02-9. Chicago: Northwestern 
University. 
 
NAPOLI, P. M. 2003 Audience economics: Media institutions and the audience marketplace, 
Columbia University Press, new York. 
 230 
 
NELSON, E.D. and ROBINSON, B.W. 1994 ‘‘Reality Talk' or `Telling Tales'? The Social 
Construction of Gender and Sexual Deviance on a Television Talk Show’, Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography, Vol. 23, Issue 1: p. 51-76. 
 
NELSON, SONIA AMBROSIO DE 2011 ‘Press Freedom Under Seige, Effects of Market 
Forces, Government Controls and Journalism Practices’, Brazilian Journalism Research, Vol. 
3, No. 1, Semester 1: p. 173-193. 
 
NEWBURN, TIM and HAGELL, ANN 1994 Young Offenders and the Media: Viewing Habits 
and Preferences, Policy Studies Institute, London, UK.  
 
NGUYEN, MAU DUNG 2011 ‘Compliance of paper-making plants with regulations on 
wastewater management in Bac Ninh Province, Vietnam’, Environment, Development and 
Stability, Vol. 13, No. 1: p. 35-50: DOI: 10.1007/s10668-010-9246-8. 
 
NIE, MARTIN 2008, ‘The underappreciated role of regulatory enforcement in natural resource 
conservation’, Policy Science, Vol. 41: p. 139-164. 
 
OFCOM 2003 Ofcom’s Penalty Guidelines, London: Ofcom: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/pg/penguid.pdf 
 
OFCOM 2004(a) Outline Procedure for Statutory Sanctions, London: Ofcom: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/guidance/sanctions/ 
 
OFCOM 2004(b) Statutory Duties and Regulatory Principles: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/sdrp/ 
 
OFCOM 2004(c) Appendix B: Definitions, public service television broadcasting consultation, 
London: Ofcom: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/psb/psb/volume2/appendixb/ 
 
OFCOM 2004(d) Informed democracy: current affairs, consultation published 21 April 2004: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/psb/psb/volume2/social_values/informed_democracy
/current_affairs 
 
OFCOM 2004(d) European Production Quotas, Proposed Guidance on the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive, London: Ofcom: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/e_p_q/condoc/#content 
 
OFCOM 2005(a) The Communications Market Report, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2005(b) Annual Report 2005-2006, London: Ofcom, 12 April 2005, pp. 5, 67: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/accoun/reports_plans/annrep0506/content/ 
 
OFCOM 2005(c) Language and Sexual Imagery in Broadcasting: A Contextual Investigation, 
London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2005(d) Ofcom Broadcasting Code, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2005(e) A Safe Environment for Children: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 
London: Ofcom. 
 231 
 
OFCOM 2005(f) Ofcom Content Sanctions Committee, London: Ofcom, pp. 4, 164, 166: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/obb/ocsc_adjud/kiss100.pdf 
 
OFCOM 2005(g) Ofcom publishes new Broadcasting Code, News Release 25 July 2005, 
London: Ofcom: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2005/05/nr_20050525 
 
OFCOM 2005(h) ‘Oceanarium Adjudication’ in Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin, 23 May 2005, 
London: Ofcom: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/obb/prog_cb/pcb60/adjudications/oceanarium.pdf 
 
OFCOM 2006(a) The Communications Market Report, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2006(b) Ofcom Q4 2006 Digital TV update, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2006(c) Annual Report 2005/6, London: Ofcom, p. 67, 87. 
 
OFCOM 2006(d) Programme Information Research: An investigation of current attitudes and 
behaviours towards programme information, London: Ofcom: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/medlitpubrss/pirinvestigation/pirrepor
t.pdf 
 
OFCOM 2006(e) The Consumer Experience: Research Report, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2006(f) Ofcom Media Literacy Bulletin, Issue 1, March 2006: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/bulletins/issue1.pdf 
 
OFCOM 2006(g) Media Literary Audit – Report on Adult Media Literacy, London: Ofcom, p. 
136: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/medlitpubrss/medialit_audit/#content 
 
OFCOM 2006(h) Statement on the fairness and privacy complaints handling guidelines 
consultation, London: Ofcom, pp. 164: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/fandp/statement/ 
 
OFCOM 2006(i) Programme Information Research: An Investigation of Current Attitudes and 
Behaviours towards Programme Information, Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2007(a) The Communications Market Report, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2007(b) The International Communications Market Report, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2007(c) Guidance Notes: Section 2: Harm and Offence, Issue Six, 13 February 2007, 
London: OFCOM: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/guidance/bguidance/ 
 
OFCOM 2007(d) The Ofcom Content Board – Functions and Roles, London, Ofcom:  
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ocb/functions_role/ 
 
OFCOM 2007(e) New News, Future News, London: Ofcom. 
 
OFCOM 2007(f) The Future of Children’s Television, London: Ofcom: 
 232 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/psb_review/childprog/ 
 
O’MALLEY, PAT and PALMER, D. 1996 ‘Post-Keynesian Policing’, Economy and Society, Vol. 
25, Issue 2: p. 137-155. 
 
O’MALLY, PAT and HUTCHINSON, STEVEN 2007 ‘Reinventing Prevention: Why did crime 
prevention develop so late?’, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 47: p. 373-389. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 1997 
Small Business, Job Creation and Growth, Facts, Obstacles and Best Practices, OECD, Paris 
p. 24. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1997 ‘OECD 
environmental action programme for Central and Eastern Europe,’ Report of the EAP Task 
Force to the “Environment for Europe” Ministerial Conference, Sofia, Bulgaria, 23-25 October. 
See also OECD (1998), Sustainable Institutions for European Union Membership, Sigma 
Papers No. 26, Paris. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1998 PUMA Multi-
Country Business Survey: Benchmarking the Regulatory and Administrative Business 
Environment: Draft Report on the Results for Sweden, OECD, Paris, p. 3. 
 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 2000 Reducing 
the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance: 
http://cccp.anu.edu.au/Published_OECD_Report2.pdf 
 
OSTROVSKAYA, ELENA and LEENTVAAR, JAN 2011 Enhancing compliance with 
environmental laws in developing countries: Can better enforcement strategies help?, 
Conference paper – INECE 9th International Conference on Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement, 20-24 June 2011: 
http://www.inece.org/conference/9/papers/Ostrovskaya_UNESCO_Final.pdf 
 
OSTROVSKAYA, ELENA; LEENTVAAR, JAN and EIZINGA, F. 2011 ‘Mitigation of illegal 
fishing activities: enhancing compliance with fisheries regulation in Lake Victoria (Kenya)’, 
Regional Environmental Change, Vol. 11, No. 2: p. 323-334: 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/h82175262856w462/ 
 
O’SULLIVAN and HEINONEN 2008 ‘Old Values, New Media: Journalism role perceptions in a 
changing world’, Journalism Practice, Vol 2, No.3: p. 357-371. 
 
PAIK, HAEJUNG and COMSTOCK, GEORGE 1994 The effects of television violence on 
antisocial behavior: A meta-analysis, Communication Research, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 516-546. 
 
PARKER, CHRISTINE 1997, ‘Converting the lawyers: The dynamics of competition and 
accountability reform’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33: p. 39-55. 
   
PARKER, C. 2002, The Open Corporation Effective Self-regulation and Democracy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
PARSONS, TALCOTT and BALES, ROBERT F. 1955 Family: Socialization and Interaction 
Process, Free Press, New York. 
 233 
 
PATERNOSTER, RAYMOND, BRAME, ROBERT, BACHMAN, ROBERT and SHERMAN, 
LAWRENCE 1997, ‘Do fair procedures matter? The effect of procedural justice on spouse 
assault’, Law & Society Review, Vol. 31: p. 163-204. 
 
PATERSON, C. A. 2001 ‘The transfer of frames in global television’, in S. D. Reese, O. H. 
Gandy and A. E. Grant (Eds), Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our 
understanding of the social world, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, New Jersey, p. 
337-353. 
 
PATERSON, STEVEN and AUGUSTINE, CHARES 2003, ‘Regulatory Failure in the California 
Electricity Crisis’, The Electricity Journal, Vol. 16, No. 7: p. 56-64. 
 
PAVLIK, J. 2000 ‘The impact of technology on journalism’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 2: 
p. 229-237. 
 
PEARCE, FRANK and TOMBS, STEVE 1990 Ideology, Hegemony and Empiricism: 
Compliance Theories of Regulation, British Journalism of Criminology, Autumn, Vol. 30, No. 4. 
 
PEARCE, FRANK and TOMBS, STEVE 1991 Policing Corporate ‘Skid Rows’: A Reply to Keith 
Hawkins, British Journal of Criminology, Autumn, Vol. 31, No. 4. 
 
PEKURNY, ROBERT G. and BART, LEONARD, BART D. 1975 ‘Sticks and Bones: A Survey 
of Network Affiliate Decision-Making’, Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. 19: p. 427-437.  
 
PETERSON, M. J. 1993, “International fisheries management” in Institutions for the earth: 
Sources of effective international environmental protection, edited by Peter M, Hass, Robert O 
Keohane and Marc A. Levy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
 
PHILLIPS, ANGELA 2010 ‘Transparency and the New Ethics of Journalism’, Journalism 
Practice, Vol. 4, Issue 3: p. 373-382.  
 
POLLARD, E. et al. 2005 Researching the Independent Production Sector a Focus on Minority 
Ethnic Led Companies, a study commissioned by Pact and the UK Film Council: 
www.ukfilmcouncil.org.uk. 
 
POLSKY, NED 1964 ‘The Hustler’, Social Problems, Vol. 12, No.1: p. 3-15. 
 
POULTER, DAMIAN R.; CHAPMAN, PETER; BIBBY, PETER A.; CLARKE, DAVID D.; 
CRUNDALL, DAVID 2008 ‘An application of the theory of planned behaviour to truck driving 
behaviour and compliance with regulations’, Accident Analysis & Prevention 
Vol. 40, Issue 6, November 2008: p. 2058-2064. 
 
POWELL, W. W. and DIMAGGIO, P. Eds 1991, The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
PRICE, C. J. 2003 ‘Interfering owners or meddling advertisers: How network television news 
correspondents feel about ownership and advertiser influence on news stories’, Journal of 
Media Economics, Vol. 16, Issue 3: p. 175-188. 
 
 234 
PRITCHARD, DAVID 2000 Holding the Media Accountable: Citizens, Ethics, and the Law, 
Indiana University Press. 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
1992 Position Papers from the Third National Injury Control Conference: Setting the National 
Agenda for Injury Control in the 1990s, Rockville, MD: PHS/USDHHS. 
 
PUNCH, MAURICE 1985 Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance 
and Control London and New York: Tavistock Publications. 
 
PUNCH, MAURICE 1989 ‘Researching Police Deviance: A Personal Encounter with the 
Limitations and Liabilities of Field-Work’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 
1989): p. 177-204. 
 
RAO, DR; ZMIKLY, JON; TYREE, SHANE J. 2007 The Gatekeeping Function of Online 
Newspaper Editions: http://www.jonzmikly.com/gatekeeping.pdf 
 
RAUSTIALA, K. 2000 Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 
32 Case Western Reserve JIL: p. 387-440 and 391-392. 
 
REBLING, BLAKE W. 2011 ‘The rise of the pedicab: Municipal regulation of an emerging 
industry’, Arizona Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 255: p. 255-284: 
http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/53-1/53arizlrev255.pdf 
 
REISS, ALBERT 1984 Enforcing Regulation, Hawkins, Keith and Thomas, John eds. Boston, 
MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff: p. 23-36. 
 
REES, JOSEPH 1994, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since 
Three Mile Island, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
 
RENO, R., CIALDANI, R. B. and KALLGREN, C. A. 1993, ‘The Transsituational Influence of 
Social Norms’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vo. 64: p. 104-112. 
 
ROBB, JAMES 1954 Working-class anti-Semite: A psychological study in a London borough, 
Tavistock, London, UK. 
 
ROBENS REPORT 1972 Committee on Safety and Health at Work, London: H. M. S. O. 
(Cmnd. 5034). 
 
ROCK, PAUL 1972 Making People Pay Routledge and K. Paul, London. 
 
ROSENBERG, DUSKA 1999 ‘3 Steps to Ethnography: A discussion of inter-disciplinary 
contributions’, in AI & Society, Special Issue Journal, Pemberton L (Ed.) "Communications in 
Design", Vol.15, No.1. 
 
RUSSELL, A. 1995 ‘MADD rates the states: A media advocacy event to advance the agenda 
against alcohol-impaired driving’, Public Health Reports, Vol. 110: p 240-245. 
 
RUSSIAL, JOHN 2009 ‘Copy Editing Not Great Priority for Online Stories’, Newspaper 
Research Journal, Vol 30, No 29: p. 6-15: 
http://aejmc.org/topics/wpcontent/uploads/2009/06/russial2.pdf>. 
 235 
 
SABATIER, P. 1975 ‘Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 6 
(September): p. 301-342. 
 
SALLOT, L. M. And JOHNSON, E. A. 2006 ‘Investigating relationships between journalists and 
public relations practitioners: Working together to set, frame and build the public agenda, 1991-
2004’, Public Relations Review, Vol. 32, Issue 2: p. 151-159. 
 
SALWEN, M. B. 2005 ‘Online news trends’ in M. B. Salwen, B. Garrison and P. D. Driscoll 
(Eds), Online news and the public, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, New Jersey: p. 47-80. 
 
SARKHEYLI, ELNAZ; SHARIFI, AYYOOB; RAFIEIAN, MOJTABA; REZA BEMANIAN, 
MOHAMMAD; MURAYAMA, AKITO 2011 ‘An investigation of the reasons for non-compliance 
with FAR regulations in Tehran’, currently in press: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275111001211 
 
SAUNDRY, RICHARD 2001 Employee relations in British television – regulation, fragmentation 
and flexibility, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
SAVAGE, JOANNE 2004 ‘Does viewing violent media really cause criminal violence? A 
methodological review’, Aggression and Violent Behavior, Vol. 10: p. 99-128. 
 
SCHOLZ, JOHN 1983 Co-operation, Regulatory Compliance, and the Enforcement Dilemma, 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-4 
September, Chicago, cited in Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Co-operation (New York: 
Basic Book). 
 
SCHUETZE, HERB J. 2002 ‘Profiles of Tax Non-Compliance Among the Self-Employed in 
Canada: 1969 to 1992’, published by University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public 
Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 28, No. 2. 
 
SCHUTZ, ALRED (1967)[1932] The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. G. Walsh/F. 
Lehnert.Evanston: Northerwestern University Press; and Harrington, A. (2000), Alfred Schutz 
and the ‘Objectifying Attitude’, Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 727-740, BSC Publications Limited, 
UK. 
 
SCOTT, W. 1987 ‘The Adolescence of Institutional Theory’, Admin Science Quarterly, No. 493. 
 
SCREEN DIGEST December 2003 UK Television Trade Deficit Soars Above £500m – Modest 
increase in exports offset by huge jump in imports. 
 
SELLTIZ, CLAIRE et al. 1965 Research Methods in Social Relations, London: Methuen. 
 
SIGAL, L. V. 1973 Reporters and officials: The organisation and politics of news-making, 
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath. 
 
SHOEMAKER, PAMELA 1991 Gatekeeping, Sage. 
 
SHOEMAKER, PAMELA and VOS, TIMOTHY 2009, Gatekeeping Theory, Routledge.  
 
 236 
SIEBER, SAM 1981, Fatal Remedies: The Ironies of Social Intervention, Plenum Publishing, 
New York. 
 
SILVERSTONE, ROGER 2002 ‘Regulation, Media Literacy and Media Civics’, in Axel Zerdick, 
Arnold Picot, Roger Silverstone, Jean-Claude Burgelmann (Eds.), E-merging Media: the 
Digitalisation of Media Economics, European Communication Council Report, Berlin: Springer. 
 
SINGER, JANE 2006 ‘Stepping Back From the Gate: Online Newspaper Editors and the Co-
Production of Content in Campaign 2004’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 
Vol. 83, No. 2: p. 265-280. 
 
SIMMEL, GEORG 2002 The Stranger, University College Cork. 
 
SHERMAN, LAWRENCE 1993, ‘Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal 
sanction’, Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 30, No 4: p. 445–473. 
 
SHOVER, N. D. A., CLELLAND and J. LYNXWILER 1986 Enforcement or Negotiation: 
Constructing a Regulatory Bureaucracy, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
SJOBERG, GIDEON and NETT, ROGER 1968 A Methodology for Social Research, New York: 
Harper and Row. 
 
SJOBERG, GIDEON. and NETT, ROGER 1968 A Methodology for Social Research, New 
York: Harper & Row, p. 47. 
 
SKEWERS, E. A. 2007 Message control: How news is made on the presidential campaign trail, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD. 
 
SLAPPER, GARY and TOMBS, STEVE 1999 Corporate Crime, London: Pearson Education 
Limited. 
 
SLAPPER, GARY 2000 Blood in the Bank, Social and Legal Aspects of Death at Work, 
Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
SMITH, RON F. 2011 6th Edition, Ethics in Journalism, Blackwell Publishing.  
 
SOAMES, MARTIN 2004 ‘Could the PCC have sorted out the Naomi saga?’, The Guardian,  
May 10, 2004. 
 
SOLEY, L. C. 2002 Censorship, Inc: the corporate threat to free speech in the United States, 
Monthly Review Press, New York. 
 
SOLOSKI, J. 1989 ‘News Reporting and Professionalism: Some constraints on the reporting of 
the news’, Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 11: p. 207-228. 
 
SOLOSKI, J. 1989 ‘Sources and Channels of Local News’, Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 66: p. 
864-870. 
 
SPARKS, COLIN (eds) 1991 ‘Goodbye Hildy Johnson: the vanishing ‘serious press’’, in 
Communication and Citizenship, Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (eds), New York: Routledge, p. 
58-74. 
 237 
 
SYKES, GRESHAM M. And MATZA, DAVID 1957 ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of 
Delinquency’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, No. 6. (December): p. 664-670. 
 
SUNSTEIN, C. 2006 Infotopia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
SUTINEN, Jon G. and Kuperan, K. 1999 ‘A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance’, 
International Journal of Social Economics, MCB Univ. Press, Vol. 26, No. 1/2/3: p. 174-193. 
 
TABRIZIAN, PARISA; RAJHBEHARRYSINGH, UMA; KHAITOV, SERGEY; DIVINO, CELIA 
2011 ‘Persistent Non-Compliance with the Work Hour Regulation’, Arch Surg, Vol. 146, Issue 
2: p. 175-178: doi:10.1001/archsurg.2010.337.  
 
TALLBERG, JONAS 2002 ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the 
European Union’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer edition: p. 609-643. 
 
THELEN, KATHLEEN 1999, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review 
of Political Science, Vol. 2: p. 369-494. 
 
THUSSU, D. K. 2002 ‘Managing the media in an era of round-the-clock news: Notes from 
India’s first tele-war’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 2: p. 203-212. 
 
TOMBS, STEVE 2002 ‘Review Article: Understanding Regulation’, Social and Legal Studies, 
Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 11, No. 1: p. 113-133. 
 
TOWLER, ROBERT 2001 The Public’s View 2001, Independent Television Commission and 
Broadcasting Standards Commission, p. 6: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/research/tv_publics_view_2002.pdf 
 
TOWLER, ROBERT 2002 The Public’s View 2002, Independent Television Commission and 
Broadcasting Standards Commission 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/research/tv_publics_view_2002.pdf 
 
TRADES UNION CONGRESS 2008 Media Professionals Give Away Nearly £6,000 a Year in 
Unpaid Overtime, London, UK, p. 1: http://www.tuc.org.uk/work_life/tuc-14312-f0.cfm 
 
TRUMAN, D. B. 1951 The Government Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, NY, 
Knopf. 
 
TUCHMAN, G. 1978 Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality, NY, Free Press. 
 
TURNER, G. 2002 British cultural studies: An introduction (3rd ed), Routledge, New York. 
 
TYLER, T. R. 1997 ‘The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary 
Deference to Authorities’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 1, Issue 4, p. 323-
345. 
 
TYLER, T. R. And DEGOEY, P. 1996 ‘Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of 
Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions’ in Kramer, R. M. And Tyler T. R. (Eds), 
Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, London, Sage: p.331-356. 
 
 238 
TYLER, T. R, and SMITH, H. J. 1998 ‘Social Justice and Social Movements’, in D. G. Gillbert, 
S. T. Fiske and G. Lindzey (Eds), The Handbook of Social Psychology (4th edition), Vol II, New 
York, Oxford University Press: p. 595-629. 
 
UNDERWOOD, MICK 2003 Broadcasting Systems in the EU: 
http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/media/eu.html 
 
URSELL, GILLIAN 1997 Employment Practices and Labour Markets in the British Commercial 
Television Industry: A Case Study of the Northern Region since 1988, PhD thesis, University of 
Leeds. 
 
URSELL, GILLIAN 2001 ‘Dumbing down or shaping up? New technologies, New Media, New 
Journalism’, Journalism and New Technologies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, [1464-8849(200108)2:2;175–
196;018441],  London: Sage Publications, p. 175–196. 
 
US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1996 The Apparel 
Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem? 
 
WOLFF, KURT (Trans.) 1950 The Sociology of Georg Simmel, New York: Free Press, p. 402–
408: http://www.ucc.ie/social_policy/the_stranger.htm 
 
VALENTINE, VALERIE MARIE 2009 A Narrative Analysis of Climate Change Coverage in the 
New York Times, 1988-2008: Social Responsibility and Weight-of-Evidence Reporting (2010). 
Master's Theses (2009 -). Paper 33: http://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/33 
 
VAN SNELLENBERG, T. and VAN DE PEPPEL, R. 2002 ‘Perspectives on Compliance, Non-
compliance with Environmental Licenses in the Netherlands’, European Environment, Vol. 12, 
No. 3: p. 131–48. 
 
VARNEY, ELIZA 2006 ‘Winners and Losers in the Communications Sector: An Examination of 
Digital Television Regulation in the United Kingdom’, Minnesota Journal of Science and 
Technology, Vol. 6, No. 2. 
 
VASSILIKI, KREPIA et al 2011 ‘Diabetic patients’ compliance to the recommended treatment: 
A qualitative study in Greece’, International Journal of Caring Sciences, Vol. 4, Issue 3, 
September – December 2011: p. 126 – 132: 
http://www.caringsciences.org/volume004/issue3/Vol4_Issue3_05_Krepia.pdf 
 
VAUGHAN, DIANE 1998 ‘Rational Choice, Situated Action and the Social Control of 
Organizations’, Law and Society Review, 1 June, Vol. 32: p. 23-61. 
 
VELJANOVSKI, C. G. (1983) ‘The Market for Regulatory Enforcement’ in The Economic 
Journal, Supplement: Conference Papers, Vol. 93: p. 123-129. 
 
VETTEHEN, P. H., NUIJTEN, K. And BEENTJES, J. W. J. 2005 ‘News in an age of 
competition: The case of sensationalism in Dutch television news, 1995-2001’, Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol. 49, Issue 3: p. 282-295. 
 
VICTOR, BART and CULLEN, John B. 1988 ‘The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work 
Climates’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1: p. 101-125. 
 
 239 
VIRTS, PAUL H. 1978 Decision-Making Processes in Television Programming, Department of 
Communication and Theater Arts, University of Iowa, May. 
 
VIRTS, PAUL H. 1984 ‘Information Processing in Television Program Decision-Making’, 
Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. 28, No. 1 Winter: p. 65-78. 
 
VOAKES, P.S. 1997 ‘Social Influences on Journalists’ Decision-making in Ethical Situations’, 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 12: p. 18-35. 
 
VOAKES, P.S. 1998 ‘What Were You Thinking? A Survey of Journalists who were Sued for 
Invasion of Privacy’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 13: p. 378-393. 
 
VOGAL, J. 1974, ‘Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent survey 
data’, National Tax Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4: p. 499-513. 
 
WALTON, DOUGLAS 1996 Plausible Deniability and the Invasion of Burden of Proof, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Netherlands, Argumentation, 10: p. 47-58. 
 
WARREN, C. A. And VAVRUS, M. D. 2002 American Cultural Studies, University of Illinois 
Press, Urbana. 
 
WEALE, ALBERT 1992, The New Politics of Pollution, University of Manchester Press, 
Manchester. 
 
WEAVER, D.H. and WILHOIT, C.G. 1986 The American Journalist: A portrait of U.S. news 
people and their work, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
 
WEAVER, D.H. and WILHOIT, C.G. 1996 The American Journalist in the 1990s: U.S. News 
People at the End of an Era, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
WELLBORN, D. M. 1977 Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies, Knoxville, University of 
Tennessee. 
 
WELLS, HELEN 2007 ‘Risk, Respectability and Responsibilisation: Unintended Driver 
Responses to Speed Limit Enforcement’, Internet Journal of Criminology: 
Internetjournalofcriminology.com. 
 
WENZEL, M. 2002 ‘The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax compliance: 
the role of taxpayers identify’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 87, Issue 4: p. 629-645. 
 
WHITE, DAVID 1950 The “Gate Keeper”: A Case Study in the Selection of News, Journalism 
Quarterly, Vol. 27, Issue 4: p. 383-390. 
 
WIKSTOM, PER-OLOF H. 2010 ‘Explaining Crime as Moral Actions’, Handbook of the 
Sociology of Morality, Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, Part 2: p. 211-239: DOI: 
10.1007/978-1-4419-6896-8_12  
 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. 1975 Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press. 
 
 240 
WINGROVE, TWILA; KORPAS, ANGELA L.; WEISZ, VICTORIA 2011 ‘Why were millions of 
people not obeying the law? Motivational influences on non-compliance with the law in the 
case of music piracy’, Psychology, Crime and Law, Vol. 17, Issue 3: p. 261-276. 
 
WITT, A. and WOODBURY, D. 1985 ‘The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax 
compliance: the case of the US individual income tax’, National Tax Journal: Vol. 38, No. 1: p. 
1-13. 
 
 
 241 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees and examples of 
interview questions 
 
 
At the production company I formally interviewed 15 people, including: 
 
1) The founder and president of the company 
2) The production director 
3) Head of development 
4) Human resources manager 
5) Series producer for Agony 
6) Producer/editor for Agony 
7) Assistance producer for Agony 
8) Production coordinator for Agony 
9) Researcher/interviewer/camera operator for Agony (two individuals) 
10) Editor for Agony 
11) Intern for Agony 
12) Series producer for Agro  
13) Producer for Agro 
14) Researcher/interviewer/camera operator for Agro 
15) Series producer for The Top Ten 
 
At the broadcasting company I interviewed three people, including: 
 
1) The commissioning editor for Agony 
2) Manager of the compliance department 
3) Member of the compliance team who worked closely on Agony 
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XXX       OFCOM RELATED TEXT OMITTED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY PURPOSES      XXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
 
The following includes an example of some of the questions that I asked television-
makers: 
 
1. What is your background?  Where have you worked and for how long? 
2. Do you enjoy your career and role as a producer?  What are the positive and 
negative aspects? 
3. What is the aim of the series you’re producing? 
4. What is your role in the making of the series? Can you please explain your step-by-
step procedures? 
5. Why do you feel that people watch the series? What do they get from it? 
6. Would you watch the series if you didn’t work on it? 
7. Do you think that the series extends the boundaries for what we currently 
understand as permissible content?  If so, do you intend to do that?  
8. Specifically, where is the line drawn for what you can and cannot show on 
television? Do you have examples? How have you responded to these limits in the 
making of the series? And why? 
9. How often do you collaborate with the broadcasters?  How much input do they 
have? 
10. What is the process for getting final approval for the series? 
11. Does the commissioner/lawyer make many changes?  What is the rationale behind 
their decisions?   
12. What is your understanding of the regulations? 
13. What elements do you think are deemed unacceptable to show on television? How 
has this played a role in your decision-making? 
14. Do you believe in the current regulations?  If not, why?  If you do, where do you 
think the line should be drawn in relation to depictions of violence, pain and sex? 
15. Has any interviewee ever complained about being treated unfairly? If so, why? And 
what did you do about it?  
16. Have you ever felt badly, or regretful, about anything you’ve done or anything 
you’ve produced? Why? 
17. What are the essential elements of a successful TV show? Of this TV show? 
18. What are your requirements for the characteristics of programme contributors? 
Their age, looks, education, etc. 
19. How do you believe violence is depicted in TV? Is it accurate? Sensationalised? 
Why? 
20. Do you feel TV’s depiction of violence/pain effects viewers’ consciousness (sense 
of fear, motivation to commit violence)? 
21. As competition in the market increases and sensationalism sells, how do you 
believe violence will be depicted in the future? Is this a good or bad thing? 
22. How do you feel about Ofcom and the commissioning broadcasters? How does this 
influence the way you produce programmes? 
23. What would you like to see improved in the industry? 
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Appendix 2: Ofcom’s classification of television 
programme genres 
 
 
 
Ofcom’s definitions of some of the main network genres (Ofcom.org.uk): 
Light Entertainment and Contemporary Music: All Entertainment, including 
situation comedy, other comedy, chat shows, variety, popular contemporary music, 
cartoons and animation (except children's cartoons and animation), quiz shows, 
game shows and family shows. 
Factual: Includes any form of Factual or documentary programming, including 
features and coverage of special events, for example parliamentary proceedings, 
party conferences or coverage of royal events. Hobbies/leisure programmes, 
consumer programmes and reality shows are also included. Drama documentaries 
are included in the Drama genre. Documentaries on the Arts, or covering religious 
topics are included in the Arts or religion genre. Coverage of Sports events are 
included in Sport. 
News: A Newscast or News bulletin providing network News coverage. News 
magazines are also included which may contain a range of items related to News 
stories, with comment and elements of general interest. Separate weather reports 
and forecasts are also included. 
Current affairs: A programme which contains explanation and analysis of current 
events and issues, including material dealing with political or industrial controversy 
or with public policy. Consumer programmes and special events are included under 
'General Factual'. Party Political and Election Broadcasts are excluded completely. 
Drama: Drama productions including Drama series and serials, Soaps, mini-series 
and single plays, Drama documentaries and TV movies. 
Children’s: Programmes designed for a children's audience - Drama, 
Entertainment (including children's animation and cartoons), Factual and pre-
schools. Schools programmes are included within the education genre. 
Film: All feature films that have had a prior theatrical release. TV movies are 
included in 'Drama: Mini-series and single plays'. 
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Appendix 4: The fairness and privacy regulations 
 
 
The ‘fairness’ regulations: 
 
The following was Ofcom’s own summary of its guidelines for the fair treatment of 
programme contributors (as quoted in the Ofcom Broadcasting Code 2005). 
 
Principle: To ensure that broadcasters avoid unjust or unfair treatment of individuals or 
organisations in programmes.  
 
Rule  
7.1 Broadcasters must avoid unjust or unfair treatment of individuals or organisations in 
programmes.  
 
Practices to be followed (7.2 to 7.14 below)  
Dealing fairly with contributors and obtaining informed consent  
 
7.2 Broadcasters and programme makers should normally be fair in their dealings with 
potential contributors to programmes unless, exceptionally, it is justified to do otherwise.  
 
7.3 Where a person is invited to make a contribution to a programme (except when the 
subject matter is trivial or their participation minor) they should normally, at an appropriate 
stage:  
 
 be told the nature and purpose of the programme, what the programme is about 
and be given a clear explanation of why they were asked to contribute and when (if 
known) and where it is likely to be first broadcast;  
 be told what kind of contribution they are expected to make, for example live, pre-
recorded, interview, discussion, edited, unedited, etc;  
 be informed about the areas of questioning and, wherever possible, the nature of 
other likely contributions;  
 be made aware of any significant changes to the programme as it develops which 
might reasonably affect their original consent to participate, and which might cause 
material unfairness;  
 be told the nature of their contractual rights and obligations and those of the 
programme maker and broadcaster in relation to their contribution; and  
 be given clear information, if offered an opportunity to preview the programme, 
about whether they will be able to effect any changes to it.  
 
Taking these measures is likely to result in the consent that is given being ‘informed 
consent’ (referred to in this section and the rest of the Code as “consent”).  
It may be fair to withhold all or some of this information where it is justified in the public 
interest or under other provisions of this section of the Code.  
 
7.4 If a contributor is under sixteen, consent should normally be obtained from a parent or 
guardian, or other person of eighteen or over in loco parentis. In particular, persons under 
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sixteen should not be asked for views on matters likely to be beyond their capacity to 
answer properly without such consent.  
 
7.5 In the case of persons over sixteen who are not in a position to give consent, a person 
of eighteen or over with primary responsibility for their care should normally give it on their 
behalf. In particular, persons not in a position to give consent should not be asked for 
views on matters likely to be beyond their capacity to answer properly without such 
consent.  
 
7.6 When a programme is edited, contributions should be represented fairly.  
 
7.7 Guarantees given to contributors, for example relating to the content of a programme, 
confidentiality or anonymity, should normally be honoured.  
 
7.8 Broadcasters should ensure that the re-use of material, i.e. use of material originally 
filmed or recorded for one purpose and then used in a programme for another purpose or 
used in a later or different programme, does not create unfairness. This applies both to 
material obtained from others and the broadcaster's own material.  
 
Opportunity to contribute and proper consideration of facts  
 
7.9 Before broadcasting a factual programme, including programmes examining past 
events, broadcasters should take reasonable care to satisfy themselves that:  
 material facts have not been presented, disregarded or omitted in a way that is 
unfair to an individual or organisation; and  
 anyone whose omission could be unfair to an individual or organisation has been 
offered an opportunity to contribute.  
 
7.10 Programmes – such as dramas and factually-based dramas – should not portray 
facts, events, individuals or organisations in a way which is unfair to an individual or 
organisation.  
 
7.11 If a programme alleges wrongdoing or incompetence or makes other significant 
allegations, those concerned should normally be given an appropriate and timely 
opportunity to respond.  
 
7.12 Where a person approached to contribute to a programme chooses to make no 
comment or refuses to appear in a broadcast, the broadcast should make clear that the 
individual concerned has chosen not to appear and should give their explanation if it would 
be unfair not to do so.  
 
7.13 Where it is appropriate to represent the views of a person or organisation that is not 
participating in the programme, this must be done in a fair manner.  
 
Deception, set-ups and 'wind-up' calls  
 
7.14 Broadcasters or programme makers should not normally obtain or seek information, 
audio, pictures or an agreement to contribute through misrepresentation or deception. 
(Deception includes surreptitious filming or recording.) However: 
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 it may be warranted to use material obtained through misrepresentation or 
deception without consent if it is in the public interest and cannot reasonably be 
obtained by other means;  
 where there is no adequate public interest justification, for example some 
unsolicited wind-up calls or entertainment set-ups, consent should be obtained 
from the individual and/or organisation concerned before the material is broadcast;  
 if the individual and/or organisation is/are not identifiable in the programme then 
consent for broadcast will not be required;  
 material involving celebrities and those in the public eye can be used without 
consent for broadcast, but it should not be used without a public interest 
justification if it is likely to result in unjustified public ridicule or personal distress. 
(Normally, therefore such contributions should be pre-recorded.)  
 
The ‘privacy’ regulations: 
 
The following was Ofcom’s summary of its guidelines for the assurance of individuals’ 
privacy in the making of programmes. 
 
Principle  
 
To ensure that broadcasters avoid any unwarranted infringement of privacy in 
programmes and in connection with obtaining material included in programmes.  
 
Rule  
 
8.1 Any infringement of privacy in programmes, or in connection with obtaining material 
included in programmes, must be warranted.  
Meaning of "warranted": 
 
In this section “warranted” has a particular meaning. It means that where broadcasters 
wish to justify an infringement of privacy as warranted, they should be able to demonstrate 
why in the particular circumstances of the case, it is warranted. If the reason is that it is in 
the public interest, then the broadcaster should be able to demonstrate that the public 
interest outweighs the right to privacy. Examples of public interest would include revealing 
or detecting crime, protecting public health or safety, exposing misleading claims made by 
individuals or organisations or disclosing incompetence that affects the public.  
 
Practices to be followed (8.2 to 8.22)  
 
Private lives, public places and legitimate expectation of privacy  
 
Meaning of "legitimate expectation of privacy":  
 
Legitimate expectations of privacy will vary according to the place and nature of the 
information, activity or condition in question, the extent to which it is in the public domain (if 
at all) and whether the individual concerned is already in the public eye. There may be 
circumstances where people can reasonably expect privacy even in a public place. Some 
activities and conditions may be of such a private nature that filming or recording, even in 
a public place, could involve an infringement of privacy. People under investigation or in 
the public eye, and their immediate family and friends, retain the right to a private life, 
although private behaviour can raise issues of legitimate public interest.  
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8.2 Information which discloses the location of a person's home or family should not be 
revealed without permission, unless it is warranted.  
 
8.3 When people are caught up in events which are covered by the news they still have a 
right to privacy in both the making and the broadcast of a programme, unless it is 
warranted to infringe it. This applies both to the time when these events are taking place 
and to any later programmes that revisit those events.  
 
8.4 Broadcasters should ensure that words, images or actions filmed or recorded in, or 
broadcast from, a public place, are not so private that prior consent is required before 
broadcast from the individual or organisation concerned, unless broadcasting without their 
consent is warranted.  
 
Consent  
 
8.5 Any infringement of privacy in the making of a programme should be with the person’s 
and/or organisation’s consent or be otherwise warranted.  
 
8.6 If the broadcast of a programme would infringe the privacy of a person or organisation, 
consent should be obtained before the relevant material is broadcast, unless the 
infringement of privacy is warranted. (Callers to phone-in shows are deemed to have given 
consent to the broadcast of their contribution.)  
 
8.7 If an individual or organisation's privacy is being infringed, and they ask that the 
filming, recording or live broadcast be stopped, the broadcaster should do so, unless it is 
warranted to continue.  
 
8.8 When filming or recording in institutions, organisations or other agencies, permission 
should be obtained from the relevant authority or management, unless it is warranted to 
film or record without permission. Individual consent of employees or others whose 
appearance is incidental or where they are essentially anonymous members of the general 
public will not normally be required.  
 
 However, in potentially sensitive places such as ambulances, hospitals, schools, 
prisons or police stations, separate consent should normally be obtained before 
filming or recording and for broadcast from those in sensitive situations (unless not 
obtaining consent is warranted). If the individual will not be identifiable in the 
programme then separate consent for broadcast will not be required.  
 
Gathering information, sound or images and the re-use of material  
 
8.9 The means of obtaining material must be proportionate in all the circumstances and in  
particular to the subject matter of the programme.  
 
8.10 Broadcasters should ensure that the re-use of material, i.e. use of material originally 
filmed or recorded for one purpose and then used in a programme for another purpose or 
used in a later or different programme, does not create an unwarranted infringement of 
privacy. This applies both to material obtained from others and the broadcaster's own 
material.  
 
 249 
8.11 Doorstepping for factual programmes should not take place unless a request for an 
interview has been refused or it has not been possible to request an interview, or there is 
good reason to believe that an investigation will be frustrated if the subject is approached 
openly, and it is warranted to doorstep. However, normally broadcasters may, without prior 
warning interview, film or record people in the news when in public places.  
(See “practice to be followed” 8.15.)  
Meaning of "doorstepping":  
 
Doorstepping is the filming or recording of an interview or attempted interview with 
someone, or announcing that a call is being filmed or recorded for broadcast 
purposes, without any prior warning. It does not, however, include vox-pops 
(sampling the views of random members of the public).  
 
8.12 Broadcasters can record telephone calls between the broadcaster and the other party 
if they have, from the outset of the call, identified themselves, explained the purpose of the 
call and that the call is being recorded for possible broadcast (if that is the case) unless it 
is warranted not to do one or more of these practices. If at a later stage it becomes clear 
that a call that has been recorded will be broadcast (but this was not explained to the other 
party at the time of the call) then the broadcaster must obtain consent before broadcast 
from the other party, unless it is warranted not to do so.  
(See “practices to be followed” 7.14 and 8.13 to 8.15.)  
 
8.13 Surreptitious filming or recording should only be used where it is warranted. Normally, 
it will only be warranted if:  
 
 there is prima facie evidence of a story in the public interest; and  
 there are reasonable grounds to suspect that further material evidence could be 
obtained; and  
 it is necessary to the credibility and authenticity of the programme.  
 
(See “practices to be followed” 7.14, 8.12, 8.14 and 8.15.)  
 
Meaning of "surreptitious filming or recording":  
Surreptitious filming or recording includes the use of long lenses or recording 
devices, as well as leaving an unattended camera or recording device on private 
property without the full and informed consent of the occupiers or their agent. It 
may also include recording telephone conversations without the knowledge of the 
other party, or deliberately continuing a recording when the other party thinks that it 
has come to an end.  
 
8.14 Material gained by surreptitious filming and recording should only be broadcast when 
it is warranted (See also “practices to be followed” 7.14 and 8.12 to 8.13 and 8.15.)  
 
8.15 Surreptitious filming or recording, doorstepping or recorded ‘wind-up’ calls to obtain 
material for entertainment purposes may be warranted if it is intrinsic to the entertainment 
and does not amount to a significant infringement of privacy such as to cause significant 
annoyance, distress or embarrassment. The resulting material should not be broadcast 
without the consent of those involved. However if the individual and/or organisation is not 
identifiable in the programme then consent for broadcast will not be required.  
(See “practices to be followed” 7.14 and 8.11 to 8.14.)  
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Suffering and distress  
 
8.16 Broadcasters should not take or broadcast footage or audio of people caught up in 
emergencies, victims of accidents or those suffering a personal tragedy, even in a public 
place, where that results in an infringement of privacy, unless it is warranted or the people 
concerned have given consent.  
 
8.17 People in a state of distress should not be put under pressure to take part in a 
programme or provide interviews, unless it is warranted.  
 
8.18 Broadcasters should take care not to reveal the identity of a person who has died or 
of victims of accidents or violent crimes, unless and until it is clear that the next of kin have 
been informed of the event or unless it is warranted.  
 
8.19 Broadcasters should try to reduce the potential distress to victims and/or relatives 
when making or broadcasting programmes intended to examine past events that involve 
trauma to individuals (including crime) unless it is warranted to do otherwise. This applies 
to dramatic reconstructions and factual dramas, as well as factual programmes.  
 
 In particular, so far as is reasonably practicable, surviving victims, and/or the 
immediate families of those whose experience is to feature in a programme, should 
be informed of the plans for the programme and its intended broadcast, even if the 
events or material to be broadcast have been in the public domain in the past.  
 
People under sixteen and vulnerable people  
 
8.20 Broadcasters should pay particular attention to the privacy of people under sixteen. 
They do not lose their rights to privacy because, for example, of the fame or notoriety of 
their parents or because of events in their schools.  
 
8.21 Where a programme features an individual under sixteen or a vulnerable person in a 
way that infringes privacy, consent must be obtained from:  
 
 a parent, guardian or other person of eighteen or over in loco parent is; and  
 wherever possible, the individual concerned;  
 unless the subject matter is trivial or uncontroversial and the participation minor, or 
it is warranted to proceed without consent.  
 
8.22 Persons under sixteen and vulnerable people should not be questioned about private 
matters without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person of eighteen or over in 
loco parentis (in the case of persons under sixteen), or a person with primary responsibility 
for their care (in the case of a vulnerable person), unless it is warranted to proceed without 
consent.  
Meaning of "vulnerable people":  
 
This varies, but may include those with learning difficulties, those with mental health 
problems, the bereaved, people with brain damage or forms of dementia, people who have 
been traumatised or who are sick or terminally ill.  
 
